# NEW MANNING SYSTEM FIELD EVALUATION

Technical Report No. 1

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DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY PSYCHIATRY

Walter Reed Army Institute of Research

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At DA DCSPER's request, WRAIR initiated a 3-year evaluation of human dimensions of the New Manning System (NMS) in FY85. This first of 12 projected reports provides conceptual & historical background to recent COHORT & NMS initiatives; report of 2-year interview & survey study of USAREUR COHORT companies; results of first wave of a 5-phase survey of 20% of all Bns included in the refocused NMS evaluation; analysis of key family issues pertaining to rotation of companies overseas; and outcome of reconnaissance of soldier/unit and family/community issues of the light infantry division.

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NEW MANNING SYSTEM FIELD EVALUATION

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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chapters

This is the first of 12 quarterly Army reports due over the next three years. As readers tread among numerous studies in myriad details that follow, they must be ever mindful of this evaluation's intent, the emerging themes from the data already collected, and the weight of the evidence bearing on the themes.

The evaluation of the human dimensions of the New Manning System (NMS) speaks to two broad questions: (a) What are the effects of COHORT on soldiers and their units? and (b) What are the effects of COHORT on soldier families and communities? These are the vital questions the research addresses directly. Other issues are specific applications or variations: the effect of COHORT on battalion rotation; battalion reconstitution; unit climate and spouse adjustment; and the establishment of light infantry divisions.

This report deals almost exclusively with the larger issues. The specific applications are just getting underway, and will provide the interpretive context for the survey and interview data that address the main two questions.

IMPACT OF COHORT ON SOLDIERS AND THEIR UNITS

With respect to soldiers and their units, the NMS seems to achieve greater soldier will and horizontal bonding than conventionally organized units. To say this is a bit like forecasting the outcome of a presidential election on the basis of a few early returns, but the signs all point in this direction. The early interview and survey data from USAREUR companies/batteries, a 20% sample of all battalions included in the refocused NMS, and a reconnaissance in the 7th Infantry Division (Light) all show consistent differences in soldier will and bonding in favor of COHORT.

The survey results are not simple to interpret. The questionnaire includes seven dimensions of soldier will: (a) company combat confidence (b) senior command confidence, (c) small-unit command confidence, (d) concerned leadership, (e) sense of pride, (f) unit social climate, and (g) unit teamwork. Not all COHORT units surpass conventional controls on all dimensions, but the general trend is toward the superiority of COHORT units.

In the past, the possibility of even measuring soldier will was challenged by many. Despite the high correlation of questionnaire measures and combat performance in World War II, as well as subsequent work in both the Israeli Defense Force and the U.S. Army, skepticism was defensible. Proper psychometric studies of reliability and validity had not been done. Skepticism is no longer warranted. The questionnaire instruments

now meet conventional psychometric tests of reliability and validity. The consistent differences between COHORT and nonCOHORT units cannot be ascribed to an uncalibrated measuring stick. Those who wish to further challenge the reliability or validity of questionnaires must now debate philosophy of measurement.

The more important question now is whether the measures developed are useful for anything save differentiating COHORT from nonCOHORT units. The key here will be the Army's ability to develop reliable and valid "hard" measures of unit training performance. Future reports will take up this issue.

IMPACT OF COHORT ON SOLDIER FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES

The effect of COHORT on soldier families is also clear, but less consistent in the data at hand. COHORT provides extraordinary potential to develop strong positive emotional bonds among families and between families and units. This potential is often not realized, primarily because unit leaders view their units in terms of discrete training/inspection events rather than in unit life-cycle terms which enable building ever stronger relationships throughout the life-cycle.

Another limit-to-potential has been the difficulty in providing adequate staff and resources at the installation/ community level to absorb units when they arrive en masse. This has been especially critical in USAREUR. Simply dumping an entire company or battalion on housing and other community support agencies that are resourced to handle only handfuls of daily arrivals leads to frustration and anger, a finding that seems hardly surprising. A closely related limit-to-potential has been some of the early special treatment of COHORT arrivals OCONUS. Issues of perceived fairness and equity on the part of nonCOHORT soldiers and their families always evoke frustration and anger, another finding that is not surprising.

The surprise is the variability among the seven dimensions of soldier will, and the variability among units with respect to families. The data at hand, preliminary as it may be, suggest only one explanation: leadership at the company/battery level.

LEADERSHIP AT THE COMPANY/BATTERY AND BATTALION LEVELS

Interviews and observations summarized in this report repeatedly come back to company/battery policies and practices which either enhance or inhibit the potentials of COHORT. The COHORT process cannot substitute for good leadership but may, to a limited degree, compensate for leadership deficiencies. There is no question that gifted company/battery leadership can achieve higher levels of soldier will and family-unit identification and bonding in a COHORT unit. The question is why all COHORT commanders cannot better capitalize on the considerable assets provided.

2

One possibility is battalion commanders and the leadership climate and context which they set. Cohesion is a battery/ company phenomenon enacted on a stage set by battalion. The respective contributions of battalion and battery/company commanders to soldier will must be a principal focus of future research.

A second possibility is that senior leaders fear COHORT units. The strong horizontal bonding among lower ranking soldiers challenges the established ways of leadership. Divide and conquer techniques will not work because COHORT soldiers respond as one. Leaders, therefore, have to be be consistent, say what they mean, and mean what they say. The accretive training potential of COHORT units places increased demands on leaders used to the old ways of repetitive, low level training, demands that many find threatening to their own sense of competence. Soldiers who know each other well seem to expect their leaders to know them well, too. Leaders who fear knowing and being known find COHORT units an especially difficult challenge.

Still another possibility, especially with respect to families, is that leaders simply do not have the skills required. They have been trained to plan and issue directives, and are at a loss when the organizational context requires different responses. The best example is superb logistical planning in rotating units to Europe, but the notable absence of involvement of key family members in the planning and movement process. Family members are not members of the unit staff. They have to be organized and led as a voluntary association of equals rather than a work hierarchy. Leaders may never have thought of the differences in leadership required. Since they have no military training in leading associations, they ignore this dimension of COHORT potential and confine themselves to doing the things for which they have been trained and with which they feel comfortable.

With respect to the family issues, the 7th Infantry Division (Light) seems to experience all of the problems noted in other units. With respect to soldiers, COHORT in the 7th ID(L) seems to realize all that war promised and more. The data are preliminary and impressionistic, but the leadership climate in the division seems remarkably different from other locations. This may be the result of sampling error (commanders and senior NCOs in the combat arms are over-represented), leader selection (handpicked for battalion commands), a halo effect, or the result of conscious leadership decisions throughout the organization. The 7th ID(L) merits careful attention in future evaluation research.

In any case, the data at hand point to leadership as the principal moderator of COHORT potential. Why and how are questions subsequent work will explore.

3

Chapter I

OVERVIEW

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Chapter I

OVERVIEW

1. Background

a. In 1981 the U.S. Army instituted the New Manning System (NMS). The primary objective of this program is to increase combat effectiveness through the reduction of personnel turbulence. By creating more stable units, the Army hopes to: (1) enhance unit training, (2) promote interpersonal bonding among soldiers as well as between soldiers and their leaders, (3) increase the soldier's commitment to the unit's mission, and (4) develop a greater sense of esprit de corps among unit members.

b. The NMS program is composed of two independent subsystems: the U.S. Army Regimental System and the COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training) Unit Movement System. WRAIR's NMS research activities target on the COHORT Unit Movement System. The human dimensions involved in the implementation of this system are the focus of this report.

2. The COHORT Unit Movement System

a. This system is designed to keep soldiers and their leaders together in the same units for longer periods of time. At first, the focus was exclusively on company-sized units. First term soldiers who had their initial Army training experience as a group, called One Station Unit Training (or OSUT), were matched with a cadre of officers and NCOs to form a new unit at a FORSCOM installation. These COHORT units had a three-year life cycle geared to the first-term soldier's enlistment. In the majority of cases, the unit was deployed OCONUS for a part of the unit's life cycle (18 months USAREUR or 12 months Korea).

b. In FY85 HQDA decided to reorganize a number of combat battalions under the COHORT Unit Movement System. Eight battalions were formed under a modified COHORT model. These units are scheduled to rotate to and from USAREUR during the summer of FY86 (four units in CONUS will switch with four units in USAREUR of the same type combat arms). There are also four COHORT battalions which were formed (with traditional COHORT companies/batteries) as part of the 7th Infantry Division (Light). These battalions are not currently scheduled to rotate OCONUS.

c. WRAIR was involved in the HQDA NMS Field Evaluation from the beginning. During FY84 and FY85 WRAIR studied a set of USAREUR based units (COHORT and matched nonCOHORT companies/batteries). This research involved interview and survey data collection in the same units across multiple points in time. A summary of this research is included in this report (Chapter III).

d. Also during FY84 and FY85, WRAIR conducted an in-depth field study of family and community issues related to the formation and rotation to USAREUR of a single COHORT company. Information from this study is included in Chapter VI.

e. In FY84, under the sponsorship of Army Community Service (TAGO), WRAIR began a three-year panel study using surveys and interviews of the wives of soldiers assigned to 14 selected COHORT companies/batteries. The first report on this study was provided to HQDA-ODCSPER in August 1985. Information from this study has also been integrated into this report. The second report will be completed during the second quarter of FY86.

3. The HQDA NMS Refocused Field Evaluation

a. WRAIR's participation in the refocused evaluation involves several distinct research activities:

(1) Soldier survey. WRAIR, through TCATA and their BDM on-station data collection agents, is conducting self-administered attitudinal surveys among members (80% or more) of selected COHORT and nonCOHORT battalions and companies/batteries both in CONUS and USAREUR. This survey involves five iterations over three years. The primary objectives of this effort are: (a) to develop reliable and valid survey measures of "soldier will" (the various human dimensions thought to be associated with individual combat readiness and psychological sustainability in combat); and (b) to compare COHORT and nonCOHORT units on these dimensions of soldier will. Results from the initial efforts to develop the soldier-will measures, as well as some initial COHORT-nonCOHORT comparisons, are included in this report (Chapter V).

(2) Spouse survey. In October 1985, WRAIR will begin a panel study of a sample of wives of COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers. This study will build on previous WRAIR Family Unit research and will investigate the relationship between family life issues and soldier-unit performance. Data collection will involve three iterations of a self-administered mailed survey over an 18-month period.

(3) Battalion rotation, family-unit-community study. This descriptive study, which began in October 1985, involves an indepth look at battalion rotation planning and implementation. The study's purpose is to describe the impact of the rotation process on the rotating families, other community residents, and the community.

(4) Unit interviews. In October 1985, WRAIR scientists began a series of unit visits designed to provide additional qualititative information in support of the COHORT-nonCOHORT comparisons. Three times over an 18-month period, extensive individual and group interviews will be conducted with selected battalion commanders and their staffs, company/battery

commanders and their cadre, and selected groups of 'rst-term soldiers. These in depth interviews are designed enhance the interpretation of the survey data, and to allow WRAIR scientists the opportunity to explore emerging issues in ways not possible with sole reliance on a structured survey instrument.

(5) Battalion reconstitution, morale and cohesion. Under the NMS, rotating battalions have stabilized personnel assignments with augmentations made only at 18-month intervals. "Packages" of mostly first-term soldiers will be added to the battalion at these points; these packages will be squads, platoons, and even companies. Many of these soldiers will have trained together and will arrive at the unit in cohesive groups with the expectation of remaining together. Most of these groups will be split up to meet the replacement needs of the battalion. At the same time, the battalion will have trained as a group, will have been together for at least 18 months, and will be fairly cohesive. The implications for morale and cohesion of integrating a new soldier package into an already existing and cohesive group are not known. The purpose of this project is to describe the reconstitution and socialization process, and to learn how they affect morale and cohesion.

(6) Unit climate and spouse adjustment. The relationship between soldier adjustment and family or spouse adjustment has been demonstrated in several studies. As intuition would suggest, soldiers who are experiencing family difficulty or turmoil are more likely to have job-related problems as well. On the other hand, spouse adjustment problems seem also in part to depend upon attributes of the soldier's unit. Such attributes include unit cohesion and command climate.

(a) There are several studies which suggest a relationship between unit climate and spouse adjustment. The purpose of this research is to examine the nature and strength of this relationship. Such a relationship would demonstrate how effective small unit leadership might ensure family commitment to the mission.

(b) Leaders must not only attend to building cohesion among their soldiers, but must attend as well to the impact of unit policies and practices on families. Thus, if poor command climate leading to family problems is in turn reflected in lost training time due to family problems, lower reenlistments and extensions, and increased health visits by family members, then the Army has a vested readiness interest in the impact of unit leadership on the well-being of families.

(c) In addition, results of this study will provide unique data concerning the mechanisms through which workplace attributes such as unit climate affect family coping and adjustment. The kinds of information that are shared between soldier and spouse, how they are communicated, and attitudes the soldier conveys to the spouse surely play a key role. However,

what these communications are, and how they are filtered and altered, are worth special study.

(7) A study of the 7th Infantry Division (Light). An associated NMS research effort is an extensive investigation of the establishment of the Army's first light infantry division. The research activities at Fort Ord involve: (a) interview-observational study over time of one COHORT battalion, (b) a study of leadership issues across a number of COHORT units, and (c) a study of family-unit-community issues related to the establishment and operation of a light infantry division. The reconnaissance phase of the study is completed, and initial impressions are included in this report (Chapter VII).

(8) The establishment of a human dimensions study advisory group (SAG). In the second quarter of FY86, WRAIR will establish a SAG composed of distinguished retired military leaders and eminent civilian scholars. These individuals, along with key representatives of HQDA (DAPE-PSB), Training and Doctrine Command, Soldier Support Center, and WRAIR will evaluate the results of WRAIR's Human Dimensions analyses and develop further research issues as well as policy and program recommendations. WRAIR recommends that the study advisory group process be carefully monitored and, if effective, that is becomes a model for a similar study group at HQDA. The HQDA SAG then could review and analyze the entire spectrum of NMS evaluation activities and the development of policy recommendations for the DCSPER, VCSA and CSA.

Chapter II

SUMMARY THEMES AND FORECASTS

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Chapter II

SUMMARY THEMES AND FORECASTS

1. In 1979, when the idea of deliberately creating cohesive units was first proposed, Morris Janowitz, the dean of American military sociology, said: "The question is not how to create cohesion. Armies have known how for centuries. The question is why the American Army doesn't want cohesive units." The truth of this penetrating observation is the primary theme of this report.

2. From the beginning the American people have been suspicious of armies; the more spirited the army the greater the reason to fear it. President Thomas Jefferson epitomized American ambivalence. He recognized the need for trained army officers, but he signed the legislation establishing the United States Military Academy with grave misgivings that in time the soldiers would become more loyal to their regiments than to the Republic.

3. Dr. Marlowe takes up this theme in the next chapter (Chapter III). He reviews the importance of small-unit cohesion (recognized since ancient times), and details how the American Army has come to accept it as a desirable by-product, rather than a central axiom in military organizational design and practice. He also discusses how modern tactics, technology, doctrine, and weaponry make small group bonding especially critical for survival on the modern battlefield.

4. Marlowe notes that the COHORT experiment with companies and the subsequent move to COHORT battalions as part of the New Manning System (NMS) had two--and only two--purposes. The first was to create military units characterized by high levels of trust, self-confidence, competence, and cohesion that would enable them to survive the first battle. The second purpose was to increase training proficiency by reducing personnel turbulence and, thereby, facilitate cumulative rather than repetitive training cycles.

5. The two expectations for the NMS merit continuous emphasis because they are often confused in the American wish for a magic bullet that will lay to rest vexing problems like reenlistment rates, SQT scores, PT scores, and soldier bitching about the Army. The NMS never promised anything more than better trained soldiers who were more confident in each other and more likely to stand and fight in the first battle.

6. Another source of confusion about the NMS has been unwarranted expectations concerning the quality of interpersonal bonding. Marlowe is careful to note that military unit cohesion is not a fuzzy, warm feeling among the privates that sends them marching off to war humming regimental ditties. Military unit cohesion represents bondings of soldiers of equal rank as well as

between ranks, commitment of all ranks to the military mission
and the affirmation of special properties of their group, team,
crew, company, or battery that will keep them alive in combat.
The bonding often gets expressed in fuzzy terms like love,
family, and brotherhood, but these sentiments are rooted in
confidence of other unit members' competence to insure
survival. All the good feelings in the world will not turn an
enemy assault, but sharply honed military skills in the hands of
soldiers who believe in their leaders and who trust each other as
brothers will.

7. In the another chapter Marlowe summarizes his observations of
initial COHORT companies in Europe (Chapter IV). Quantitative
questionnaire data, interviews, and observations in the field
lead him to conclude that keeping first term soldiers together
after one-station-unit-training (OSUT) procedures had achieved
greater horizontal cohesion than that achieved in conventionally
organized units. Despite charges of elitism and favoritism,
despite repeatedly showing off to visitors, despite hostility
from some senior leaders and sister units, even the most
skeptical commanders confided to Marlowe, "They aren't perfect,
but they look damned good in the field, better than most of my
conventionally organized companies."

8. Marlowe identified two problems, however, in realizing the
dual objectives toward which COHORT was directed. The first was
extreme variability in the degree to which COHORT units were
vertically bonded. The OSUT experience seemed to weld the lower
ranking enlisted into a cohesive whole, but many NCOs and
officers seemed to have difficulty adapting to the new units.
Indeed, many seemed to have difficulty talking informally with
their soldiers at all! Instead of joining the unit and earning
respect--as they will have to do in combat--leaders seemed to
react with social distance and an authoritarian leadership style
better suited to leading trainees or green troops without an
established social history.

9. Another reason for social distance involved training.
Marlowe observed leaders who experienced the change to cumulative
training threatening and embarrassing. They were threatened when
the troops balked at repetitive training on skills they had
mastered, and embarrassed that they had little else to teach
them. Again, many leaders met this challenge with increased
social distance and recourse to an authoritarian leadership
style. It is not surprising that the early COHORT companies
showed satisfactory horizontal bonding, but disappointing that
they showed little change in vertical bonding or in cumulative
training over conventionally organized companies.

10. Major Martin's study of the impact of COHORT on families and
communities (Chapter VI) sheds further light on why COHORT units
achieve only a small fraction of their potential. Martin noted
the same extreme variability among COHORT commanders with respect
to family bonding and identification with sponsor units that

Marlowe had noted with respect to soldier-leader interactions. In Martin's view, few leaders seemed capable of conceptualizing their role and the unit in life-cycle terms.

11. Instead, leaders continued to view unit life as a series of discrete events (ARTEP, AGI, OCONUS rotation) essentially unrelated to each other. While this may be a valid assumption in conventional units, it fails in COHORT units because the personnel are stabilized. In COHORT units it is possible to build on the experiences of the last event to better prepare for the next. But leaders ignore such possibilities, possibly because they have never been trained or required to think beyond three-month time spans.

12. If Martin is correct that company/battery leaders fail to see the world beyond the next unit "event," then both the failure to capitalize on potential family involvement and the failure to plan and execute cumulative training become understandable. The difference in thinking is between, on the one hand, where the leader wants the unit in six months, one year, and two years (which includes ARTEPs, AGIs, rotations as a means), and, on the other hand, merely wanting to pass the AGI (as an end) before beginning to think about the next event in unit life. This insight suggests the possibility of greater realization of COHORT potential by teaching commanders to think of themselves and their units in terms of life-cycles rather than discrete events. However, even this possibility presumes a battalion command climate supportive of longer range planning, a point that Marlowe repeatedly underscores.

13. Martin reports that the consequences of taking a life-cycle view are dramatic. Units taking such an approach have encouraged considerable family involvement in the rotation planning and preparation process, and these units have had very positive rotations. He also notes that units which began their rotation preparations early (language training opportunities for families, for example) have engendered a positive mindset among family members that continued following rotation. Units that took adequate time to settle their families on arrival had better adjustments than units that immediately deployed to the field. He further notes that family members will tolerate considerable uncertainty if they know the unit leadership is keeping them informed to the best of its ability.

14. Martin also describes some of the negative impacts of early rotations on the installations and communities in Europe. He ascribes this to the failure to provide knowledgeable family support officers, increased personnel for impacted communities, and a mechanism for sharing lessons learned among rotating units. He is right on all counts, but ultimately agrees with Marlowe that company/battery commander initiatives play the most critical role. Why are commanders so seemingly inept at involving families in unit life?

II-4

15. One reason is that they have never been trained to involve families. It is all well and good to exhort them toward greater diligence, but what might they do--concretely, for instance, right now--to improve the situation? Traditional Army leadership training offers them few clues. Lieutenant Colonel Furukawa and his associates, Drs. Kirkland and Teitelbaum, suggest another difficulty based on their experience with the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Ft. Ord (Chapter VII). Involving family seems to require different leadership skills than leading work groups.

16. The Ft. Ord experience suggests that family support groups exist in structural opposition to military work groups. Support groups work best when military rank is minimized, when they receive maximum support but minimal direction from commanders, and when they include single soldiers in barracks as well as family members. The more initiative they show and the more demands they make, the more they threaten the commander's needs to know and to control. Leadership of such voluntary associations requires extreme patience, tact, and willingness to compromise in the interests of consensus--skills antithetical to the military ideal of quick, decisive, unyielding logic.

17. Leading a family support group is not unlike leadership in a church where both the pastor and prominent parishioners receive deference, so long as they remember they are not bosses, but firsts among equals. The seemingly conflicting leadership demands between work groups and voluntary associations may account for the vigorous and effective leadership roles Army chaplains tend to play in promoting and maintaining effective family-unit relationships. Chaplains, by training and temperament, come equipped with the necessary leading-from-behind skills commanders apparently ignore when trained in the follow-me tradition. At a minimum, teaching there is a distinction between leadership in voluntary associations and in work hierarchies would be a useful addition to Army leadership training.

18. Research reconnaissance in the 7th Infantry Division (Light) stands in remarkable contrast to the initial reports from USAREUR. Furukawa, Kirkland, and Teitelbaum report many of the same problems noted earlier by Marlowe and Martin: concerns about the effects of COHORT on career goals; being in the limelight; the importance of good communications and relations with families; the importance of predictable work schedules in garrison which make provision for quality family time; and disconnects between unit and installation efforts to meet family needs.

19. The remarkable difference in the 7th IDL is the absense of rancor and bitter disappointment reported so eloquently by Marlowe. On the contrary, commanders at Ft. Ord presented themselves as positively ebullient about their COHORT units and the possibilities for accretive training. At all command levels, the command climate was described as 'a dream come true," where

initiative was encouraged and rewarded and mistakes critiqued and forgotten. Note must be taken, however, that these represent officer opinions. The very sketchy work thus far conducted with NCO's and first term soldiers suggests the same disparity of perceptions across ranks that Marlowe reported, but their tone seems more muted.

20. There are no doubt many reasons for the positive responses in the 7th ID(L), despite problems experienced at other locations, which will surface in future research. The leading hypothesis, however, consistent with all previous research, is significantly better leadership. Battalion commanders were double selected, first for command and then for the new light division; therefore it should not be surprising that the best of the best are better able to capitalize on the assets provided them. It remains to be seen whether the 7th ID(L) can sustain its current high level of cohesion, morale, and training as a more representative sample of qualified commanders takes its place in the new light division. Certainly with respect to training lieutenants, the 7th ID(L) seems no different than other Army divisions.

21. If they succeed, it seems safe to predict that the 7th ID(L) will present the Army with the same dilemma COHORT companies have presented their leaders: demands for new and challenging training opportunities, which will cost more money, which will fuel jealousy among sister divisions, and which will require changes in the way the whole Army conceives of training. Like company/battery leaders, senior Army leaders may find the New Manning System threatening, once its implications are known.

22. Many of the observations on which this analysis rests have been previously reported in bits and pieces to various forums throughout the Army. While conceding the observations are thoughtful and provocative, they are invariably challenged on the grounds they are subjective, impressionistic and, therefore, inherently unreliable. Captain Griffith's chapter on developing measures of soldier will ought to eliminate these objections in all future discussions (Chapter V).

23. Griffith used a collection of measures ranging from adaptations of World War II questionnaires to instruments developed quite recently at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. Marlowe used early versions of some of the measures in USAREUR, while others had been used in studies of both Israeli Defense Force and American Army units. Griffith's was the first attempt to combine them all, and to subject them to rigorous psychometric analysis for reliability and validity.

24. Griffith reports in elaborate detail and with elegant logic that the "dipstick" has been calibrated. Reliable and psychometrically valid measures of soldier will now exist. Confirming Marlowe's earlier reports, the measures indicate small, but consistent differences among the components of soldier

will in favor of COHORT units over conventionally organized units. The final results will demand sophisticated interpretation. Griffith identifies seven dimensions of soldier will: (a) company combat confidence (b) senior command confidence, (c) small-unit command confidence, (d) concerned leadership, (e) sense of pride, (f) unit social climate, and (g) unit teamwork. In general, COHORT units were superior to conventional units, but not on all dimensions. The last word on the complex interrelations among dimensions of soldier will lies far in the future.

25. At this early stage, it is sufficent to note that the measures reliably discriminate conventional, COHORT, and COHORT-airborne units, as they ought to if they were valid. In addition, they are inversely correlated with measures of personal distress, medical problems, and wanting to get out of the Army. The higher the score on soldier will, the lower the scores on measures of individual distress. Soldier will measures were also positively related to positive life adjustment and satisfaction with the Army.

26. In World War II measures like these correlated positively with combat performance, but little attention has been given to them in the American Army since that time. Future work will attempt to correlate measures of soldier will with measures of training performance. The problem, however, is finding reliable, valid, "hard" measures of training performance or readiness.

27. Another problem will be finding reliable and valid measures of leadership, the single greatest moderator of soldier will and COHORT training potential.

28. It is far too early in the evaluation to hazard formal recommendations for sweeping changes. A change as major as the New Manning System may require up to 10 years before all the second- and third-order effects are known. Instead of sweeping changes, it seems prudent to follow the Chief of Staff's directive to "fix-as-we-go." Even at this early stage in the evaluation, however, it seems clear that company/battery leadership practices need fixing. Two dimensions clearly need attention: teaching commanders to think in terms of COHORT unit life-cycles, and teaching them the difference between leadership of work hierarchies and voluntary associations. It is yet unclear how to do this. It is also clear the United States Army knows how to create cohesive, competent, committed units, but not yet clear whether it really wants to let them be all they can be.

Chapter III

THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM: THE HUMAN ASPECTS AND THE EVALUATION

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Chapter III.

THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM: THE HUMAN ASPECTS AND THE EVALUATION

1. The New Manning System was developed in response to initiatives undertaken by GEN Edward Meyer, former CSA, and was initially developed along lines suggested by the Army Cohesion and Stability Task Force (ARCOST) in 1979. The human ends envisioned in the creation of the NMS and its COHORT units were the creation of military units possessing the kinds of unit bonding, cohesion, competence, self confidence and trust that would ensure effective combat performance and organizational coherence and avoid high levels of psychological breakdown in battle. The concept was fundamentally aimed at providing the typical combat arms unit with bonding, cohesiveness and mutual trust prior to commitment to battle that, historically, most military units have acquired only after some days or weeks of combat exposure. In addition to the enhanced bonding envisioned, it was also felt that the reduction of personnel turbulence and the stability of COHORT units would lead to a significant increase in the level and status of training in such units. By virtue of personnel stability, COHORT units would be able to follow patterns of accretive and cumulative training in which individual and unit tactical skills would increase markedly above the levels of conventional units committed by their turbulence to a pattern of cyclical repetitive training.

2. The effect of unit cohesion in preventing psychological and performance disintegration in battle has been amply demonstrated in past research carried out in the U.S. Army in W.W. II and Korea, the German Army in W.W.II and the Israeli Army in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Cohesion building has not, except for special and elite combat units, been a major preoccupation of the U. S. Army. Prior to the development of the New Manning System, the creation of cohesive units was a function of the special gifts of commanders, accident, or the by-product of the way in which units contended with external circumstances.

3. The relationships between members of the military group subserve a number of psychological and psycho-social purposes. These have made the group of critical importance to military psychiatry. The group provides the service member with critical social supports that mediate the effects of stress, provide a psychological "armor" of strength and competence through incorporation of the individual into the "power" of the group, legitimates and justifies the activities of combat, e.g., destroying the enemy and killing other human beings. It also provides the instrumental and affective bonds that offer some assurance of safety and survivability to the individual in an overwhelmingly hostile environment. Above all, the cohesion of the military group holds at bay what many, particularly BG S.L.A. Marshall, have described as the overwhelming and terrifying

loneliness of the battlefield. In combat when the connectedness with one's fellow soldiers as both individuals and the embodiment of the group as real or powerful symbolic others ceases, behavior also tends to cease.

4. In a very significant sense, except for so called elite and special units, the U.S. Army has ignored or neglected structuring and training its units in ways designed to maximize and encourage military unit cohesion prior to commitment to battle. This neglect was encouraged by a number of interrelated factors.

5. The first was the fact that the Army was built on a drafted base for the most significant part of this century. A base that, except for W.W. II, mandated a two-year obligation of military service for first term soldiers. This obligation defined a maximum unit tenure of no more than 18-20 months in the unit of assignment following the first PCS from basic training.

6. A second factor of profound importance was the Army's individual replacement system, a system based upon a conception as fundamental to the raising of mass armies as it has been to mass production in industry. Soldiers were defined as interchangeable parts in systems that primarily required the training of individuals in sterotyped sequences of individual behavior ("by the numbers"). In many ways the performance of the unit was assumed, despite much evidence to the contrary and the belief of many line commanders, to be a simple summation of the individual soldiers' skills and stereotypical behaviors. These concepts were further supported by the economies of scale attendant upon mass training and the economies and responsive flexability, particularly in combat, of an individual replacement and training system. They have been further reinforced by the vision of military operations as essentially driven and shaped by technology and not by the structure and nature of the human groups that carry them out.

7. Another reason for the inattention to issues of military unit cohesion in the peacetime or pre-combat situation was the very success of policies designed to minimize psychological breakdown in battle.

8. Army policies developed after the initial disasters in Korea were based upon W.W. II findings that the length of combat exposure in relationship to combat intensity was the most significant risk factor conducing towards breakdown. During World War II it was found that significant numbers of psychological casualties would be generated in 150 or more days of combat exposure, i.e., days in which actual engagement with the enemy took place, at the typical levels of combat sustained in Italy and the Mediterannean Theater of Operations. Equivalent casualty levels were obtained in 20-30 days in higher intensity fighting such as the Normandy Invasion.

9. In the limited wars of Korea and Viet Nam, the comparatively massive resource base of the U.S. and the nature of the conflicts led to the decision to minimize the levels of potential psychiatric casualties by minimizing combat exposure for the soldiers engaged. Whereas in World War II the conscripts term of duty was "the duration and six months," Korea and Viet Nam saw the imposition of one year tours of duty in the combat zone followed by the return of each eligible service member home at his rotation date. The open ended commitment of the previous war, alterable only by death, wounding, disease, breakdown, or the need to refit and retrain a unit was now changed to one in which a fixed term of exposure to combat defined the soldier's commitment, no matter what the proximate situation on the battlefield. While there may well have been a number of confounding variables, this rotational policy was deemed to have significantly lowered classic combat psychiatric casualties during the latter part of the Korean War and throughout the Viet Nam conflict.

10. It is important to point out that such success was integrally related to the nature and structure of those conflicts. Korea and Viet Nam would be classified as primarily low- to mid-intensity wars on the continuum of modern warfare. Commitment of forces in Korea and Viet Nam also involved a pace of warfare that was comparatively slow enough in tempo for the classically defined combat bonding and integration of units to take place under fire during the initial period of unit "blooding." With the exception of the first disasterous months of the Korean conflict, most units were introduced to combat at levels of intensity just high enough to enable the rapid testing and development of knowledge, trust and intimacy that exemplify the horizontal and verical bonding of the combat group. Concommittently, the levels of initial commitment to combat most often were also low enough to pose no ultimate threat to the existence of the not-yet-fully bonded and integrated group.

11. A second set of fundamental factors for the lack of active concern with the psycho-social processes involved in creating effective group cohesion lies in the structure of warfare as it has evolved over the centuries.

12. In human and social terms, both pre-modern and modern warfare have provided, within their tactical doctrine and the social organizations created in combat forces, systems designed to provide high levels of support to the soldier committed to battle. In the simplest terms effective pre-modern military units relied upon the support and coherence provided for their members by being a part of a disciplined mass. Soldiers drew support, strength, security and a sense of invulnerability and the capacity to perform their mission from the physical presence of the "line," from the shoulder to shoulder contact with their fellows, a confidence and a sense of competence enhanced and extended by the drills and convolutions of the parade ground which made each a part of a whole with great charismatic power.

The well trained, well disciplined soldier could submerge himself in the organismicity of his company or the line of battle, marching, turning, moving thrusting, parrying, discharging musketry as one mighty whole, each literally flowing into and becoming a part of the other.

13.   The psychological and, if you will, moral integrity of the soldier was in its greatest measure dependent upon the maintenance of the physical integrity of the line of battle.   If the line broke, the soldier was prone to break and to cease to be capable of effective performance.   The Roman Legion, as described by Vegetius (390 AD), devoted its core training and built its organizational structure to ensure the functional integrity and indissolubility of the line of battle and its constituent groups.   Vegetius says the most essential reason for drills is to "teach soldiers to keep their ranks and never abandon their colors in the most difficult evolutions.   Men thus trained are never at a loss amidst the greatest confusion of numbers."   Indeed the maintenance of the line and of order was the primary concern of legionary infantry.   As Vegetius described it, " The light armed troops...advanced in the front of the line and attacked the enemy.   If they could make them give way, they pursued them; but if they were repulsed by superior bravery or numbers, they retired behind their own heavy armed infantry, which appeared like a wall of iron and renewed the action, at first with their missile weapons then sword in hand.   If they broke the enemy they never pursued them lest they should break their ranks or throw the line into confusion, and lest the enemy taking advantage of their disorder, should return to the attack and destroy them without difficulty."

14.   The physical bonding and ordering of drill was profoundly reinforced by the social ordering, group identification and bonding of the legionnaires.   Each legion was divided into 10 cohorts, each with its unique ensign or "dragon" and each cohort divided into 10 centuries of a hundred men.   Each century "had an ensign inscribed with the number of both the cohort and century so that the men keeping it in sight might be prevented from separating from their comrades in the greatest tumults."   Each century was further divided into squads or messes of ten men under the command of a <u>decanus</u> (a commander of ten) who ate, lived and fought together.   These <u>conturbinia</u> or <u>maniples</u> always fought together.   In the Roman legion, then, the social, training and the tactical merged to reinforce each other to optimize the combat performance of the line of battle.

15.   As far as infantry tactics were concerned, this general model has governed formally constituted armies since classical times (in the American Civil War, the squad was the group of mess and tent mates) through to W.W. I.   Each small group was supposed to be highly bonded and submerged in the longer assault or defensive line of the company, battalion or regimental front. This submergence was, as indicated, an institution that underpinned the psychological integrity of the soldier and the

line. It was in support of this kind of physical and psychological cohesion that the emphases upon the corporate behaviors of the drill field, the parade ground and the garrison evolved.

16. The other aspect of military unit cohesion is based upon a web of ties and bonds holding together a group of soldiers who are familiar with and who trust each other. The perception of this psycho-social cohesion as critical to the maintenance of militarily effective performance and to minimizing the probability of individual or group succumbing to the terrors of battle has long been known and understood.

17. Military unit cohesion is a complex end state built upon processes that are often interdependent. It is multiform in nature and is the product of: the bonding of equals (soldiers, with each other); the bonding of structural unequals (superiors and subordinates); the bonding and affirmation of the special properties of a group, a team, a crew, a company; and a set of perceptions of the skills and abilities of self and others.

18. This is a set of cohesive processes that are at once affective and instrumental. The metaphors that combat personnel use in describing their relationships are those of love, kinship, and fraternal bonding, the referents for these metaphors are rooted in the perception of the the degree to which the skills, competences and interpersonal linkages of self with other will ensure survival of the self and of the group--a group which defines a significant proportion of the probabilities of life or death for its members. This intertwining of the instrumental with the affective is the foundation upon which military unit cohesion is built.

19. These relationships between members of the military group subserve a number of psychological purposes and functions that have made it of critical importance to military psychiatry. The group provides the service member with critical social supports that serve to mediate the effects of stress, provide a psychological "armor" of strength and competence, through incorporation of the individual into the "power" of the group, legitimates and justifies the activities engaged in combat, e.g., destroying the enemy and killing other human beings, and provides the instrumental and affective bonds that provide some assurance of safety and survivability to the individual in an overwhelmingingly hostile environment, and serves to maintain the soldier in the face of the grief and loss created in combat when friends and acquaintances are killed and wounded.

20. As an old soldier put it, talking of his first military experiences in the British Army at Gallipoli: "My first experience of war came in 1915. I'd worked my way over to England on a cattle boat from Texas and I joined the British Army, I was just 16. Then not too long afterward I wound up at

Gallipoli. I remember my first time over the top. We were charging the Turkish lines through heavy Artillery and machine gun fire. I kept going as long as I could see the men to right and left of me. Then suddenly they went down. There was no one there. I was alone, all alone on the battlefield. I was terrified and could not go on. I fell to earth, crawled into a hole and lay there trembling for hours" (Marlowe, Unpublished Life history of Master Sergeant "X" collected at U.S. Soldiers, Sailors and Airmans Home, 1975).

21. The ecology of warfare is in rapid transition. This is particularly true in terms of the concepts and doctrine that have been developed to fight what can be considered as "worst case wars," e.g., mid- to high-intensity main force conventional wars and high-intensity warfare on the so-called integrated (nuclear and chemical) battlefield. Such warfare raises the shock, intensity and stress of combat to levels that have not heretofore been seen and is designed to maximize psychological and behavioral/performance breakdown among soldiers. Its armies will be decentralized and cellular--that is, distributed in small combat teams in order to minimize the destructive effects upon force concentrations and mass of new weapons and sensing systems. Levels of lethality that can be achieved locally dictate the absolute minimization of the kinds of shoulder to shoulder and face to face groups that traditionally mediated the stresses and reinforced effective combat behavior and performance for soldiers. The worst-case war may well also be a "come as you are war," fought with no prior build-up and/or proximate preparation. Because of its lethality and violence and the speed with which armies can operate and distances that can now be traversed, the fundamental decision may well be defined by the effectiveness of the units in the armies in being during the first week to month of the engagement. The initial and preliminary model for this kind of war, one involving high-intensity high-density conventional conflict, carried out by an enemy operating in a continuously echeloned combat mode (initiating upwards of 5 to 9 pulses of combat per day as opposed to the 2 to 3 of most past wars) erupted into consciousness in 1973.

22. The Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War of October 1973 was the first to be fought between main force armies with non-nuclear weapons and tactics that characterize the armamentarium of the latter third of the Twentieth Century. Its decisive battles took place in a three-week period. Its outcome was determined by the ability of outnumbered Israeli maneuver units to contain the massive thrusts of their opponents, maintain unit integrity and performance under conditions of overwhelming stress and hosotility, sustain soldier performance in the face of tactics (such as continuous echeloned operations) and weaponry designed to maximally disrupt the individual and cause behavioral and performance breakdown. Above all the Yom Kippur War demonstrated that a mid-high-intensity/lethality war brought the issue of protecting the soldier and the unit against breakdown in battle

back to a central position. The "gains" of Korea and Viet Nam could be seen as preferable in low-intensity warfare rather than as solutions to the problems of the human response to the stresses of combat. Initial Israeli reports stated that 10% of all casualties, during the 3 weeks of active engagement, were combat stress related. Later revisions of these figures by Israeli scientists have raised the estimate to 40-50%. The Egyptians have reported in private discussions combat stress rates of 50% of casualties. In the Israeli Defense Forces it was again reported that highly cohesive units, with strong horizontal and vertical bonding, strong unit self confidence and so forth, produced minimal numbers of combat stress casualties and the maximum possibilies for reconstitution after battle. (These observations paralleled those made of unit breakdown in a study of American combat units in Europe carried out by the Operations Research Organization at Johns Hopkins University, mimeographed document, OTSG, 1954) in which unit sustainability in combat was demonstrated not to be related to the proportion of casualties in the unit but to other unit characteristics. Highly cohesive, confident units could sustain effective combat with casualty levels of well above 50%, for example.)

23. In reponse to the changing conditions of warfare, in part as evidenced in the '73 war and in part in response to new technologies and the tactics that they mandate, the U.S. Army began to develop a set of images, concepts, and tactical doctrines and organizations for coping with the future battlefield. Among these were the "Central Battle Scenario" developed at TRADOC, Division 86, AirLand Battle 2000, and Army 21. Each of these documents defines a combat ecology of high lethality and high intensity, sustained operations in the face of multi-echeloned attack, decentralization of forces operating in small high-performing groups and extreme dispersal of small units on the battlefield having no substantive physical contact with each other.

24. Such conceptions of the battlefield combined with the intensified nature of combat stresses place new demands on the soldier and the combat group. Decentralization and dispersal destroy in one fell swoop the organic physical solidarity of the parade ground and the drill field and replace it with the need for an intense psycho-social solidarity between unit members. Such a solidarity implies a level of automatic trust and respect among soldiers and between soldiers and their leaders. It demands greater unit self knowledge than was commonly expected, greater interpersonal support and minimization of extraneous distress and distractors. Functioning well in the new environments of warfare requires new levels of sharing and understanding of a common military and unit culture. That is, a set of behaviors, expectations and patterns of decision making in the combat situation that lead the dispersed unit with poor or no communications to do its job in a commonly shared way. It requires units with clear patterns of communication and clearly expressed and communicated thoughts where soldiers and leaders

are predictable each to the other. And it requires units that moderate the external stresses that affect the soldier's capacity to perform--particularly in the realm of family issues. It requires units that demonstrate concern and care for their members. Of equal importance it requires units whose members are cross trained to levels high enough so that the death or loss of certain key or senior personnel does not disrupt the overall ability of the unit to function.

25. In 1979 the senior Army staff recognized that much of the U.S. Army did not exist in a state capable of meeting the demands of current tactics, technology, doctrine and weaponry. In many units cohesion was minimal. There were palpable hostility and real adversarial relationships across ranks. Many units offered little or no support to their members. In some units, soldiers died strangling on their own vomit following combined alcohol and drug use. They died in the sight of their fellows who uncaringly passed them by. In other units, NCOs and officers routinely referred to their soldiers as "scum bags" and "dirt balls." Others announced that they had banned all family members from their company areas to avoid the exposure of women and children to the "...kind of animals I command."

26. COHORT was adopted to meet the demands, the stresses and the terrors of the future battlefield and to seek a way to restructure combat arms units to achieve the kind of unit cohesion, concern, bonding and professionalism that would reverse the disarray of the seventies. It is profoundly important that we remember what COHORT is for because this initial set of definitions is the one that has thus far guided our research. COHORT was created to produce cohesive, well trained combat army units, horizontally and vertically bonded, supportive of their members, prepared to be skilled and resilient in battle, and prepared above all to do what soldiers do best: fight for each other as a family, a band of brothers. COHORT was not created to increase re-enlistment rates, raise SQT scores or make soldiers love the Army. It was designed to make soldiers bond together, bond with their leaders and enhance their unit esprit, skills and durability in combat.

Chapter IV

USAREUR COHORT SOLDIER AND UNIT EVALUATIONS

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Chapter IV

USAREUR COHORT SOLDIER AND UNIT EVALUATIONS.

Introduction

The USAREUR COHORT evaluations are based on data gathered in four cycles of interviews and two questionnaire administrations carried out by members of the staff of the Department of Military Psychiatry WRAIR and the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe, a WRAIR overseas activity.

Contacts were made with the nine companies initially rotated into posts in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as with the units in the second rotation of COHORT companies. It is important to point out the information available for these units represents the COHORT unit when the unit was already mature. In all cases the units had been in existence at least 19 months prior to initial interviewing or contact. The present results thus represent the soldiers' perceptions, assertions and attitudes from mature units through old age and disestablishment. Following the change in policy mandated by the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff which terminated the previous evaluation strictures (of no comparisons and no controls), conventional comparison units were chosen in each battalion to which a COHORT company was assigned, and equivalent interview and questionnaire contacts were carried out in those units.

The interview program in each unit was designed to reach all key personnel and a broad sample of all unit members. Individual interviews were carried out with each company or battery commander and first sergeant. Group interviews were carried out with unit platoon leaders or equivalents, platoon sergeants (or equivalents), squad leaders (or equivalents), junior NCOs in the grade of E5, and two to four groups (8 men) of first term soldiers. Each interview lasted from an hour to an hour and one-half. The interviews were open ended and covered the concerns of unit members, perceptions of unit cohesiveness and morale, perceptions and evaluations of unit readiness for combat, training status, quality of leaders and followers, attitudes towards COHORT, acceptance and adaptation in USAREUR, unit history, family issues, levels and sources of stress within the unit, and unit/battalion relationships. In addition to interviews, questionnaires were given to the soldiers in both rotations of COHORT and conventional units. The first questionnaire set consisted of the WRAIR "Company Perceptions Inventory" designed to assay members' perceptions of unit cohesion, morale, training status, and leadership, the "General Well Being Scale" designed to measure levels of stress, distress and well being of unit members; and the WRAIR "Squad Platoon

Inventory" designed to measure small group affiliation and relationships within the unit.

The second questionnaire set also included the "Field Forces Evaluation," an evaluation of perceived unit status based upon pre-combat questionnaires developed and used in W.W.II; "The Unit Morale and cohesion Instrument," a questionnaire adapted from the Israeli Defense Forces; and an instrument designed to look at the differential perception of unit leaders and members by the unit membership.

Some of the quantitative materials based on first rotation COHORT units and their comparisons with conventional units will be used in this report. Materials on the second rotation COHORT units and comparisons between units in the first and second rotations will be available in February 1986. Preliminary inspection of the quantitative findings supports the data and conclusions of this report, which are based primarily on interviews.

Background Issues

It is important to point out a number of areas in which the COHORT units under assessment are not truly comparable, as well as differences in comparability between rotations of COHORT units. The social organization of units and the attendant relationships and distribution of authority, responsibility and power differ among units. Mechanized infantry, armor, and artillery units are built upon different fundamental human systems: squad, crew, howitzer sections each with implications for the final system of relationships that defines the unit. The section sergeant in the artillery battery shares role aspects of both the infantry squad leader and platoon leader, while the chief of firing battery appears to play a major role in defining patterns of cohesion, unit self concept, and relationships that has no analogue in either infantry or armor.

In addition to these a priori structural differences between units based on combat arm affiliation, there were significant structural differences between a number of first and second rotation COHORT units. Many of the former had been organized under the H-series TOEs while most of the latter were organized under the new J-series TOE. Some units were reorganized after arriving in USAREUR.

Force modernization had real effects upon the units. Some H-series units had problems integrating the unit's non-COHORT support personnel with the COHORT line fill. In some, support personnel felt like "second class citizens," at least initially, and felt a significant gulf between themselves and the COHORT soldiers who had shared a common BT-AIT experience. These same problems did not exist in J-series units since there were no significant numbers of support personnel in the units as deployed. Certain units were subjected to appreciable turmoil

following deployment in their conversion to J-series when cross platoon relationships extending back to CONUS were dramatically disrupted, as when segments of the unit (such as the TOW section or weapons platoon) were suddenly removed and transferred to the newly enlarged headquarters company. Some units were thus essentially stable in terms of their first term fill while others saw marked disruption.

Another significant area of difference between the units is officer and NCO turbulence both in CONUS prior to rotation, and in USAREUR following rotation. Some units suffered extensive cadre turbulence; others almost none. There were units that had as many as four company commanders and four first sergeants during the three years of the unit life cycle and units that completed their life cycles with the same senior leadership in place. Some units saw extensive replacement of their platoon sergeants or equivalents, others none. Some had extensive movement of mid-level NCO's within the unit (squad leaders, section sergeants); others were comparatively stable. There were, likewise, marked differences between units in the stability of squads, crews, or sections driven by within-unit promotions, rehabilitative transfers and readjustments due to personnel losses. Levels of personnel loss also differed among units, particularly in the first COHORT company/battery rotation.

Cadre turbulence resulted from a number of factors. Among these were relief for cause, transfer for poor performance, burnout, promotion, eligibility for promotion, resignation, and conflict within the chain of command.

Patterns of cadre allocation spanned the entire range of capability. Some units reported their NCO fill was only of the "top tier," highly selected volunteers; others reported a reasonable "cross section" of fair to excellent NCOs; and yet others claimed that they had received, as one first sergeant put it, "the dregs, the weakest, most incompetent sweepings of the battalion, the people everyone wanted to get rid of came to me as half my platoon sergeants and most of my squad leaders."

First Rotation COHORT Units

Political visibility also affected unit policies, particularly perceptions of "DA requirements." Several unit leaders considered it would be a mark of failure to lose any soldiers under the various Army Chapter programs, while others felt COHORT units, as essentially "elite" units, should be purged of any soldier whose performance was marginal in any way. Loss levels were also affected by markedly different post, division and brigade policies in Germany.

Other factors also bear upon problems of comparability of COHORT units with each other and with the conventional controls. Differences in command climate, in part at division and post levels but particularly at battalion level, define

markedly different military environments for both COHORT and non-COHORT soldiers. These differences are even more marked than among the combat arms. They define those life conditions that markedly affected soldiers' perception of the Army, job satisfaction, unit morale, commitment, and expressed probability of re-enlistment, as well as soldier stress and family adjustment. It is critical to emphasize that the most important of these command climate considerations are involved in the soldier's life in garrison. Field duty, while seen at times as onerous, is usually perceived as satisfying. It is when the soldier "does his thing." It is seen as necessary and is the period in which most soldiers feel that they truly behave as, and are treated as, professionals. The soldier's perception of unit and the Army as good or bad, his decision to remain or go and his family's contribution to that decision are overwhelmingly taken in response to the climate and conditions of life in garrison. Perceived unnecessary hours in the motor pool, depriving the soldier of personal and family time in garrison, carry far more weight in the soldier's and his spouse's perception of military life than does days in the field.

These differences between battalion command climates or cultures are far less relevant to issues of geography, resources and specific location than they are to the battalion's normal ways of doing business or command "ideology." Such factors as barracks inspections, regulations, standards, furnishing and decoration, visitation by women, and drinking in the billets may vary dramatically between sister battalions at the same post. In like fashion average work-weeks (number of days), average number of duty hours per day (varying between 10-19), and philosophies of training (e.g. some battalion commanders focus on multiple skill acquisition and cross training, others disapprove of cross training and focus on position specific training only), all may vary dramatically. Some battalions actively encourage vertical integration in their units, some actively discourage it. Leadership philosophies differ widely, particularly in respect to NCO and junior officer authority, responsibility and relationships to troops. In one battalion, for example, senior NCO's were encouraged to organize platoon and company functions, parties, trips and so forth. In another, senior NCOs were counseled against "engaging in and encouraging fraternization" for exhibiting identical behavior. Some battalions greeted the first rotation of COHORT companies with hospitality and worked hard to integrate the new unit into the battalion, the post and the community. Others received the new company with unremitting hostility. Some battalion commanders understood and agreed with the basic concepts of cohesion, stability, accretive training and anticipated higher combat effectiveness driving the COHORT experiment, but others saw it as unnecessary, indulgent, producing a company of "spoiled brats", and intimated that they hoped it was doomed to failure. These were not simply the views of a few individuals in the COHORT units. Members of COHORT units in battalions with "hostile" commanders almost universally perceived that "battalion" was hostile and antagonistic to their

unit, gave it more details than sister units, and cheered each possibility of the unit being shown up by sister units in the battalion. Such COHORT units universally reported that they were somehow deprived of or disqualified of every training performance award they had rightfully won. One unit even reported that "the battalion commander refereed or umpired in every sports competition we were in so he could call them against us."

As the final, critical issue, we must return to the vertical integration or vertical bonding of COHORT units. It is important, as a basic principle, that unit stabilization by itself does not and will not in any way force or conduce vertical bonding of the unit. It does create and provide strong horizontal bonding, but vertical bonding remains controlled by the ideologies, attitudes and behaviors of unit leaders. Unit leaders who are perceived as operating with care and concern for their soldiers, unit leaders who are seen as participating, fair and mentoring, rather than distant, arbitrary and careerist (as one senior NCO said," more concerned about the image they present to their bosses rather than effects on us, unit morale, our lives, families and quality of life") have vertically integrated companies and batteries. There were COHORT companies in dramatic vertical disarray in which a majority of NCOs and soldiers saw themselves as driven rather than led, achieving results through fear and the need for self protection, rather than as the result of personal and professional pride and self discipline. In such instances the mediating factor in the unit was the support that the soldier group gave each member. The powerful horizontal bonding could be damaged but not destroyed. Soldiers reported that the reason they could make it was the support and help that they gave each other because they "knew each other so well," as well as the support of a few concerned NCOs. NCOs would report the same thing, pointing out, "In this company we NCOs take care of each other; you can't expect anything from the people above you." Again it is critical to underline the fact that issues involved are virtually all garrison issues. Issues involve life at the post, not in the field. Few COHORT soldiers or leaders ever complained about relationships, responsiveness or the importance of field activities. Almost invariably leaders in COHORT units pointed out that in the field their soldiers did everything immediately, well, and without any complaint. The soldiers echoed these sentiments, and noted that their morale was usually highest when in the field because the petty harassments and problems that made life in garrison aversive were not there. The only significant instances of personal complaint about the chain of command during a field problem came in units in which severe family crises (spouse medical emergencies) had been met with the response "Nobody leaves an ARTEP, if the Army had wanted you to have a wife, it would have issued you one." Vertical integration appears to be "leader-dependent" and secondary to such basic ideological and evaluative constructs as:

1. The division of power and authority between officers and

NCOs. In a number of units, COHORT and conventional, there was active competition for power between the officers and NCOs. NCOs might define the officer's role as "solely that of a paper pusher and administrator who passes orders on to us to execute." A number of junior officers and several company commanders, for example, responded to the query as to whether or not they ever informally talked to their soldiers to assess unit morale or determine how "well they were taken care of," with, "That's Sergeants business. I would be intruding on the NCO's domain if I spoke informally with my troops. They are supposed to take care of their soldiers." Other commanders were perceived by their NCOs as micro-managers who had stripped them of all power, authority and responsibility.

2. The relationship of mission to soldiers, e.g., one CO defined his men as, "part of his mission," and discussed how he minimized the impact of such "missions" as "recovery" or GI'ing the motor pool on the family and personal lives and time of his soldiers. Another would point out that the same "missions" always came first, no matter what the effect on the soldier's personal or family life.

3. Adversarial stances of leaders towards their men. Leaders fell along a spectrum with respect to their proper position towards their men and the "Army." While all enunciated the book solution of "leading by example," some saw their roles as essentially adversarial: "It's my job to get these people to do what the mission requires and the Army needs no matter what they may think their personal needs are." As one senior NCO put it, "My job is to so stress these guys out, to be meaner and harder on them than the Russians will be in war, so that they will be able to take it. If they hate me, well that's what its all about." Others saw their jobs as leaders as ones of brokering between the Army's "demands" and the needs of their men. Others saw their major job as buffering their soldiers from "the crazy make-work that the highers are wrecking everybody's lives with." Others saw their major job as the simple transmission of all orders, duties, and work details, without protesting or interceding in terms of secondary effects on soldier or unit morale. As a number put it, "My job as an NCO is to pass on every order, no matter how stupid it is, as if it were my own."

4. A number of leaders in COHORT units had problems with combining intimacy and authority, a characteristic of COHORT units. In some cases this led to greater expressions of arbitrary behavior and extreme distancing of the leader from the group. Leaders would say, "I cannot be friends with my men--that is fraternization." On further examination the definition of "friend" was a drinking buddy. There were few available models for the development of friendship across the status differential that divides superordinate from subordinate.

This is evident when a question like the following, "Do you

know the first names of the men in your platoon?" was asked, and
an NCO responded, "The only first names my people have are
Private, Specialist and Sergeant! To use a first name is to
fraternize." A significant number of NCOs pointed out that
relationships in peacetime must be distant and formal, "Otherwise
people will not do their jobs or accept orders." These same NCOs
have difficulty finding instances where such behavior has
occurred. These NCOs and some officers also agreed that in
combat such distance was unwise and, as asserted by those with
combat experience, intolerable. The same NCO who asserted any
"closeness" between leaders and men is destructive to discipline
and good order in the peacetime environment also asserted that
such closeness and real friendship--including at times first name
usage--are critical to ensuring the survival of the combat
group. "But," they would say, "combat is different, you all have
to depend on each other in the face of the enemy." (Several with
experience in the latter stages of the Viet Nam War pointed out
that a closely bound group didn't "frag" its NCOs.) For all
these reasons it is not surprising a number of COHORT units
exhibited poor vertical bonding despite powerful horizontal
bonding. Nor is it surprising that several conventional units in
which the chains of command were seen as responsive, caring, and
able showed much greater vertical bonding and integration with
much less horizontal integration.

An additional factor affecting COHORT units was a lack of
understanding of the COHORT concept and its int   effects.
There were officers and NCOs who viewed COHORT   move to cut
expenses" in the personnel system or to create   ease in
rotation. While most were aware of the intent   mize unit
cohesion, many did not see it as an opportunity   anize their
actions, activities and training to help optimiz   sion. A
minority of leaders, particularly in the NCO ran   t including
a smattering of officers, had given little though
consideration to using the opportunities for accret   , cross-
individual or cross-team training. As in leader- follower
relationships, little explicit guidance had been given as to the
necessity for different and accretive training in the COHORT
units. However, leaders were well aware of the benefits of
stability to the pattern of normal training.

The meaning of COHORT: The Real Army and the COHORT Army

Evaluation of the COHORT unit and process is complicated by
the wide range of symbolic meanings and connotations that the
term "COHORT" rapidly acquired. The majority of these
connotations have been negative. Most soldiers rapidly
"learned," primarily from their own NCOs and soldiers in other
units, that being a member of a COHORT unit meant being subject
to deprivations and restrictions that did not apply to the rest
of the Army. This had a particularly heavy impact on first term
soldier who had no mode of comparing experience as a "COHORT"
soldier against the expected norms of behavior and performance of

soldiers in non-COHORT units. Typically, the soldiers saw themselves as:

1. Locked into a unit which "they could never leave," while other soldiers had freedom to move and transfer. COHORT members believed if they stayed in the Army, they could not reenlist except for that unit and regiment. A typical view was, "If I stay in the army I must spend twenty years between Fort Carson and Garlstedt. I can never go any place else or see any place else"

2. Barred from special schools, e.g. Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger etc., general educational improvement, college courses, or special career paths, SF, and OCS, which had been implied as open to them following BT/AIT "by their recruiters."

3. Denied promotion at the same pace and speed as members of regular units.

4. Perpetually subject to being treated as trainees. Standards that seemed appreciably "higher and stricter" in COHORT as opposed to regular units were symbolized in some units by unit SOPs barring posters, rugs, curtains, plants or any personal expression in billets. The term most often used by first termers was, " They treat us like kids, never like men; we are like trainees; we have no responsibility." Many saw no transition or alteration in "cadre" behavior from the training base to the permanent unit: "They still treat us as if they're the drills and we're the trainees."

5. A member of a unit that was always on show (particularly in the first rotation), said he was always doing extra work because of the number of general officer/VIP visits. If not a show unit (second rotation), the COHORT unit was seen as consistently being volunteered for additional duties, extra details, and extra time commitments to "show how good it was." The COHORT units were routinely perceived as pulling more duties than sister units, and working longer hours and a greater number of days per month. As one soldier put it," It's like the people in the other units say: 'COHORT-Showhort, work your ass off! It's not the real Army its the COHORT army." Or, as members of another unit pointed out, the Jody their sister units preferred to chant was:
    If I had a low I.Q.
    I could be a COHORT, too
    Faggots! Maggots!
    COHORT CHEESE!

6. NCOs also believed that they were "locked in"; that their careers were in jeopardy; and that their promotions would be slowed or barred. Even junior officers believed that COHORT threatened their careers by denying them the multitude of experiences deemed necessary for advancement.

7. First term soldiers believed that COHORT units were marked by favoritism established early in the unit life cycle which could not be broken, and that promotions were based upon such favoritism. They believed that favoritism expressed in terms of choices for acting NCO positions and rapid promotion were unique to their unit and a product of COHORT. Equally they felt that the long term relationships of the COHORT unit led to early labelling of soldiers as good or bad that was almost impossible to alter through time. As one put it, "If you screwed up just once in the first week, the NCOs never forget, and a year and a half later they still dog you out even though you've tried to change completely."

For these reasons the initial response to the COHORT unit concept tended to be negative. In several of companies, for example, almost all of those interviewed, from platoon sergeant to first termer, expressed the desire to get out of the COHORT company and never to serve in the "damned COHORT army again." They cited combinations of the above factors, but above all, the perception that COHORT units pulled more duties and longer duty hours in attempts to prove their presumed "eliteness."

The power and strengths of the COHORT unit and COHORT system were not seen until the interviewing moved into some of the areas upon which the COHORT system was originally founded. These areas included unit self knowledge and assessment, perceived horizontal cohesion, psychological readiness for battle, and perception of and combat ability. It was in these areas that the COHORT units outshone their conventional counterparts.

Several other factors are important to underline at this point. The first is the fact that few if any first termers had any comparator for their experience in their COHORT units. For them it was the Army; the "COHORT army" was the totality of their experience. The differences between their units and conventional ones were meaningless to these first termers. Their closeness, knowledge of each other, interdependence and trust of one another were the norm. There was no recogition of the fact that conventional units did not have the same bonding trust and cohesion. This lack of experience and lack of knowledge of life in conventional units placed the COHORT soldier in a world much different from that of his unit cadre. The cadre could see the differences in closeness, unit self knowledge, and trust between the COHORT unit and other units they had been affiliated with. The COHORT soldier could not. The COHORT soldier's lack of experience became obvious to him when his unit disestablished, and he was transferred to a conventional unit. The sense of loss and nostalgia for the COHORT unit with its close ties, trust, and intense bonding was overpowering when these soldiers were seen six months after the COHORT unit's disestablishment. They spoke of wanting the old unit back, their sense of loss, and regretted their lack of appreciation for what they'd had in the COHORT unit. In one interview a group of first termers from a disestablished unit were well known to the interviewer. They had

been angry, resentful and bitter about their COHORT unit. When last seen, just prior to disestablishment, they had defined the unit as the "pits", and were pleased to leave it. Six months later they agreeed that would like to be back in their COHORT unit again. They missed it and the closeness and support profoundly. As one put it,"What was screwed up and bad--that was the Army! It's worse in a regular unit. You don't have the trust and the people to keep you going 'we had in the old company. They did lousy things to us but we took care of each other. Here, nobody takes care of anybody. I wish we had the unit back!"

Political importance and visibility permeated many of the acts and organizational behaviors of the first rotation of COHORT units. COHORT units were singled out from other combat arms units. Many units were regularly and continually visited by general officers, and their officers and NCOs reported that they felt it necessary to maintain performance, housekeeping and other standards well above those of their sister companies or batteries. In some cases these pressures led to alienation and disgruntlement. Several officers felt that they were under intense scrutiny and evaluation as leaders of COHORT units and that any failure of the unit to reach above average standards would be injurious to their careers. There was a general feeling that COHORT units were special, and as such were to be pushed to higher and even different standards than others. A significant number of commanders and senior NCOs expressed the view that COHORT "soldiers could do what others would not," since, "there were no sources of contamination around to make them question the standards and ways of doing things that they had as trainees." In some units creative and effective leaders helped their soldiers to commit to these standards, in others unthinking leaders helped to create an atmosphere in which soldiers saw themselves as beset and resented being singled out for excess work by "careerist leaders."

Second Rotation COHORT Units

The second rotation of COHORT units appeared different from the first rotation. Their reception was less contentious, possibly because there were fewer privileges and indulgences offered them, and because of the removal of the glare of publicity. The soldiers and NCOs complained about the same disabilities as the first COHORT units, exhibited a number of the same strengths, but appeared to have lower morale. In some cases, they exhibited poorer and more hostile relationships between leaders and soldiers.

Once again, many soldiers saw themselves in a special "COHORT" army, treated more poorly than other soldiers, working longer hours, and "volunteered" for an excessive number of details. "In order to advance the CO's career because we're COHORT, they think they can make us do anything." It can be hypothecated that the reasons for this also include the lessening

of external hosility, which appeared to intensify cross rank bonding in first rotation COHORT units, as well as the loss of high visibility. The latter, while distorting perceptions in the units and responsible for a perceived increased work load, at least justified that work load by providing reasons for it. For the former, the rejection by sister units helped in some cases to provide the motivation for high performance and enhanced morale.

In addition to receiving less special attention and reinforcement than did the first rotation of COHORT units, more of these units reported dissatisfaction with the level of training they received in CONUS. There appeared to be less appreciation of the reasons for the establishment of the New Manning System, and, in many cases, less appreciation of the enhanced training potential of the COHORT unit. In a number of cases the unit was handled essentially as if it were a conventional one. Neither the unit commander nor its NCOs had thought beyond the usual zero to six month training cycles that dominate individual replacement units. There were fewer attempts at cross training and cross-echelon training and fewer attempts at long term skill enhancement. In written comments on questionnaires, dissatisfaction with training quality, intensity and frequency dominated the responses. Quality of life issues were more salient and at times tinged with bitterness as they were discussed by first term soldiers and junior and mid-level NCOs. Horizontal cohesion, Among sergeants (E-5) and those below, remained exceptionally strong, resisting most degrading factors, as did the feeling that the unit would outperform most others in combat. However, the inability of a significant proportion of leaders to handle the combinations of intimacy and authority, support and discipline, while balancing creative and meaningful training with garrison chores and details, remained striking.

In several instances the strengths of the unit were noted with bitterness in the interviews. As one soldier put it:

"Yeah, tell the man what he wants to hear, what the Army wants to hear. Yeah we are tight. We are brothers, we are family. We will fight for each other and we will die for each other. We will do well. We'll take out 20 or 30 Russians to every one of us. But tell me, Why does our life in this unit have to be such a useless hell? Why are we treated like dogs here at this post? Why can't they treat us like men, like human beings? We'll die well but you won't get any re-ups out of this company. No one here among the highers gives a damn for us or our families."

Reception in Germany: First Rotation COHORT Units

The initial reception of the first rotation of COHORT units at the posts of assignment was almost always hostile. This hositility was predicated on the beliefs that COHORT units were

the recepients of special privilege and that these privileges
were gained at the expense of members of other units on the
posts. The first units to arrive in USAREUR were indeed given
"special privileges", in so far as both local and command-wide
perception was involved. The extensive media coverage and
publicity attendant on the initial rotations intensified and
exacerbated the hostility. The photographs of general officers
seeing the unit off in CONUS and receiving it in USAREUR, the
accompaniment of family members on the same aircraft and the
quarters made available to unit members, the work done in
preparing billets and equipment, and local reception involving
"stocked refrigerators" and special greetings, all inflamed
tempers. They appear to have created a negative view of COHORT
units as "indulged" and "pampered" show organizations that
thrived at the expense of ordinary soldiers and ordinary
soldiers' families. While certain privileges were given only to
the first two COHORT units rotated, it was commonly believed that
such "COHORT" privileges had been extended to all units.
Hostility and anger were the order of the day.

A number of COHORT soldiers and their spouses reported
verbal abuse as common, as well as incidents of physical abuse.
Parents spoke of cautioning their children not to let anyone know
that, "Daddy is with a COHORT unit," in order to avoid possible
abusive confrontations. Unit members reported that they were
routinely subjected to verbal harrassment in their Kasernes, in
formation, or at training. Several units reported equipment
prepared for turnover to them had been actively and passively
sabotaged. Incidents discussed included fluids contaminated or
drained and vehicles stripped of key parts prior to arrival.
Most soldiers reported a four to six month period before
hostility began moderating at all, and a number reported residual
hositility and anger still present at the time of
disestablishment of their units.

A further fall-out of the hostile reaction to COHORT units
in USAREUR was the reinforcement of the COHORT soldiers' view
that they were in a special and burdened segment of the Army.
The images provided by others were those of units privileged,
disliked, indulged, overworked and in perpetual trainee status.
Soldiers in conventional units consistently pointed out their
"pleasure" at not being in COHORT units, the less burdensome and
less "trainee disciplined" lives that they led, the greater
freedom that they had, and their acceptance as responsible and
mature adults by their commanders. While a number of conventional
units demonstrated the same kinds of leader-soldier problems seen
in COHORT units, COHORT first termers tended to believe and
magnify such differences. These views were, in a number of
cases, reinforced by NCOs and soldiers with non-COHORT experience
within the unit. They were particularly strong among those who
resented the compulsory nature of their assignment to a COHORT
unit.

Reception: Second Rotation COHORT Units

The second rotation COHORT units were subject to some residual prejudice, but nothing like the intensity that greeted their predecessors. It is important to note, however, that many of the original beliefs about special privilege and indulgences for COHORT units, (e.g, preferential positioning on housing lists, concurrent travel, sponsorship for first termers on 18 month tours, special sponsorship and reception), were still current as posts began to prepare for the disestablishment of first rotation units and the reception of second rotation COHORT units. Many second rotation units reported some hostility, but most said that relations with members of sister units were "normal" in three or four months. All reported continuing hostility towards the concept of COHORT, expressed in such phrases as, "COHORT-showhort" or "locked in and locked up".

Battalion Commanders' Perceptions: First Rotation COHORT Units

COHORT units were generally seen as good units and "better" than sister non-COHORT units by their battalion commanders, especially as better field units (7 of 9). While some battalion commanders saw their COHORT units as not necessarily their best in performance of garrison duties, or not the best at each individual skill, e.g., gunnery, they were seen as the "best field units overall" in their battalions. This was particularly so in the combination of maneuver, level of collective training and collective skill.

All battalion commanders with first rotation COHORT units stated that their COHORT units were more cohesive than their conventional units, and that they exhibited more esprit and unit pride as well as mutual support. There was a certain amount of disagreement among battalion commanders as to why COHORT units differed from conventional units. Some battalion commanders attributed differences to the NMS-COHORT process, others opted for "conventional" explanations, e.g. stronger NCOs, more highly selected officers, or more intelligent soldiers. In several cases the researcher sensed that any explanation other than the COHORT process would have been preferred by the battalion Commander. Several viewed the strong bonding and cohesiveness of the COHORT unit as potentially threatening. Using phrases like, "They are too tight, they cover for each other and watch out for each other," one commander complained about the way his COHORT unit had generated problems for him with incident reports. He noted, disapprovingly, that when a member of the unit had been beaten by members of a German motorcycle gang the entire unit "even NCOs and, I think, a couple of officers-I'm not sure," had gone to the Gasthouse at which the gang centered and "cleaned their clocks, which sure as hell made a lot of extra work for me answering incident reports."

All of the battalion commanders saw their COHORT units as likely to perform better in battle, particularly in terms of

absorbing the initial shock of engagement and maintaining combat
capacity over a longer haul than their conventional units. The
COHORT units were seen as more "resilient," possessing a greater
depth, committed to taking care of each other, and having better
teamwork and intra-unit support. In almost all cases COHORT
units were also seen as possessing better tactical skills, i.e.,
better at maneuver, road marches, and company level tactics, as
well as having higher levels of individual skill.

Several battalion commanders pointed out that while they had
squads, crews or sections in their conventional units that were
individually more able than COHORT counterparts, the unit skill
levels and general mastery of their jobs and obligations were not
the same. Response to an alert was an off-cited example. As one
Battalion commander, who was not particularly partial to his
COHORT unit, put it:

"I'll tell you one way in which they are different. They
are certainly not my best unit. Their billets are not well kept,
their uniform standards are not the highest and they are too
close to each other, I think,--too much fraternization. But in
the field and in some other things they seem to have it together
in ways my other units don't. On alerts, for instance, my COHORT
company is always the first to move out. The privates and
specialists who live in the billets get the vehicles loaded on
line and they are ready to move by the time the NCOs and
officers come in from their housing areas. It's not like that in
my conventional units. They're always much slower. They have to
wait for their NCOs to come in and tell them what to do."

In the first rotation, then, the overwhelming majority of
battalion commanders and higher staff tended to assess their
COHORT units as potentially more combat-effective than their
conventional units. Almost all felt that their COHORT units
possessed greater psychological durability and were capable of
greater resilience in, and resistance to, the stresses of
combat. There was also a consensus that COHORT units exhibited
better teamwork, an ability and a desire to work together that
was not equally so in their conventional units. The units were
seen as exhibiting a helpfulness, a way of pitching in to work as
a group, that was absent from all but the best conventional units
the battalion commanders had known.

Almost all battalion commanders felt that their COHORT units
by virtue of their bonding and esprit, their knowledge of their
personnel's skills, strengths and weaknesses, and their concern
for each other would have longer staying power in combat and
would resist the initial disruption and shock of combat better
than the average conventional unit, although not necessarily
better than the "best" of conventional units. Those battalion
commanders who perceived their COHORT units as their best units
also classified them as better than the best of conventional
units they had ever led.

In the first rotation battalion commanders saw a number of problems with their COHORT units as well. The most pervasively discussed was the lack of well defined and distributed skills and knowledge about USAREUR and its operations, systems, and demands. In effect, most felt their COHORT units were knowledgable in the behaviors, performances, standards, SOPs and norms of the CONUS army, but lacked in those skills important to effective performance in Germany. Differences in vehicle loading SOPs, maintenance requirements, modes of acquiring training aids and accessing training areas, billets standards and other specific knowledge about the "USAREUR" ways of doing things were cited as unit deficiencies.

Several battalion commanders felt that their COHORT units were closed entities, too strongly bonded and bounded against the rest of the battalion and the post. This was particularly true at several posts where COHORT units had been received with great hostility. They felt that their COHORT units behaved like outsiders in the battalion, particularly the officers and senior NCOs. Several critiqued their COHORT officers and senior NCOs strongly for interacting almost exclusively with the company rather than their peers at battalion and in the other companies. Several noted that they had to devote extra time and effort to breaking down the "special feeling" the COHORT units had about themselves and integrating them into their battalions as "just another unit." As one Battalion commander put it:

"When they arrived I got them together the first day and told them, "You are no longer a COHORT unit. That was OK back in CONUS, but that stopped the minute you got off the plane and arrived here. You are just X company of X battalion. You are just a regular company like everyone else here. I don't ever want to hear you refer to yourselves as the "COHORT" company. You are X company and that is it."

Several battalion commanders complained about the state of training of their units as they arrived from CONUS, particularly the level of individual skills. Several also complained about the "extremely poor quality" of the mid-level NCOs assigned to the units. Battalion commanders were almost equally divided as to NCO quality in their COHORT units. About a third felt that the COHORT unit NCOs were specially selected, a third that they were an average mix, and a third that the units had particularly weak NCOs. Perceived officer quality also sums out by thirds.

Most battalion commanders felt that leadership in their COHORT units was more demanding than in their conventional units. They were particularly concerned about the junior and mid level NCOs of whom, "so much more had to be expected because of the loading profiles of the COHORT units which did not provide experienced senior Specialist 4s who would act as agents of socialization and teachers of norms and standards to the new first termers." Some felt that this put an excessive burden on the junior and mid level NCOs, particularly during the initial

months in Germany.

Battalion Commanders' Perceptions: Second Rotation COHORT Units:

Battalion commanders' perceptions of second rotation COHORT units paralleled those of first rotation units. However, there were several marked differences. A larger number of second rotation units were considered less well trained upon arrival in Germany. As one battalion commander put it, "I don't know what they did at FTX, but these people had no basic skills at all. They had never done a night maneuver or had significant night training. They had people who couldn't even headspace a ".50." It was appalling and we had to get them up to speed. We did get them there and they are now a good unit but initially it was a real problem."

There appeared, as well, to be more negative evaluation of the quality of mid and senior level NCOs in the second rotation units. The terms most commonly used were, 'weak and marginal.' Several battalion commanders stated, "they (the NCOs) looked like a dump of a brigade's incompetents," or, "I thought the NCOs would have been more highly selected but there were fewer strong one than I expected."

Another area alluded to by several battalion commanders was a perceived decline in garrison performance qualities between first and second rotation COHORT units (although in several cases a reversal was asserted in which second rotation units were seen as more "disciplined in the spit and polish sense than first rotation units). As one battalion commander put it:

"They are too close, and so they are easy on the unit. They are not as attentive to pressed "camis" and spit and polish and housekeeping here in garrison as my other units are. There's a funny thing, however, when they are in the field they are the best all around unit I have; movement, manuever, tactically, it all comes together better than it does for any other unit that I have. Their ability to work together and get the job done is just better-- better teamwork than any of my other units. In garrison I have problems with them; they are not my idea of a first rank unit. But in the field--they really have more overall strength and depth than any of my other units. "

The battalion commanders' perceptions of second rotation COHORT may be summed up as follows: units are seen as more cohesive, more able to sustain themselves during ther initial shock, exhibiting higher levels of teamwork and self knowledge and possessing a somewhat better balanced integration of field and operational skills. Some were more poorly trained upon rotation to USAREUR and the units were not necessarily seen as the best because of non-achievement of high garrison standards, behavioral problems within the units (defined as like those of average units) and low quality middle and lower leadership.

Disestablishment

The disestablishment of COHORT units was marked by a certain amount of "short-timer syndrome" as an overall unit phenomenon. This was exacerbated by the slow dissolution of the units during the period between the last scheduled FTX and actual disestablishment. Large numbers of NCOs and officers were transferred three or four months prior to unit termination. This had marked effects on unit morale. Almost all agreed however that in the event of mobilization the unit could and would perform well if sent into a combat situation. The psychological withdrawal from the unit and the beginnings of short-timer syndrome normally began with the completion of the final field exercise before the units projected disestablishment date.

Company Commanders' and NCOs' Perceptions:

With few exceptions company and battery commanders and senior NCOs perceived their COHORT units as either the best or among the best with which they had ever served. Overall, company commanders considered their units highly trained and competent. With few exceptions, they were more enthusiastic about their units state of training and readiness. Above all, COHORT commanders felt that they had a truly realistic appreciation of the capacities, the strengths and weaknesses of their soldiers and NCOs. They saw their units behavior as predictable. They often expressed it as, "I really feel that I know how these guys will do and what they will do. I know them well enough to feel that I know how they will do in combat."

In all cases the COHORT commander saw his unit as one he would be willing to take into combat, and in almost all cases as the unit (of those he had served with) he would most prefer to take. This was by no means the case among the conventional unit commanders. Almost none felt the sense of knowledge or predictability about their units expressed by their COHORT colleagues; all felt that there were significant numbers of men in their units whose behavior was essentially unpredictable, and those men hadn't been there long enough to know them or how they might do." Each stated that for 20-50% of men in the unit, "I don't know them. They've been here too short a time. You really can't really be sure of the new people. You don't know what anyone is capable of until you've had them on ARTEP or a major FTX." While many conventional commanders felt that their units would do well in combat--their responses were more measured and tentative than those of the COHORT commanders. Where the latter were more prone to statements like, "We'll kick ass and take names," the conventional unit commanders usually answered that they thought the unit "could probably do its job" or would take high initial losses but probably be effective. Unqualified enthusiasm was much rarer among them than among the COHORT commanders. The units which the COHORT commanders perceived as

"better" than their present ones were almost invariably elite or
quasi-elite organizations like the 82nd or Armored Cavalry units
on border duty.

In a large number of cases NCOs with prior combat said that
if they had to go to war again they would prefer to go with their
present COHORT unit. The reasons given usually involved greater
cohesion and better cooperation in the COHORT unit than in the
previous combat unit. As one senior NCO in an artillery battery
put it, "This unit has it more together than my unit in Nam. The
sections work together and support and take care of each other.
Here, if one section needs something or has a problem what you
need will be supplied by the other sections. They will always
give you help. We never worked together that well in Nam.
Another section would never offer your section help or
resources. That happens all the time here." A wide majority of
NCOs with previous combat experience felt that their present
COHORT units would perform "very well" or better in combat than
the conventional units with which they had recently served. In
contrast, commanders and senior NCOs of the conventional units
believed that their units operated as "a set of platoons", rather
than as an integrated entity. They asserted that there was
little communication or cooperation between platoons or
sections.

In terms of mission capability unit commanders and
subordinate leaders also cited "objective" criteria which they
felt established the clear superiority of their COHORT units.
These included speed of response to alerts, ARTEP performance,
road march performance, and FTX performance, as well as the
status of their billets and their role as host (often deeply
resented) to all visiting VIPs. Unit leaders also cited gunnery
scores, weapons and weapons system qualification scores, percent
of vehicles going to and returning from FTXs, as examples of
their high competence. These scores and levels of performance
could be cited by all. In one clearly outstanding COHORT unit,
every leader, soldier and group of soldiers interviewed (over 60%
of the company) spontaneously told the interviewer that over 80%
of the company had qualified for the EIB, and that, in a recent
MILES exercise, the company had destroyed 43 vehicles of an
attacking Cavalry unit to a loss of 3 of their own ("with no
pulling batteries out of the MILES gear or playing games").

Commanders of COHORT units overall presented a sense of
surety about their units matched only in a much smaller fraction
of conventional units. This surety included perception of level
of training, the teamwork and capability to accomplish unit tasks
and anticipated effectiveness. In all cases this sense of the
unit and its capacities was underlain by the depth of knowledge
the commander felt the unit had of itself and its capabilities,
as well as his knowledge.

Commanders were about equally divided in their perceptions
of the ease or difficulties of leading a COHORT unit. All saw a

special burden, particularly on the NCOs. In the first year of
unit life demands upon the NCOs as teachers, trainers, and agents
of socialization were at their greatest. Some found leading
COHORT units particularly easy, noting, "a standard is laid out
once, an SOP once, then they are known for all time; basic skills
are taught and retained. "With no turnover, I don't have to keep
reestablishing standards." All felt that leadership was enhanced
by the predictability of the unit--the leader's knowledge of what
and how the unit would do when given any particular task. All
felt that leadership was enhanced by high levels of teamwork and
responsiveness to demands.

Some felt that leadership was more difficult and demanding
in a COHORT unit than in units they had previously been assigned
to. COHORT soldiers were perceived as more demanding with higher
expectations of their leaders. Closeness was seen by some as a
trap that could lead to fraternization and favoritism. Others
felt the very solidarity of the unit to be a threat. As one
commander put it, "They will always see an injury to one as an
injury to all." The rapid communication within the unit and a
sensitivity to leader behavior that involved, "all the soldiers,
either for you or against you," were seen as further burdens to
the leader. Again, the points of difficulty invariably involved
leadership and management of the unit in garrison. All of the
COHORT units were considered easy and effective to lead in the
field.

Leader Comparisons

Further insight may be gained by comparing the perceptions
of two battalion commanders and two subordinate unit
commanders. The first battalion commander viewed his COHORT unit
as one of the best he had ever seen. The second quite frankly
despised his COHORT unit. Let us consider the perceptions of the
relevant commanders. The first battalion commander viewed his
COHORT unit as the best he had ever seen, stating:

"1. This is a high performance unit. It does all the
things it has to do as part of its ordinary soldiering. It knows
what it has to do at every level without the need for direction
from echelons above it.

2. These people acclimated faster; they knew each other
better, they knew their people and they knew their standards.
They knew and achieved those standards.

3. This unit has exceptional leadership. I believe that it
was hand-picked back in CONUS. The soldiers are ordinary. They
are no better than those in my other units. But it is a high
performance unit. Unfortunately, they are losing their edge to
some degree. I cannot continuously exercise them at the level
they have reached. It is very far above that of my other
maneuver units. In training I must look at the median and devise
training at the battalion level that will encompass them all.

4. Their ARTEP performance has been exceptional.

5. This unit communicates very effectively. You never have to worry about information. They have a tremendous ability to get the word down. If I ask for X or Y they do it and understand why. They know their skills. They know their movement. They know what they have to do.

6. Their skills are simply well above those of my other units. If my other maneuever elements are at 60 they are at 100. They differ in commo and supply as well as a broad observable difference in professional skills.

7. Most important of all they are proud. They have a family kind of unity. There are very few problems that get to my level. They pull together and take care of each other. The families take care of each other. They take care of the young wife or the family in trouble."

The second battalion commander saw his unit quite differently:

"1. I think this COHORT unit is at the bottom of my Battalion. First I think it has to do with the NCOs. A unit is a success or failure based on its NCOs. They are the chain that binds the unit. This chain isn't linked. They were obviously nabbed from everywhere. The NCOs in this unit are not qualified and experienced.

2. They did average to good in their company ARTEP. They did fairly well; they did their job, but they are not at the top. They have a lot of rah- rah and cheering each other on. They did a lot of rah rah in a bounding overwatch. Good NCOs would have stopped that. It was tactically degrading.

3. They do have the basics. In some things they are better than others. Their tactical movement at night is very good. For example another convoy busted between their unit. They all did their jobs, put out local security and were very impressive at that. They are very very good at mounted movement.

4. I'm not satisfied with the quality of their officers. Only one had a Ranger tab. It was a very poor fill. I had one lieutenant who always got lost. Another had flat feet and no arch supports in his boots. On the whole poor platoon leaders, just very poor quality.

5. They have been winning lots of sports championships, volley ball, baseball, basketball, boxing. They all come out and cheer for their team and really put down the other team. They're not team players in the battalion. It's all for their unit. Their cohesiveness is good in team sports, running, things like that. They are very proud of their unit. They get into fights

because of their unit. They are proud of their company
identity. It does show a certain esprit and willingness, and
their teamwork is better in some cases. But they do not come out
to cheer for battalion.

6. I think their real problems are inexperience and
immaturity. They have had real maintenance problems because
their NCOs were not up on my SOPs for maintenance inspections.
But I think I'm getting them well integrated into the unit. They
were just slammed together; they haven't evolved together like my
other units. They are learning. I am teaching them. They were
100% in vehicles for the last field problem. Tops for it, but
not for the other ones.

7. If they went to combat I could depend on them. If I say
I want you there tomorrow they will be there tomorrow. In combat
I have the gut feeling that initially they will do dumb things,
but will pull together better than my other units. I'd give them
a little bit of an edge, pulling together, knowing each other.

8. I don't like the fact that they are stabilized. I can't
touch them for drivers and other duty personnel, but have to go
to my other units. There's a lot of resentment about that. It's
unfair.

9. Personally, I think its all just lip service to
COHORT. Unless you really select officers, and particularly
NCOs, its not worth anything.
I don't like it."

A unit commander in the first battalion described his unit
and experience as follows shortly before disestablishment:

"1. After a lot of turmoil in other units I finally saw
some opportunities to do some good long range planning. That's
the fascinating thing about the COHORT unit. Its fascinating not
to have to worry about personnel turnover and turbulence and be
able to look at where you were, where you are and where you can
go. I enjoyed it.

2. I'm really proud of this unit. I've seen them grow up
and mature, take on added responsibility, get promotions, and
demonstrate their potential for further advancement. I'm really
convinced that COHORT is both workable and good.

3. The best thing about it is its predictability based upon
stability. It's given me the opportunity to do long range
planning--to develop a good coherent plan. You can know exactly
where you want to go with this unit.

4. I'm really going to miss them. Emotionally this is a
very tough break for me. I guess that they have mixed
emotions. I think that they feel about like they did when they
graduated from high school. They are going to miss each other

but they want to go on to other things. I think they think that I am a "fair" commander. That is that I am fair to them. I think I have loyalty from them because they know they will get a fair shake. However, I don't think a lot of my soldiers really understand what a commander does and what he is responsible for.

5. Now my NCOs, that's interesting. Each of them falls into a niche. Each has a role. The Top is a father figure; he's their main counselor. The next most senior NCO is the "doer"; he kicks butt and is the unit's main organizer. The other senior NCOs are the basics; they have had a hard role. Some troops feel closer to some than others and some have maybe gotten too close. But most of them have been able to walk that fine line somewhere between being a big brother and being a leader. I deeply believe an NCO has to be both.

6. It was hard coming here. The hostility was fierce over the privileges we were getting and so on. I think it took six months total before we were accepted as just another unit. It took a lot of effort and lots of times we had to pull a lot more than our fair share. Above all, you didn't mention the word COHORT to anyone. Gradually people began to accept us. Some of them even began to see the advantages of having COHORT units around.

7. I think we are the best unit of its kind in the U.S. Army. I think that Command here thinks that that's so also. I think over the short term there are some units that might surpass us at one thing or another but not over the long run. Over the long haul there is no unit that can compare with this one.

8. You've got to understand we've got a lot of pride. We are proud as a unit.

9. We have had no problems in terms of authority relations within the unit. The relationships of our junior NCOs to their soldiers were a little difficult at first. It's a hard transition to make. I started a junior NCO training program in the unit. We went back to basic and started training them. Part of the reason I started this training program for my E4s was that they had begun to feel there was no place for them to advance to. There was a feeling of stagnation and we had gotten to the point where some of our soldiers were just doing enough to get by. That's why we established the junior NCO program.

10. The battalion commander is a soldiers' commander. He cares about his troops, he looks out for them and us. He has established a good decentralized command climate and given the unit commanders all the authority we need to do our jobs. He doesn't get excited.

11. One problem of the system that we weren't prepared for was the level that these guys were capable of reaching. The first termer in this Army has to know X number of tasks. These

guys knew them eight to ten months into the program. It created
real difficulties because we had to come up with ways to
challenge them long range. We had the time to think and plan.
First we trained them up to the 20 level then began cross
training them. My average soldier is now at Sergeant's level.
We have required this kind of cross training of everyone. They
now know every job required of them and everyone else's as
well. We've cross trained everyone in every job they might have
to do. Half of my troops can now do an E-6's job with ease.

12. In terms of families I don't think our problems are
really different from most other units. I think we have had
typical family problems. There were some very hard transitions
and a lot of hostility that really affected the families when
they came in because they were COHORT. We're mostly over that
now. It does tend to be like a small town. Some people do call
it Peyton Place, perhaps because we live so closely to each
other. There are little squabbles, a lot of gossip with one
clique against another. I don't know if it's the same with
regular units at any small post like this. There is no real
animosity. People are really pretty close and give each other a
lot of support. When we go to the field we don't get many calls
like the other units in the battalion. The Top's wife and the
other senior sergeants' wives are really helpful. We had a one
month and then two, two week field exercises in which we didn't
get a single phone call. There have been very few problems when
we've gotten back. When we come back there's always a sign over
the door saying, "Welcome Back", that the wives put up and they
have cookies, cake and things to drink waiting for us. Like I
said, we're pretty close. There are lots of parties every month
at someone's house as well. We also have a formal family net and
publish a regular letter for the families.

The above should be contrasted with the perceptions of the
unit commander in the second battalion as characterized below.

"1. My COHORT unit accomplishes most things reasonably well
to very well. Our battalion, company, platoon and squad ARTEPS
were all done well. On our IG we got satisfactory results in 4
major areas comparing well with the other units. We've done very
well in sports and are post champions in a number of
competitions. Where we haven't done well is in the subjective
things that is in the eyes of the Battalion commander. He says
we're undisciplined. He called me in a month ago, to say, 'You
have undisciplined soldiers, you have too many blotter
incidents. What will you do about i ?' Hell I had six months
with fewer blotter incidents than any other unit. Then I had a
few. Then we had a couple of fights downtown that were started
by members of other companies whom we beat at sports. They
resent us and resent us winning. They don't like it or us. I
took action but....

2. I think the battalion commander feels that we are
inferior. We do the things that can be measured objectively very

well. Subjectively he feels we aren't doing well, nothing we do counts, nothing I do counts--our personalities certainly don't mesh. He feels we're a weak sister and does everything he can to emasculate me and the company.

3. I think this is a good company. I would happily go to war with it in a heartbeat. It will do as well or better than any other unit in this Army. On alerts and field problems we roll 100%. No other unit here can make that statement.

4. It has nothing to do with COHORT. I think the battalion commander is a micro-manager--he tends to do the COs job--hell, he tends to deal directly with the platoon sergeant and give them directions and orders. His prejudice about us was that he wants to be absolute master of the battalion and really had difficulty not being able to move our people around.

5. After a year now prejudice against us has just begun to abate and we are starting to feel as if we belonged in this battalion for the first time. We as people are just beginning to be accepted by the other officers in the battalion. The NCOs too, but they still identify closely with the unit.

6. I think we have been a close company. We've had a couple of company parties, a barbeque with games, a good Christmas party, the wives have put on bake sales to buy Christmas presents for the kids and all the unmarried soldiers.

7. We have had some problems, the usual ones with hash and some Chapters and bars to re-enlistment, but I think in some part we are being picked on deliberately. CID really dogged the unit out and it affected morale very deeply, though morale is pretty good right now. We've had good performance and there is a lot of esprit.

8. I guess my biggest problem is with the battalion commander. He's very directive and he micro-manages me at every opportunity. It's hard to run a company when he changes everything every few minutes.

9. Let me lay down the bottom line. The folks in this company get the job done. Sure sometimes they get me angry, as with the fights in town but when they go to the field, or do something important they have never failed. They come through, they always come through. They have a lot of pride. I think we are the best unit in the battalion but the battalion commander doesn't see that. He sees us at the bottom. I've always believed in showing by doing, but you can't show him anything. He won't see what he doesn't want to see.

10. They are really cohesive. When one of our teams plays we'll give them much greater support than the other units do. It's a real turnout.

11. In terms of combat I trust the people and NCOs. I understand them and know who they are. I know that this NCO is good and this one is not so good. I know who I have to watch. I know my young NCOs--the ones up out of the first termers are good. They may not yet be exceptional but they are still learning and their skill level is very high.

12. I think they have more esprit than other units but there is also a tendency to gripe and bitch, and there are some things they really have to gripe about. The first is housing. They were made a lot of promises that weren't kept. The second is the way we are singled out by the battalion for criticism, extra duties, hostility. Everyone--officers, NCOs, and soldiers-- gripes about that.

13. One of our best things though is family support. We have a real strong family support group.

14. I don't know, I feel it is all like the live fire platoon course. The range officer said the three best platoons were two of mine and one from another unit. He told that to me, two other unit commanders and the battalion commander. You can ask them. The battalion commander said, "I've already made my decision." He'd observed my one weak platoon and gave the trophy to another unit. We can't win here.

Observations made by some of the other battalion commanders interviewed during the first rotation of COHORT units are of interest at this point as they help flesh out the spectrum of battalion command ideologies and climates, into which the COHORT units rotated.

One battalion commander:

1. Discipline is much better in my cohort company. There are far fewer accidents, other incidents or blotter reports. Spouse abuse is infinitesimal compared to my other companies. My other companies have significantly more DUIs, fights, drug problems etc.

2. Their horizontal bonding is self evident.

3. Well lets look at their strengths and weaknesses. They were weaker in gunnery when they got here and they remain weaker in maintenance than the other companies. They've had some specific personnel problems there. They are much stronger than the other companies in appearance, in billets maintenance and inspections, and above all, in basic individual training and skills, in the fundamentals. They are also much better in manuever, and are outstanding tactically.

4. I don't know why the company is so outstanding. They have an outstanding company and 1st sergeant. But the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants are average. The soldiers E4 and

below are more cohesive. They take care of one another more.
You'll never find one alone; you never find one getting in
trouble because he's alone.

5. I think the vertical integration there is much better.
They know one another better. They are more familiar with each
other. Sometimes this is not good.

6. We have a lot of visitors here. Whenever one comes he
gets sent to my COHORT unit because they look so good.

7. When I first got here I realized that relationships
between COHORT and my conventional companies were not very
good. All the others thought of them as different. There were
bad relationships in the battalion and between the COs. That's
changed now. The battalion relationships are good now. The
initial problems are over. The unit members still think of
themselves as an entity and different, but the other units no
longer resent them or see them as separate.

8. The COHORT unit is generally upbeat and its soldiers
complain about insignificant things like the weather, not enough
ammo and so on, not about duty rosters.

9. My view of the battalion's status is based upon blotter
reports, training, my open door policy. I talk to the troops and
encourage them to come and see me. I spend a lot of time
informally walking around and talking to soldiers. When I first
came, I ran some OE sessions with the troops."

Another battalion commander:

"1. This unit hasn't been here long enough to seriously
evaluate, but I can tell you they had a lot of dud NCOs dumped on
them. There are a few good ones but they are mostly incompetent
and the most important ones can't seem to make it work. The most
critical one is being relieved today. He created a lot of
dissension and there has been utter chaos in the unit,
particularly before they came here from CONUS.

2. They've jerked a lot of people around. The way they
worked this has done a lot of damage to my battalion. I had to
tear up a good unit to bring in this bunch. The battalion has to
be cohesive, too. You've got to get them to believe in the
battalion, not just the individual units. That's the problem
with bringing them in here as a unit. So many of our SOPs are
different from anywhere else. It will take at least a year for
them to become integrated into the battalion. Then they'll be
gone.

3. They are good soldiers, high spirited, good workers, the
junior soldiers. The NCOs are weak. It's hard to tell if its a
vertically cohesive unit because of all the conflicts in the
command group. The soldiers certainly came up actively in our

battalion sports program and won a big one right away. They seem
to have a lot of cohesion there.

4. They didn't do as well as my other units in some tests,
but I felt the reason, again, was the NCOs--they're very weak--as
a group they are far below average. CONUS and FORSCOM did a job
on us with the leadership of this unit.

5. The soldiers are good and willing. They are a good
group; they have had good training. They look upon themselves as
a unit. They will do well; they are a lot better than their
NCOs. The soldiers and the acting NCOs are able to acheive a lot
more than what they are assigned to do.

6. There was some sabotage of equipment that went to
them. But that's not the only aspect of their maintenance
problems--their E6s just aren't capable of running hard.

7. Eventually it will be a good unit, but I've got to make
a lot of changes in its command structure."

A third battalion commander:

1. When my COHORT company first got here they were
different. When my other companies went to run in the morning
there were jodies and joking but not the COHORT unit. They ran
silently, but always faster and further than the other
companies. Their uniforms, barracks, behavior and general make
up clearly indiciated a well trained cohesive and proud unit.

2. When they arrived they didn't know how good the
battalion was, but they knew how good they were. They are tough
competitors. They won't accept second place but always go for
first place. They go for all or nothing.

3. Their platoon sergeants were good, not standouts, but
you felt they and the soldiers had been together a long time.
They told their soldiers what to do and it happened. They seemed
to respect them and treat them as people. Not like the CO.

4. The CO was an authoritarian. He was a big bully. I'm
sure even his mother had difficulty in liking him. He was a
dictator who ruled with an iron fist. He repressed everyone and
everything. He was a one-man show. It took a long time but I
finally got an opportunity to pull him. The only respect he
could have gotten from anyone was to his rank.

5. The soldiers were bright, well-trained. Only the first
sergeant kept that COHORT unit together at all. That and
pride. I know what that first sergeant was up against. It was
appalling.

6. They are at a higher level of training and skill than my
other maneuver companies. I would say it would take 30 days for

them to get up to the level of my COHORT company. They would be very strong in combat. They wouldn't run. They would hang on to the eleventh hour. They would hold their positions. The COHORT company has an edge. The COHORT people know each other. They know each other's strengths and weaknesses and know who they can count on in respect to skill and professionalism--they also know who the potential weak ones and cowards are."

A fourth battalion commander:

"1. First, let me tell you that good units are good because of strong leadership, not because of cohesion or keeping people together or any of that stuff. Soldiers are supposed to follow and do things that good leaders tell them to do. Leaders are born. You can only teach people to teach the tangibles, the "how to's". Men are either leaders or not.

2. I think it's a damn good unit with certain reservations. I don't think it would necessarily exceed in combat. A lot of leaders do well in peacetime working out of fear only of those above them. In peacetime that works. In combat if they are not true leaders they fail. So I can't tell you that they or any of these units would exceed others.

3. This is an above average unit. It is above average because it has a strong chain of command. The chain equals the company, that's the one thing that counts. As COHORT it has an advantage. We received soldiers with better discipline; discipline like basic training and AIT. They do have better individual and unit discipline than the other units in the Battalion. That shows in the indicators.

4. They do things well. They have a lot of rah-rah. I don't like that rah-rah kind of team work, but to my mind they don't perform better than other good units. Their real weakness is in their squad leaders and team leaders. They do as well as other units on common tasks, SQT; they have basic teamwork and their leadership has drive, but their basic leadership doesn't have the skills. They hustle but they don't know what to do.

5. As a company they do very well, they maneuver well. It's squads and below where they don't do well. It's a problem of their leadership and their leadership's lack of knowledge of Germany.

6. I think they would do as well as my other companies, not because of COHORT but because of the normal reasons why soldiers do well. I think COHORT might be of value if they were coming directly from the states into combat. Then I think they might do better than another non-COHORT unit.

7. The COHORT CO is not a team player; he's for his company, not the battalion. He really thinks of it as HIS company. That's one reason I rate it No. 3 of my companies. My

other two COs are team players. The discriminator is that he is not a team player.

8. You must remember soldiers follow the lead of what we tell them. They pick up what you bitch about. If I say something is OK they will all think it's OK. Thats how they are. They follow the lead of what we tell them."

A fifth battalion commander:

"1. I think it's a good unit. They have done things very well. They have done all of their tasks and missions and have worked quite well together. That's based on their chain and the fact that they are enthusiastic about themselves. They feel that they are better than anyone. Not that they necessarily are. Sometimes they are better; sometimes they are worse.

2. I think it would do very well in combat. It's well trained and well disciplined. Overall they are probably my best maneuver unit. They have a disciplined and strong chain. From a tactical standpoint they would do very well. However, let me say that I think they are too cohesive. If they were given an impossible or difficult task, I would not trust them. They would probably fall apart. Why? Because they are so cohesive and know each other so well. Units like that will fall apart when a number of people get killed. They know each other too well. They are too close. In a really difficult high casualty situation, I'd rather have one of my other units where people don't know each other well and don't care about each other.

3. They are absolutely part of the battalion. We took that head on as a problem and got them 100% committed.

4. They are really a strong unit and have no weaknesses that you could talk about in the same way you talk about their strengths. Their maintenance, esprit, their whole manner of doing things. Their maintenance, hell, they really understand it and believe in it. Their equipment doesn't fail.

5. One of the reasons they are so good is that each man knows his job. As for cross training I don't believe in it. I think the most important thing is that each soldier know his job better than anyone else. I don't want them to know other peoples' jobs. I told them that. No training one man at another man's job. I want each man to know his job the best possible, period!

6. I'm very proud of the unit and of how it's doing. I really support the program and support cohesion and stability.

NCO Selection Requirements

The selection requirements, extension, reenlistment or bar, have had essentially negative effects. It must be remembered,

however, that these effects were exacerbated by the fact that COHORT was new and was viewed by a number of career soldiers with suspicion. It was seen by a number of NCOs as violating long standing conditions of their relationship to the Army. These violations were seen as selective alterations of contracts for those who had the "misfortune" to be in COHORT units, as opposed to the rest of the Army which continued under the "normal" scheme of things. The contrast of this perceived "selective disability" as opposed to the "business as usual" status of colleagues in non-COHORT units added to the intensity of expression. The concerns presented by NCOs do not necessarily represent the violations of basic values that they often sounded like in presentation. Some NCOs who most vehemently asaulted basic COHORT or regimental concepts, such as home basing for example, would describe it as good idea in one context (more effective unit, easier on families), and attack it vehemently in another (having been coerced or ordered into a pattern of long term obligation that did not apply to most other soldiers).

The most often expressed concerns in the interviews of the NCOs about these aspects of COHORT assignment were the following:

1. Coercion and loss of mobility upon reenlistment. The selective aspect was seen as a special disability since a 'good' soldier or a 'good' NCO could have his career ended if he wanted to do something different or go to school.

2. The loss of mobility. Many NCOs cited the desire for maximum mobility and new experiences--a common American value--as a basic reason for joining the Army. There was a widespread feeling that assigment to a COHORT unit had terminated all possibility of mobility for the rest of their careers.

3. Being trapped, again, non-volitionally, in a home base rotation that might be undesirable or economically disadvantageous. Again this concern was most often prefaced with the statement, "Nobody asked me whether or not I wanted to do this. It was go COHORT or get out of the Army."

4. The widely disseminated view that COHORT unit assignments were injurious to NCO careers by locking them into a single unit with "no room for promotion or moving up."

5. The widespread view that because COHORT had many of the above disabilities and was considered to be in some ways "elite," it should have been a voluntary rather than a coerced assignment.

6. A number of senior NCOs, particularly at the Sergeant First Class and First Sergeant level, felt that as members of COHORT units they were being discriminated against and their careers injured by the loss of the possibilities of advanced schooling. Again it was not, for most, the actual case that they were deprived of entry to the Sergeants Major Academy, or First Sergeants School, or of an actual promotion. The issue was

conceptual; it was one of belief that a departure from the bureaucratically normal patterns of assignment and rotation would bring both short term and long term disabilities. It might best be described as fear of the consequences of alteration of the long term patterns through which the Army has done its business.

COHORT NCOs may be divided into three groups. It is, once again, important to point out that attitudes in all three groups were affected by battalion command climate and relationships among unit leadership and the NCOs, in particular relationships between the CO and first sergeant.

1. Those who came aboard voluntarily. These NCOs chose to enter COHORT units because they "liked the idea," "had been in a stabilized unit before and liked the way it turned out," were "eager for a new challenge," wanted a situation in which "I would have the responsibility for molding my people," "felt COHORT would be career enhancing" and so forth. These NCOs, estimated at third, self selected for COHORT units and were the most positive about the units, the COHORT experience and potentialities. They made up the overwhelming majority of NCOs who expressed the desire to continue their careers in COHORT units, and appeared to have the best grasp of the COHORT concept and its special requirements. They seemed to be among the most enthusiastic about the multiple and accretive training possibilities in COHORT units as well. They were not evenly distributed through the units but tended to cluster in those units that had selected for "quality," and that had bent the requirements in an attempt to ensure self selected cadre.

2. The second group, again about a third of the sample, viewed their COHORT assignment as "another assignment" to be discharged as best as possible in their capacity as career soldiers.

3. A final third saw COHORT as essentially negative, a coerced alteration of their careers, possessed of the entire spectrum of disabilities discussed above. These NCOs were undoubtedly responsible for many of the negative views of COHORT held by their soldiers. (Often when soldiers were questioned about strongly held negative views of COHORT, they referred to their mid-range NCO's as the source of their information.)

Their own low morale often affected the morale of their soldiers. This group produced the majority of the NCOs who had "difficulties" with the training demands of the COHORT process. They are the ones who most often stated that they had exhausted all their "knowledge and trained [my] soldiers with all I know." They are the NCOs who most often presented themselves as "burnt out" by the COHORT process or who conceived of the COHORT unit as in no way different from a conventional unit in terms of training needs.

The dislike these NCOs evidenced at being in COHORT units

was often palpable. A number began their interviews wondering if the interviewer could help "get me out of this damned unit."

The distribution of such NCOs and such feelings was moderated by the character of unit leadership. Where leadership was supportive (at both battalion and unit levels) and supplied clear information about the COHORT system, rotation, promotion etc., the impact of the perceived coercive nature of recruitment of COHORT cadre was minimized. In units perceived in contrary fashion, it was maximized. Overall, however, the interviews leave the impression that the image of coercion was an extremely injurious one and one which "tainted" the image of the COHORT unit for many of its members.

Leaders' Comparisons of COHORT and non-COHORT Units: Interview Summary

The majority of battalion commanders and higher staff assess their COHORT units as potentially more combat effective than their conventional units. Almost all feel that COHORT units possess greater psychological strength, and will be capable of greater resistance to the stresses of combat.

Almost all leaders feel that their COHORT units, by virtue of their bonding and esprit, their knowledge of each others skills, strengths, and weaknesses and their concern for each other, will have longer staying power in combat and will resist the initial disruption and shock of combat better than the average conventional unit.

With few exceptions company/battery leadership perceived their COHORT units as either the best, or among the best, with which they had ever been associated. The units which they perceived as "better" were almost invariably elite organizations. In a number of cases NCOs with prior combat expressed the thought that if they had to go to war again they would far prefer to go with their present COHORT unit.

Comparisons of COHORT and non-COHORT units: Questionnaire Data

The generally more positive stance of leaders in respect to the combat potential and competency of units is demonstrated in responses to the WRAIR Company Perceptions Inventory. Leaders E-5 through O-3 who responded to the questionnaires consistently rated their COHORT units more highly than did their conventional unit counterparts, as shown in responses to the WRAIR Company Perceptions Inventory.

First Rotation COHORT Units

Mean Scores on the Company Perceptions Inventory: COHORT vs Conventional (USAREUR); Rank E-5 through O-3

41

Total Unit Sample: COHORT N=172 (9 Units) and CONV N=165 (8 Units)

(To interpret these scores please note that higher values are associated with more negative responses for all questions. Scores of some questions have been reversed to reflect this ordering to facilitate comparisons. The range of responses is 1-5, from "strongly agree (1)" through "can't say(3)" and "strongly disagree(5). Use the following symbols to determine if differences between responses to a question are significant by t-Test at p <.01: ** = COHORT soldiers significantly more positive than "Conventional" soldiers; ## = Conventional soldiers significantly more positive than COHORT soldiers.)

	COHORT E5/O3	CONV. E5/O3
1. This company is one of the best in the U.S. Army.	2.51**	3.12
2. People in this company feel very close to each other.	2.38**	3.28
3. The officers in this company really seem to know their stuff.	2.87	2.96
4. I think this company would do a better job in combat than most other army units.	2.29**	2.91
5. The men I work with always try to do a good job.	2.30	2.31
6. The NCO's in this company really seem to know their stuff.	2.29	2.69
7. I really know the people I work with very well.	2.14**	2.53
8. There are too many people in this company who are just out for themselves and don't care about others.	3.12	3.20
9. I spend my after duty hours with other people in this company.	2.90**	3.26
10. My closest friendships are with the people I work with.	2.94	3.15

11. The officers in this company don't spend enough time with the troops.   3.07   3.08

12. I am impressed by the quality of leadership in this company.   2.96   3.04

13. If I have to go to war the men I regularly work with are the ones I want with me.   2.21**   2.68

14. The NCOs in this company really don't spend enough time with the troops.   2.47   2.60

15. I really like the work I do.   2.41   2.52

16. I think the job this company is supposed to do is one of the most important in the Army.   2.16   2.10

17. There are several people in the chain of command of this company I would go to for help with a personal problem.   2.75   2.70

18. I have real confidence in our weapons and our ability to use them.   2.10   2.30

19. I think the level of training in this company is very high.   2.54**   3.09

20. If I have to go into combat I have great confidence in my personal skills and training.   1.72   1.89

21. Whites and blacks in this company mix after duty hours as well as at work.   2.59   2.51

22. Almost all of the people in this company can really be trusted.   2.95   3.18

23. I really want to spend my entire tour in the Army in this company.   3.93   3.97

24. My superiors make a real attempt to know me and treat me as a person.   3.09   3.00

25. I believe that the people in my company will stand by me in any difficult situation.   2.59**   2.98

26. I think people in this company
will get tighter as time goes on.   2.92   2.72

27. I really enjoy being a member
of this company.   2.68   2.86

28. This company is a secure place.
You don't have to watch your possessions
in the company area.   3.40   3.46

29. People really look out for each
other in my company.   2.77**   3.30

30. I think we are better trained
than other companies in the Army.   2.26**   3.04

31. The Officers and NCOs in this
company would do well in combat.   2.41**   2.79

32. The soldiers in this company
are skilled enough for me to trust
my life to them in combat.   2.63**   3.01

     Soldiers E-4 and below demonstrate this positive COHORT
effect even more markedly than do their leaders. The level at
which they appraise their competence and skill is significantly
higher than that of their conventional counterparts. These
perceptions, as studies in past wars demonstrate, do correlate
significantly with actual battlefield performance. Even in units
where morale is poor and leadership perceived as poor, COHORT
soldiers believe in their technical proficiency and military and
combat abilities. Typically they assert that they know and are
good at their jobs, that they would function well in combat and
would "kick ass" in any battle with "Ivan", if war should come.
The members of each COHORT unit consider themselves the best in
their battalion and the best at their post. Members of
conventional units tended to be more tentative in their
assessments. The question "How do you think you'd do in combat?"
usually brought silence followed by mixed response and often by
arguments. The commonest response was, "I don't know" usually
followed by an estimate of loss of one half to two thirds of the
unit in the first day. The almost universal confidence of the
COHORT soldiers was lacking.

Particularly in terms of horizontal relationships and bonding,
COHORT units are markedly different from most conventional
units. The ones they resemble most are Ranger battalions whose
members use much the same descriptive metaphors of "family," and
"brothers," and focus heavily on knowledge of each other's
strengths and weaknesses in describing their units. These
commonalities were marked in debriefings carried out by WRAIR
research personnel of Rangers following the Grenada rescue
operation. Conventional units in USAREUR responded markedly

differently. In no case did members of a conventional unit spontaneously discuss their perception of individual strengths and weakness within the unit.

The differences in the web of ties and perception that bonds COHORT soldiers as contrasted to conventional soldiers is most clearly demonstrated in data dealing directly with cohesion and bonding from the WRAIR Company Perceptions Inventory. Here, once again, item by item t-tests show many significant differences favoring COHORT.

Mean Scores on the Company Perceptions Inventory:
COHORT vs Conventional (USAREUR)

Total unit sample

COHORT N=576 (9 Units)
CONV   N=449 (8 Units)

E1/E4 SAMPLE
COHORT N=406 (9 Units)
CONV.   N=285 (8 Units)

(To interpret these scores please note that higher values are associated with more negative responses for all questions. Scores of some questions have been reversed to reflect this ordering to facilitate comparisons. The range of responses is 1-5, from "strongly agree (1)" through "can't say(3)" and "strongly disagree(5). Use the following symbols to determine if differences between responses to a question are significant by t-Test at p <.01: ** = COHORT soldiers significantly more positive than "Conventional" soldiers; ## = Conventional soldiers significantly more positive than COHORT soldiers.)

	COHORT ALL	CONV. ALL	COHORT E1/E4	CONV. E1/E4
1. This company is one of the best in the U.S. Army.	2.86**	3.35	3.01**	3.49
2. People in this company feel very close to each other.	2.54**	3.44	2.61**	3.54
3. The officers in this company really seem to know their stuff.	3.17	3.12	3.29	3.21
4. I think this company would do a betterjob in combat than most other army units.	2.54**	3.22	2.63**	3.28
5. The men I work with always try to do a good job.	2.66	2.52	2.82	2.64

6. The NCO's in this company really seem to know their stuff.	2.84	3.00	3.07	3.18
7. I really know the people I work with very well.	2.22**	2.65	2.26**	2.72
8. There are too many people in this company who are just out for themselves and don't care about others.	3.47	3.53	3.62	3.73
9. I spend my after duty hours with other people in this company.	2.72**	2.99	2.64	2.83
10. My closest friendships are with the people I work with.	2.83**	3.10	2.79**	3.07
11. The officers in this company don't spend enough time with the troops.	3.22	3.27	3.29	3.38
12. I am impressed by the quality of leadership in this company.	3.41	3.48	3.60	3.73
13. If I have to go to war the men I regularly work with are the ones I want with me.	2.53**	2.83	2.67**	2.92
14. The NCOs in this company really don't spend enough time with the troops.	2.79	2.79	2.93	2.90
15. I really like the work I do.	2.92	2.84	3.14	3.02
16. I think the job this company is supposed to do is one of the most important in the Army.	2.59##	2.31	2.78##	2.42
17. There are several people in the chain of command of this company I would go to for help with a personal problem.	3.08	3.11	3.22	3.35
18. I have real confidence in our weapons and our ability to use them.	2.49	2.54	2.65	2.67
19. I think the level of training in this company is very high.	2.68**	3.14	2.74**	3.16
20. If I have to go into combat I have great confidence in my personal skills and training.	2.03	1.98	2.16	2.03

21. Whites and blacks in this company mix after duty hours as well as at work.	2.89##	2.63	3.01##	2.75
22. Almost all of the people in this company can really be trusted.	3.48	3.50	3.71	3.67
23. I really want to spend my entire tour in the Army in this company.	3.96	4.10	3.97	4.17
24. My superiors make a real attempt to know me and treat me as a person.	3.46	3.41	3.61	3.65
25. I believe that the people in my company will stand by me in any difficult situation.	2.94**	3.26	3.09**	3.42
26. I think people in this company will get tighter as time goes on.	3.20**	2.98	3.31	3.14
27. I really enjoy being a member of this company.	3.08	3.22	3.25	3.43
28. This company is a secure place. You don't have to watch your possessions in the company area.	3.68	3.77	3.80	3.94
29. People really look out for each other in my company.	2.99**	3.44	3.08**	3.52
30. I think we are better trained than other companies in the Army.	2.45**	3.13	2.50**	3.18
31. The Officers and NCOs in this company would do well in combat.	3.97	3.06	3.21	3.21
32. The soldiers in this company are skilled enough for me to trust my life to them in combat.	2.98**	3.20	3.13	3.31

An alternative way of interpreting these materials is to examine responses to the eight cohesion questions (Numbers 2,7,9,10,13,21,25,29 above) by type of company (COHORT vs non-COHORT) within each battalion. For this analysis, the total number (out of eight) of questions responded to more positivley for each unit was totalled.

	COHORT	CONVENTIONAL
Bn A	8	0
BN B	7	1
BN C	7	1
BN D	6	2
BN E	5	3
BN F	3	5

Here we see that unit by unit five of the six COHORT Units
score better than do their conventional counterparts in terms of
the number of cohesion questions responded to more positively.
In the case of the cohort unit in Battalion F, the cause appears
not to lie in the COHORT process. Interviews in these units
indicate that the causes of negative responses appear rather to
be generated in three areas, some of which have already been
discussed at length.

1. The first is Kaserne or post.

2. The second is battalion command climate.

3. The third is degree of vertical integration within the
company or battery and the correlative degrees of trust,
competence, concern and buffering perceived by lower ranking
soldiers. A post climate or command climate perceived to be
punitive or hostile by the soldier may be strongly buffered and
compensated for by tight vertical integration of the company. A
disvalued unit commander may be compensated for by strong unit
bonding between soldiers and NCOs and so forth. Each of these
factors and the interactions between them affects the units view
of itself and the unit members' view of the effectiveness and
desirability of being in the unit. Many such issues have little
to do with the COHORT process but are univeral ones for an armed
force. However, they may be complicated and confounded by the
symbolic ways in which they are gathered into the concept of
COHORT by unit members.

Vertically well-integrated COHORT units impressed all as
exceptional. COHORT units in which soldiers and junior and mid-
range NCOs perceived their leadership as uncaring and incompetent
impressed one as well with the sense of anger and sense of
distrust and betrayal and frustration with which the unit and the
Army were perceived. While members of some conventional units
were as alienated as members of these COHORT units, a subtle
difference appeared to exist between the two. In the
conventional unit a collection of individuals or small groups
were alienated and unhappy primarily in terms of their own
perceived disabilities as individuals and small groups. In the
COHORT unit unhappiness, low morale and alienation were a group
process. They were both an individual and collective response.
An injury to one was perceived as an injury to all. The first
termers in COHORT units established a rapid collective stance

towards their leaders and their actions. The problems of
leadership in COHORT units are therefore somewhat unique, in that
the COHORT unit am fies the consequences of a leader's acts
through the profou. processes of identification that the
soldiers have with each other. The very processes that maximize
cohesiveness, interpersonal, psychological and social support,
and the profound belief that ones' fellows are the singular group
of men with whom one would wish to go into combat with, place far
greater demands on leaders and their skills than does leadership
in conventional units.

The COHORT soldier, in all interviews, has higher
expectations of his leaders than most soldiers in conventional
units. He expects to truly be led by example and to be led by
those who "participate" and "bear their fair share of the
burden." "Not doing my job, but doing theirs and teaching me."
He expects fairness and equity for himself and his fellows.
Above all, he expects respect for himself, his needs, and family
needs. When these factors are seen as disregarded or abused by
leaders, COHORT soldiers respond as a unit whenever any sense of
inequity is involved. Thus, when an unpopular and disliked unit
leader r moved a thief and a drug dealer under Chapter
discharges, his act was applauded by his soldiers who felt no
sense of solidarity with "those no good dirt bags." When,
however, he refused to let a "good soldier" out of a field
exercise to deal with a family emergency (a sick, pregnant wife)
the act became a capstone solidifying the unit's hostility and
contempt for him. COHORT units are "leader demanding" and leader
sensitive to a much greater degree than are conventional units.
The degree to which any COHORT unit reaches its potential is
significantly leadership dependent.

Problems of COHORT Units as seen in USAREUR:

One critical problem was that of the relationship of
"information" to perceptions and expectations. This was true of
both COHORT and conventional units. Some leaders expressed
unhappiness with the the constant demands of their soldiers to
"know why." This was expressed particularly strongly in some
COHORT units where it was seen as a widespread and somehow
illegitimate, as well as new, kind of demand. One school of
thought seemed to feel that soldiers asking why certain kinds of
things had be done was prejudicial to good discipline and order,
that it respresented a potential threat to authority. It was
seen as "something new we have to cope with; this never existed
in the old Army." (It is interesting to point out that Baron Von
Steuben characterized the American soldier as one who constantly
insisted upon being told why he had to do what he did--its uses,
ends, and utility, before he would respond to orders.) This
perception of "why" queries as prejudicial to the unit status quo
led to problems that were generated by significantly different
interpretations of events. Soldiers often saw necessary demands
as capriciously des.gned make work since its necessity had never
been explained. Personnel changes were likewise viewed as

assaults upon the first term soldiers rather than acts that may
have had significant causes. In one unit a First Sergeant who
was extremely popular with the troops was removed for cause after
the development of extreme conflict between him and the unit
commander. The NCO had been viewed by the first termers as their
only "real friend" and protector in the COHORT unit's chain of
command. The threat of his removal precipitated a mass
protest. Following an abortive attempt to mollify the unit on
the part of its commander, a collapse of morale and the
generation of potent anti-unit and anti-Army sentiment ensued.
No really substantive explanations were made and in time the
event was transformed by the soldiers into a racially motivated
one. (The popular former First Sergeant was black and, at the
time, the only black NCO in a unit with a significant black
content.) By the final months of the unit's life cycle it showed
signs of some racial polarization (the only unit in which race
was an issue of any sort) and significant alienation from the
Army and its values on the part of first term soldiers.

Only a few of the problems of COHORT units are specific to
such units. The overwhelming majority of problems affecting such
units, their cohesion, morale and perceived effectiveness are
reflections of general problems involving leadership,
organization, and actions that affect all the units studied.
However, some of these general problems have more intensive or
skewed effects on COHORT units. This appears to be particularly
true of leadership factors. Others are based upon what appears
to be a COHORT-specific factor, that is a lack of understanding
of the nature and intent of the NMS-COHORT process. COHORT units
are sometimes perceived as special, different, or elite in ways
that have little to do with the assumptions that underly unit
stabilization. The reasons for unit stabilization and the
outcomes to be anticipated from stabilization itself are at times
misunderstood or misperceived. At times, policies or stances
towards the unit are adopted that tend to counter and undo the
enhanced horizontal bonding and the intended movement towards
enhanced vertical bonding that are desired as specific outcomes
of the COHORT process. In other cases policy decisions are made
which treat the COHORT unit as if it were a conventional unit.
Command training policies may not build upon the stability and
"accretive" skill acquisition model implicit in COHORT.

If there is one essential set of problems degrading both
COHORT and regular units it is a set of problems that may be
cojoined under the heading "malfunctional leadership and the
mismanagement of human resources." Leaders whose behavior leads
to their characterization by their subordinates as unthinking,
uncaring and unfeeling leaders are seen as alienating their
soldiers from unit, post, and Army. Leaders who are perceived as
petty tyrants, gross authoritarians, micro-managers or
thoughtless advancers of self-interest are consistently seen by
their subordinates as undermining unit integrity, disrupting
vertical bonding and degrading unit readiness and collective
spirit. Leaders are perceived as disregarding both the essential

needs and individual concerns and aspirations of their soldiers, and as not recognizing "that the soldier is part of the mission" when they repeat the shibboleth that mission comes first and "concern" about soldiers second. Those who are perceived as using that canned phrase to justify arbitrary and capricious work, leave, pass, and other policies, contribute to this alienation from the goals of the cohesive, vertically-bonded unit. In such units soldiers capacities to endure and maintain a commitment to competence and willingness for combat are maintained in spite of their leadership. Soldiers define, in these units, their competence and performance as a "defense against the harassment of their leaders." They will say, "We max every inspection so that they will keep off our backs and leave us alone." In contrast, in the vertically bonded units soldiers will say, "We max everything because we have the highest standards in this battalion."

I use the term "perceived bad leadership" deliberately. It is not my intention to imply that a significant number of leadership positions are held by "bad," "incompetent," or "vicious" officers and NCOs. Good people may readily be perceived as bad leaders. The instances of such maladaptive leadership also help to demonstrate that the robustness of the COHORT bonding and "knowing" effect represents a highly significant outcome. It serves as an offset to alienation and perceived, unconcerned leadership and punitive command climates. Leaders who are perceived as not caring about their soldiers' needs, or as militarily incompetent, lead units with measured decrements in morale and unnecessarily high levels of stress. The COHORT process seems to provide the soldier with more sustenance to endure such stresses and low morale and maintain confidence and commitment. It does not, however, offset or reduce such stresses.

Chapter V

THE MEASUREMENT OF "SOLDIER WILL"

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Summary of Results of the "Soldier Will" Survey

Research Objectives

The U.S. Army is attempting to increase combat readiness through a series of initiatives known as the New Manning System (NMS), which entails profound changes in the structure, training, and deployment of combat units. These changes are expected to significantly alter human dimensions that appear to be centrally involved in the soldier's will to fight and his ability to survive the psychological stress of combat. A crucial element in evaluating the soldier's will to fight (collectively known as "soldier will") and its relationship to unit structure, training, and deployment is the reliable and valid assessment of those psychological phenomena that compose the soldier's will to fight. The research objective of this first report of results obtained from the Soldier Will Survey was to identify and develop reliable and valid measures of "soldier will."

Sample Description

A sample of two COHORT battalions and three nonCOHORT battalions (27 companies, total N = 2830) was studied to develop reliable and valid measures of "soldier will." Results obtained in this sample were also used to build and to test an analysis model for the NMS "Human Dimensions" Field Evaluation. The units sampled and studied in this report comprised one-fifth of the units under investigation in the NMS "Human Dimensions" Field Evaluation. Results, then, are not necessarily generalizable nor intended to be definitive for all units. Precautions were taken, however, to ensure the results obtained were valid for the sample under study. Units were matched by unit type (infantry, armor, or artillery), unit status (COHORT or nonCOHORT), and post location. In addition, demographic and unit characteristics were controlled for in comparisons.

Summary of Findings

"Soldier will" can be reliably measured. Results demonstrated that "soldier will" can be reliably measured in terms of seven psychological constructs; these are:

1. Company Combat Confidence
2. Senior Command Confidence
3. Small-Unit Command Confidence
4. Concerned Leadership
5. Sense of Pride
6. Unit Social Climate
7. Unit Teamwork

Seven attitudinal scales, corresponding to these constructs, were developed. The scales showed high internal consistency and were generally unidimensional.

"Soldier will" scales have validity. To demonstrate the validity of the measures, two levels-of-analyses were used. One approach used scores obtained from individual soldiers, whereas the other approach used mean scores of companies.

If the "soldier will" measures tap a more global construct like unit cohesion and esprit, then soldiers should have scored similarly among the measures. "Soldier will" measures demonstrated a high degree of interrelationship which showed they are components of a more general, unitary concept, such as unit cohesion.

If "soldier will" scales measure positive unit characteristics, then they should bear positive relationships to measures of positive life adjustment, such as life satisfaction, Army satisfaction, psychological well-being, and should have negative relationships to personal distress, medical problems, and wanting to get out of the Army. Soldiers who scored high on "soldier will" reported greater life and Army satisfaction, greater psychological well-being, less personal distress, fewer medical problems, and expressed more willingness to re-enlist and stay in the Army than those soldiers who scored low on "soldier will."

The COHORT system of replacement, training, and deployment has strong historical precedent in terms of its intended effects on soldier morale and unit cohesion. The expectation is that COHORT soldiers should score higher on "soldier will" scales than nonCOHORT counterparts if these scales measured soldier morale, unit esprit, and cohesion. In fact, COHORT soldiers consistently scored higher on the "soldier will" measures. Most differences were small, but differences were significant and consistent across all "soldier will" measures. Differences were most pronounced on the Small-Unit Command Confidence and Unit Social Climate Scales, especially for first-termers (E-4s and below).

The COHORT "treatment" is realized at the company-level. Soldiers are organized by company as they go through basic and advanced individual training, and personnel are stabilized at the lowest level within the company. When companies were arrayed from highest to lowest on each measure of "soldier will," COHORT companies had higher company means on four of six "soldier will" scales. A similar analysis identified companies that fell in both the upper one-third and lower one-third of the arrays of rankings on "soldier will." Eight of eight companies that fell in the lower one-third across the "soldier will" scales were nonCOHORT companies, and three of four companies in the upper one-third were COHORT. In yet another analysis, paratroop COHORT, COHORT, and nonCOHORT companies were compared on "soldier will" to provide a method of evaluating mean differences in scale scores. Mean "soldier will" scores increased in magnitude from nonCOHORT to COHORT to paratroop COHORT companies consistently, though not always significantly.

Demographic correlates of "soldier will." Also worth mentioning are demographic characteristics that bore significant relationships to "soldier will." Whereas race and education were not correlated with the "soldier will" measures, age, rank, marital status, place of residency, and unit type (infantry, armor, or artillery) were. When controls for other unit and demographic charterisitics were applied in comparisons, race, rank, type of unit, and place of residency were significant predictors of "soldier will." Generally, older soldiers, and those soldiers in armored units and who lived either in on-post housing and in off-post housing fared better on the "soldier will" measures than younger, artillery men who lived in the barracks. Soldiers of higher rank reported higher company combat confidence, senior

command confidence, greater sense of pride, and unit social climate, but soldiers of lower rank reported greater small-unit command confidence.

Future Research Issues

Even if differences were observed between COHORT and nonCOHORT units, questions remain unanswered: What do these differences in "soldier will" mean in terms of measurable performance? What aspects of the COHORT process (for example, the common experience of basic and advanced individual training, or personnel stabilization) contribute most to observed differences in "soldier will?" The first question asks to translate the "soldier will" measures into measurable performance. Presently, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) is attempting to integrate both individual and unit training performance (obtained from The Combined Arms Testing Agency) into its questionnaire data base to determine relationships between "soldier will," unit status, and training performance.

The second question, "Which aspect of the COHORT process contributes most to "soldier will?," requires clear articulation of the COHORT "treatment," in addition to specifying which units receive which aspects of the COHORT "treatment." The NMS Field Evaluation has been preoccupied with outcome measures, trying to develop measures on which COHORT soldiers differ most from nonCOHORT soliders. These differences are then attributed to one unit being COHORT and the other nonCOHORT. Such a conclusion has obvious methodological flaws. But, even if soldier and unit differences between units were held constant in such comparisons, there are no guarantees that units under study did receive the COHORT "treatment." To specify which aspect of the COHORT process gives what changes in "soldier will," training performance, logistics, or whatever the outcome measure, different operational definitions of COHORT must be clearly articulated and measured for each unit under study. To compare COHORT to nonCOHORT units does not tell Army leaders in the vaguest way which aspect of the COHORT process gives the most positive outcomes. Emphasis is needed on monitoring the processes of COHORT: Do COHORT units receive the COHORT "treatment," and to what degree? To evaluate the processes that make a unit COHORT requires measurable aspects of the COHORT "treatment." A major aspect of COHORT "treatment" was to enhance the quality of interpersonal relationships (through personnel stablization), enabling better coping with stress and moderating its deleterious effects on physical and psychological well-being as well as job performance. Presently, WRAIR is assessing differences in friendships, interpersonal support, and bonding among soldiers and their relationship to personal distress, "soldier will," and psychological and physical well-being for soldiers in COHORT and nonCOHORT units.

1. Introduction

The U.S. Army has attempted to increase combat readiness and in turn combat effectiveness through a series of initiatives known as the New Manning System (NMS). Through profound changes in the structure, training, and deployment of combat units, the NMS attempts to significantly alter human dimensions that appear to be centrally involved in the soldier's will to fight and his ability to survive the psychological stress of combat.

Traditionally, all soldiers are assigned to units as individuals. The NMS approach (called COHORT) assigns, trains, and deploys soldiers as intact groups during their first three-year enlistment in the Army. The common experience of basic and advanced individual training, transfer of personnel in groups, and low personnel turbulence within the unit during the initial first-term enlistment afford the opportunity to build strong interpersonal relationships. Strong interpersonal relationships in turn provide support for individuals, especially during stressful life circumstances. The availability and use of these support groups remediate the potentially negative psychological and physical effects of stress. The beneficial effects of social supports have strong logical as well as intuitive appeal and are empirically grounded.

Empirical accounts aside, the ameliorative effects of social support have strong intuitive appeal. The notion that individuals undergoing stressful life events should seek out others for help and advice in order to better cope with such circumstances and lessen personal distress is pervasive, and indeed, may be a cultural norm (Jung, 1984).

Although the mechanisms of social support have not been yet empirically teased out, there are two general interpretations as to how social supports operate. First, the buffering effect of social supports is conceived as an interactive process whereby social supports are more beneficial for persons who experience higher stress levels than those who experience lower stress levels. The second interpretation is that social supports make a direct contribution to one's positive mental well-being, irrespective of the amount of stressors that the individual experiences. Results obtained from surveys of the general population show a significant, albeit weak, inverse relationship between social supports and psychological distress symptomatology, while evidence for the buffering effect is mixed (for a review, see Griffith, 1985; Leavy, 1983).

These relationships are also believed to have both individual and group effects pertinent to the soldier's will to fight, especially during high-intensity and sustained operations. Greater group identity, cohesiveness, esprit, and high levels of mutual caring, sharing, and providing of emotional and instrumental support should occur. As a result, the individual should experience higher morale, general well-being, satisfaction, and commitment. NMS initiatives also allow for more advanced levels of individual and group training, that provide not only better behavioral performance, but create a psychosocial climate of exuberance. Troops have greater confidence in themselves, their leaders, and their weaponry.

Central to our "human dimensions" evaluation is the combat soldier's psychological readiness to fight and his psychological sustainment in combat

(collectively known as "soldier will") and their relationships to unit structure, training, and deployment. A crucial element in evaluating these relationships is defining the psychological phenomena that compose the soldier's will to fight. Based on previous research findings (Griffith, 1984), six highly interrelated factors were found to best represent psychological readiness; these are:

1. COHESION: A sense of belonging to the unit and trust in other soldiers in the unit.
2. GENERAL CONFIDENCE: Confidence in weaponry, individual skills, and abilities, and the perception of supportive relationships among fellow soldiers.
3. COMMAND CONFIDENCE: Confidence in tactical leaders and immediate supervisory cadre.
4. CONCERNED LEADERSHIP: Perception that leaders are concerned about the personal welfare and general well-being of their soldiers.
5. SENSE OF PRIDE: Pride in and perceived importance of self and the unit and its mission.
6. SUPPORTIVE RELATIONSHIPS: Quality of relationships with other unit members, to include the perception of socially supportive relationships among fellow soldiers and their families.

General Research Objectives of the "Human Dimensions" Field Evaluation

Comparison of COHORT and nonCOHORT units on "soldier will" requires reliable and valid measures of the psychological constructs that comprise "soldier will." The first objective of the "human dimensions" evaluation is to establish reliable and valid measures of "soldier will."

Our second research objective is to compare COHORT and nonCOHORT units on the measures of "soldier will."

The third objective of the evaluation goes beyond rather simple comparisons between COHORT and nonCOHORT units. We are especially concerned with how unit organization, training, and deployment (COHORT or nonCOHORT) affect "soldier will" and both individual and group training performance. That is, to what extent do COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers differ in training and combat performance, and to what degree are those differences attributable to the effect of the NMS on "soldier will?" To address these questions, a model was developed to increase conceptual clarity about the constructs of interest and their interrelationships, and to provide a model for analyses.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Specific Research Objectives of this Paper

This document addresses the first two general research objectives outlined above. Subsequent reports will update results of newly integrated data obtained from other units, in addition to presenting results pertinent to the third general research goal. The research objectives of this first technical paper are:

1. To develop reliable measures of "soldier will;"
2. To demonstrate the validity of "soldier will;"
3. To refine operational definitions of the concept "COHORT;" and
4. To discuss issues for future NMS research bearing on relationships of both COHORT unit status and "soldier will" to bonding among soldiers and between soldiers and their leaders, to personl distress, to physical and psychological well-being, and to both individual and group training performance.

2. Method

Sampling of Units Participating In the NMS Field Evaluation

Selection of units for the NMS "Human Dimensions" Field Evaluation was accomplished by matching COHORT and nonCOHORT units on three criteria: type of combat arms unit (namely, infantry, armor, or field artillery), post location, and site of OCONUS rotation. Units participating in the NMS "Human Dimensions" Evaluation are summarized in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 about here

The sampling frame consisted of nineteen battalions of which ten were infantry, four armor, and five field artillery. In addition, 44 "independent" COHORT companies and their matched nonCOHORT companies were included in the sampling frame. These companies were eleven mid- to end-of-life cyle "independent" COHORT companies (three infantry, four armor, and four field artillery) along with their five matched nonCOHORT companies (two infantry and three field artillery). Fourteen "beginning-of-life cycle" COHORT companies and their fourteen matched nonCOHORT comparison companies were also included in the sampling frame. In both the COHORT and nonCOHORT categories, there were eight infantry, five armor, and one field artillery. The 137 companies under study represented 20% of the Army's total unit strength.

Problems in coordinating survey dates with unit commanders, and the dissemination and reproduction of questionnaires caused an approximate two-month delay in the schedule for questionnaire administration. As a result, analyses reported in this report were not based on data obtained from the entire sampling frame (i.e., 137 companies). (Results obtained from the entire sampling frame will be reported in the second quarter of FY86.) Instead, data obtained from 27 companies (one-fifth of the sampling frame) were used for analyses in this technical paper. This sampling of units was judged to be adequate in size. In addition, COHORT and nonCOHORT units were comparable in number of companies, type of combat arms unit, and post location. The units in the present sample were five battalions, two COHORT battalions (one infantry and one field artillery), three nonCOHORT (one infantry, one armor, and one field artillery). Units were matched by type of unit, COHORT/nonCOHORT status, and post location. Table 2 summarizes companies and the number of soldiers by unit status (COHORT/nonCOHORT) within type of combat arms unit.

Sampling Questionnaire Respondents
within Participating Units

All soldiers in the five battalions under study formed the pool of potential respondents. Questionnaire administrators (BDM contractors) were asked to achieve at least an 80% response rate of personnel assigned to each company.

The overall response rate was 77.3%. The overall response rates between COHORT and nonCOHORT units differed statistically (respectively, 78.7% and 75.3%, $z = 2.15$, $p < .05$, two-tailed). A breakdown of response rates between COHORT and nonCOHORT units by rank (first-termers, NCOs and officers) showed that both first-termers and NCOs were overrepresented in the respondents from COHORT units.

"Soldier Will" Survey Instrument

The "Soldier Will" Questionnaire (Appendix I) was a compilation of behavioral and psychological measures. Some of these were newly constructed, and others had been employed in previous research and have demonstrated reliability, validity, and research utility. The questionnaire instrument was divided into ten sections; each is briefly described below.

Instructions. This section of the questionnaire informed the respondent of the general nature and purpose of the study, and how to complete the questionnaire instrument.

General information. The general information section was comprised of 41 items. Most items asked the respondent personal information such as his(her) unit assignment, gender, age, education, race, rank, native language, number of years on active duty, marital status, and living arrangements (e.g., on-post housing, off-post housing, household configuration). Personal information on the service member's spouse was also asked, such as his(her) age, education, and employment. Other items asked the respondent about how much time was spent at work, on field exercises, with family, taking care of personal matters, and relaxing and recreating. Still other questions related to perceptions of personnel turbulence within one's unit, desire to get out of the Army, willingness to reenlist, and reasons for reenlisting and for not reenlisting.

Unit cohesion and morale. The 19-item Unit Cohesion and Morale Scale was developed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) (Gal, 1983). The scale purportedly measures the soldier's perception of his(her) unit's cohesiveness and morale. Respondents rated items on a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 ("very high") to 5 ("very low"). So that higher item ratings consistently represented more positive unit characteristics (e.g., greater

unit morale), ratings given to the first 18 items were reversed scored.
Responses to Item 19 did not need reverse scoring.

Two separate studies, one employing a sample of U.S. Army Cavalry
soldiers stateside (N = 309) and another using a sample of U.S. Army Cavalry
soldiers stationed abroad (N = 243), yielded Cronbach alphas of .86 and .87
respectively (R. Gal, personal communication, October, 1984). Scale scores
for IDF units have also been shown to be strongly related to known correlates
of a highly cohesive unit (e.g., high performance, low combat casualties) as
reported by Gal (1983).

Modified Field Forces Questionnaire. Twenty-five items were included in
this section. Items asked soldiers to rate statements about pride in and
importance of oneself, the unit, and the Army in general; unit "togetherness"
or cohesion; unit morale; and unit leadership. The majority of these items
were taken from the "Field Forces Questionnaire" developed by Army researchers
during World War II to investigate attitudes of soldiers prior to and after
the Normandy invasion (Stouffer, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949). In its
original form, items were scored employing the Guttman scalogram. Items were
reworded slightly to increase their contemporary relevance and to make 5-point
Likert scale response categories. Responses ranged from "strongly disagree"
(scored as 1) to "strongly agree" (scored as 5). Higher ratings represented
more positive relations among soldiers, e.g., pride in oneself or greater
sense of unit cohesiveness.

Mental well-being. The 18-item General Well-being (GWB) Scale was
developed by Dupuy (1978) and was a measure of "the net impact of many forces
that affect an individual's subjective emotional or feeling states" (Dupuy,
1978, p. 2). Questions asked respondents about such things as being bothered
by nervousness, losing control of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, feelings
of hopelessness, downheartedness, and loss of energy and vitality. Response
categories were precoded. Fourteen of the eighteen items were on a 6-point
Likert-type scale, and the remaining four were on an 11-point Likert-type
scale. Item responses were summed to form summative scale scores; higher
scores indicated greater mental well-being.

The GWB Scale has been used extensively on samples drawn from military
populations. Presently there are data from well over 6500 respondents from
both OCONUS and CONUS military populations in the Department of Military
Psychiatry's data base. The GWB Scale has demonstrated reliability and
validity in those samples. In a sample of 500 soldiers stationed stateside
(J. Martin, personal communication, October, 1984), the Cronbach alpha for
this scale was .90. In a sample of 321 spouses of Army service members, the
Cronbach alpha was .93 (Martin & Carney, 1984). In that same study, scale
scores were significantly and negatively correlated with a standardized
measure of depression, the CES-D (r = -.79).

In the present sample, the GWB Scale showed high internal consistency.
The Cronbach's alpha coefficient was .90 (N = 2557), and item-total
correlations ranged from .71 to .32, with 15 of 18 items having correlations
.50 or higher. Factor analysis of the scale showed the presence of three
factors. Factor 1 accounted for 42.0% of the total variance in item
ratings. Nine of the eighteen scale items loaded on this factor. Factor 1
measured distress symptoms of stress (e.g., feelings of nervousness,

tenseness, hopelessness, downheartedness, emotional instability, and loss of control of thoughts and feelings). Factor 2 accounted for 8.5% of the total variance in item ratings, and was labeled "Well-being." The eight items that loaded on this factor related to general feeling, life satisfaction, and level of enthusiasm and cheerfulness. The third factor accounted for 6.4% of the total variance in item ratings. The remaining two scale items that loaded on this factor pertained to psychosomatic complaints of distress. A scree test (Cattell, 1966 in Gorsuch, 1974) showed that treatment of emergent factors as subscales was not warranted.

Interpersonal support. This section was comprised of 10 items and tapped the soldier's interpersonal or social support. Degree of support offered by family and friends was measured, in addition to the respondent's assessment of reciprocal helping and the overall effectiveness of and satisfaction with the help. Responses were arranged on a 5-point Likert-type continuum. Items have high face and content validity, and are very similar to other standardized measures of social support (e.g., Sarason et al., 1983; Williams, Ware, & Donald, 1981).

Company perceptions. Thirty-five items comprised the Company Perceptions Scale. Items asked soldiers about their perceptions of the quality of relationships among soldiers; competency of officers, NCOs, and soldiers; and preparedness for combat. Items were rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5). Responses were keyed so that higher item ratings represented more positive unit characteristics, for example, soldier perception of competent and concerned leadership, preparedness of leaders, fellow soldiers, and self for combat.

This scale has been used in several previous Departmental investigations and was shown to have high internal consistency; alpha coefficients ranged from .91 to .93 (Marlowe, personal communication, November, 1984). Regarding the scale's validity, scale scores have been found to be significantly and positively correlated with measures of positive command climate and leader assessments in USAREUR units (Marlowe, personal communication, November, 1984).

Squad/platoon perceptions. This 30-item scale asked soldiers questions relating to small unit interpersonal relations, perceived competency of leaders, and combat readiness. Responses were arranged on a 5-point Likert-type scale. Response categories and scoring were identical to the Company Perceptions Scale. However, only soldiers at the squad-level (E-4s and below) completed this section. This scale had been employed in previous studies of small unit dynamics and has demonstrated reliability and validity (see Manning & Ingraham, 1984).

Family life. Thirty-eight items made up this section. Respondents were presented with several general "life areas" (e.g., marriage, family life, health, and neighborhood) and "life areas" specific to the military (e.g., sponsorship program, company's leave and pass policies, and the unit's concern for families). Respondents rated their degree of satisfaction with each life area on a 5-point Likert-type scale. Responses ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5). Four subscales were created based on reliability and factor analyses of data obtained from the present sample. These analyses are briefly summarized below.

81

Based on previous investigations (Martin, 1984), items were segregated according to content similarity. This yielded four scales: Life Satisfaction (F1-F12), Army Satisfaction (F13-F26), Spouse Support (F28-F32), and Psychological Sense of Community (F34-F38). (Numbers in parentheses indicate the numbered items in the "Family Life" section of the questionnaire comprising each scale.) Scales were then subject to reliability and factor analyses. The Life Satisfaction Scale had high internal consistency. Cronbach's alpha coefficient equalled .86 (N = 1179), and item-total correlations ranged from .69 to .43. A factor analysis of this scale showed three factors. Each factor was specific to different issues, namely, community concerns, personal and family concerns, and economic concerns. The three factors respectively accounted for 40.2%, 12.8%, and 10.3% of the total variance in item ratings.

The Army Satisfaction Scale also showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .90, N = 1156). Item-total correlations ranged from .71 to .44. Two factors emerged from this set of items. Factor 1 accounted for 44.6% of the total item variance and assessed satisfaction with unit policies that directly affect the soldier and his family. Factor 2 pertained to satisfaction with pay, Army life, job security, retirement, respect shown toward spouses and family. This second factor, reflecting general Army life issues, accounted for 9.3% of the total variance.

Compared to previous scales, the Spouse Support Scale showed less internal consistency. The Cronbach's alpha was .70 (N = 1024). Item-total correlations ranged from .54 to .42. Two factors emerged from a factor analysis of this scale. Factor 1, accounting for 45.8% of the total variance, was a measure support afforded by Army institutions, whereas Factor 2 assessed support provided by friends and neighbors. The second factor accounted for 25.3% of the total variance in ratings given to items.

The final family assessment scale was the Psychological Sense of Community Scale. This scale showed less internal consistency than the others. The Cronbach alpha coefficient was .70 (N = 1034), and item-total correlations ranged from .61 to .17. Three of the four items had item-total correlations above .40. A factor analysis of this scale showed one emergent factor accounting for 48.1% of total item variance.

For each subscale, item ratings were summed to form summative subscale scores. Higher scores represented greater life satisfaction, greater Army satisfaction, more spouse support, and greater psychological sense of community, respectively.

Volunteer Agreement and Privacy Act statements. This section was comprised of two pages. The first page was the "Volunteer Agreement" and was read to respondents. This statement fulfilled requirements of scientific and federal regulations pertaining to "informed consent" of research participants. The statement explained the general nature, scope and purpose of the study, and the soldier's rights as a research participant. The second page was entitled, "Privacy Act," and respondents were read this statement, asked to sign the statement, detach it from the questionnaire, and return it to the survey administrator.

Both statements were physically separated from the questionnaire at the time of questionnaire administration and then kept separate from the completed questionnaire instrument to ensure respondent anonymity. The Privacy Act contained the respondent's social security number and questionnaire number, and these data provided a mean. for researchers to track changes in "soldier will" across time, and also, to match data keyed by social security number in other data sets (e.g., training performance data—see below). Both the Volunteer Agreement and Privacy Act statements were kept under lock and key in the Department of Militar- Psychiatry. Only WRAIR researchers had access to these form.

Questionnaire administration. Representatives of the BDM Corp ation, contrac. field data collectors for The Combined Arms Testing Agenc. [CATA), administered the soldier questionnaires to soldiers of units under study in 'cco' nce with a pre-established schedule of questionnaire administration. Ques..ounaires were to be administered five times at six-month intervals during the three-year life cycle of a COHORT unit. Concurrently (at the same time intervals), questionnaires were to be administered to each COHORT unit's matched nonCOHORT comparison unit. Questionnaire administrations corresponded t. critical phases in the life cycle of a COHORT unit, namely, six months afte. unit formation, prior to OCONUS deployment, shortly after OCONUS deployment, mid-life during OCONUS deployment, and right prior to unit disae ablishment. Detailed written instructions were provided to contractors t assure standard questionnaire administration (see Appendix II).

Training Performance Data

Data on individual training performance (e.g., standard military occupation special. test scores, physical fitness scores, marksmanship scores, and the like) and group (company-level and battalion-level) training performance were obtained from TCATA. The procedure for reporting these data to WRAIR were: for independent companies, the data were collected on all soldiers and immediately after the company completed the "soldier will" questionnaire and for battalions, data were reported after the last company in the battalion had taken the questionnaire.

Analysis Plan to Accomplish Objectives

The first phase of analysis was aimed at clarifying the constructs of interest (see Figure 1 "Soldier Will"). Analyses consisted of a series of factor and reliability analyses to determine whether those constructs were demonstrated in the data, and also, to decide which items in the questionnaire coul1 be deleted (i.e., added little va 'ance to emergent factors and were uncorrelated with factor analytically derived scales).

The factor extraction method employed for all factor analyses was the principal components, with square multiple correlat in the diagonals. Components were rotated orthogonally by way of the v. x rotation method. To di ein the number of factors present in each analy. , two methods were employed: (1) the interpretability of items loading on factors; and (2) the scree test (Cattell, 1966, in Gorsuch, 1974, pp. 152-156). Factor analyses were again performed, specifying the number of factors to be extracted.

To determine which items comprised the factors, a relative criterion for a factor loading was used. Factor loadings for each item were examined across the extracted factors, and the highest loading for the item determined the factor on which the item was to be included. In cases where loadings of an individual item were very similar across emergent factors, the item was placed on more than one factor. The reliability analysis used was the SPSSx statistical package (SSPSx User's Guide, 1983, pp. 717-732). The package reported item means, standard deviations, inter-correlations, item-total correlations, and Cronbach's alpha coefficient.

Throughout the questionnaire, items were specific to unit assignment and rank (e.g., all company personnel, all company personnel with a rank of E-4 and below, etc.). Consequently, some scales were applicable for only certain subsets of respondents. For example, one set of questions was relevant only to E-4s and below assigned to companies; hence, any scales that included these items applied only to E-4s and below assigned to companies. For each factor-analytically-derived scale, the applicable respondent pool is described below.

The second phase of analyses validated the "soldier will" measures by demonstrating interrelationships among the "soldier will" measures and their relationship to life and Army satisfaction, psychological well-being, personal distress, medical problems, and wanting to stay in the Army.

In the third phase of analyses, simple comparisons between COHORT and nonCOHORT units were made on factor-analytically-derived scales. Comparisons were made at two levels: the individual- and company-level. While measurements were taken from the individual soldier and comparisons made between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers, the COHORT "treatment" is implemented at the company-level. Soldiers go through basic and advanced individual training as intact units, namely in companies, and too, the lowest level at which personnel are stablized is within the company. Therefore, to assess "soldier will" as a company-level phenomenon seemed appropriate.

The fourth phase of analyses involved sharpening the operational definition of the concept of "COHORT" and to demonstrate its relationship to the measures of "soldier will."

3. Results

Demographic Description of the Sample

Table 4 summarizes the demographic differences between COHORT and nonCOHORT units in the sample.

Insert Table 4 about here

COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers did not differ in race, education, and years of service. COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers exhibited significant differences in marital status, type of residence, rank, and age. Younger men comprised the COHORT units. Given this, the remaining differences had logical coherency. Younger soldiers are more likely to be unmarried, living in the barracks, and of lower rank.

"Soldier Will" Measures: Scale Construction

There were three separate steps of analyses involved in constructing measures of "soldier will."

In the first step, a draft questionnaire was administered to a nonrandom sample of soldiers in COHORT battalions within the same division (N = 226) (Griffith, 1984). Item content of this draft instrument and that of the present "Soldier Will" Questionnaire was very similar. A series of factor analyses of both "traditional scales" (scales that had been used intact in the Department of Military Psychiatry for some years) and of pooled items of similar content from these "traditional scales" showed nine interpretable factors: (1) soldier confidence in their leaders (knowing their jobs and leading well in combat), in themselves and their peers (knowing their jobs and performing well in combat), and in their weaponry; (2) soldier confidence in senior commanders' decisions; (3) soldier confidence in squad, platoon, and company leaders; (4) soldier perceptions of leaders' concern about their welfare and general well-being; (5) soldier pride in and perceived importance of self, the unit, and the mission; (6) amount of trust among soldiers; (7) soldier perception of group cohesion—the sense of belonging to the unit; (8) feelings among soldiers in the unit; and (9) perceived availability of emotional and instrumental support among soldiers in the unit. Several technical cautions are worth noting. First, the SPSS option to include the average value on the variable for missing data was used. Second, in factor analyses in which there were over 40 scale items, the minimum 1-to-10 variable-to-case rule was waived.

A panel of four Ph.D.s, who had extensive experience in military psychology, grouped emergent factors that were conceptually similar. This resulted in six constructs; these were:

1. COHESION: A sense of belonging to the unit and trust in other soldiers in the unit.
2. GENERAL CONFIDENCE: Confidence in weaponry, individual skills, and abilities, and the perception of supportive relationships among fellow soldiers.
3. COMMAND CONFIDENCE: Confidence in tactical leaders and immediate supervisory cadre.
4. CONCERNED LEADERSHIP: Perception that leaders are concerned about the personal welfare and general well-being of their soldiers.
5. SENSE OF PRIDE: Pride in and perceived importance of self and the unit and its mission.
6. SUPPORTIVE RELATIONSHIPS: Quality of relationships with other unit members, to include the perception of socially supportive relationships among fellow soldiers and their families.

A similar procedure was used in the second step of scale construction. Data obtained from the present sample on the "traditional scales" (namely, Unit Cohesion and Morale Scale, Modified Field Forces Scale, Company Perceptions Scale, and the Squad/Platoon Scale) were factor analyzed. First, each scale was factor-analyzed separately, and second, items of similar content from these "traditional scales" were pooled and factor-analyzed. Interpretability of emergent factors was better for factor analyses of the

individual "traditional scales" than for that of pooled items of similar content from the "traditional scales."

Table 5 summarizes factor analyses of the four "traditional scales" of soldier will.

Insert Table 5 about here

Both conceptually and in terms of item content, factors on some scales were very similar to those obtained on others. To reduce redundancy and to develop a manageable number of scales measuring "soldier will," items that loaded on similar factors were combined to form one scale. The seven "human dimensions" judged by a panel of experts to be the psychological components of combat readiness (described above) were used as a guide for establishing the content of the new scales. When item content clearly overlapped, redundant items were eliminated. Items that did not load on any of the factors of the traditional scales, yet were judged to be similar in content and to tap unique aspects of constructs measured by the newly developed scales, were added. This yielded seven measures of "soldier will:" (1) company combat confidence; (2) senior command confidence; (3) small-unit command confidence; (4) concerned leadership; (5) sense of pride; (6) unit social climate; and (7) unit teamwork.

These new scales then underwent factor and reliability analyses in order to establish their unidimensionality and internal reliability. The result of these analyses are reported in Tables 6-20. Tables report the mean ratings, standard deviations, and item-total correlation (the correlation between ratings given to an item and the sum of ratings given to the remaining items). Tables also report results of factor analyses of each scale.

Company combat confidence. Most mean ratings fell at the mid-point of the 5-point Likert scale (corresponding to the descriptor, "can't say"). The exceptions were Items P19, P18, P21, U14, U17, and U5. (The letter preceding the item number indicates from which traditional scale the item came: U = Unit Cohesion and Morale Scale; F = Modified Field Forces Scale; P = Company Perceptions Scale; and S = Squad/Platoon Scale.) The content of most of these items related to one's confidence in weaponry and in oneself during combat. All but two items, relating to confidence in oneself during combat, correlated highly with a score obtained from the sum of remaining items. The appropriate respondent pool for this scale was all personnel assigned to a company (namely, O-3, O-2, O-1, and E-8 and below).

Insert Table 6 about here

A factor analysis of the Company Combat Confidence Scale showed three subscales, one tapping general combat confidence (accounting for 41% of the total variance in item ratings), another measuring confidence in weaponry (9% of the total variance accounted for), and a final one assessing confidence in oneself (7% of the total variance in item ratings).

Insert Table 7 about here

Although differences in the proportion of variance extracted by each
factor and the scree test did not warrant consideration of each subscale
separately, these results are consistent with previous results that showed·
confidence in leaders (knowing their jobs and leading we`l in combat) and
confidence in weaponry represented differe t aspects of .ombat confidence than
did confidence in oneself.

Senior command confidence. The relatively high mean item ratings in
Table 8 showed that soldiers generally had confidence in those decisions made
by senior commanders. The high internal consistency of this scale is
demonstrated by high item-total correlations.

Insert Table 8 about here

A factor analysis of this scale showed the scale to be unidimensional
(Table 9). High item-total correlations and high factor loadings on the one
emergent factor (accounting for 82% of total variance in item ratings) suggest
that soldiers tended simply to check the same response for all senior
leaders. This scale was applicable to all soldiers.

Insert Table 9 about here

Small-unit command confidence. Table 10 reports the means, standard
deviations, and item-total correlations for the Small-Unit Command Confidence
Scale. The appropriate respondent pool for this scale was squad- and crew-
level personnel with the rank of E-4 and below.

Insert Table 10 about here

Items that received neutral mean ratings (S21, S22, S23, and S24) tapped
connotative aspects of small-unit leaders (Do they consider soldier feelings
and wants?), whereas remaining items that received more positive mean ratings
related to perceived abilities of leaders ("knowing their stuff") and soldier
confidence in these leaders' decisions. However, a factor analysis of the
scale showed that soldiers gave ratings according to whom they were asked to
rate: squad or platoon leaders (accounting for almost one-half of total item
rating variance); officers (accounting for 11% of total aw variance); and
oneself and squad/crew members (accounting for nearly one-tenth of total item
variance) (see Table 11).

Insert Table 11 about here

Concerned leadership. All but two mean ratings on this scale fel' r
the mid-point of the 5-point Likert scale. Items S12 and S13 received
considerably lower ratings than the other scale items; those two items related
to how much time officers spent with soldiers outside normal duty hours.
Responses from squad- and crew-level personnel were used to derive these scale
scores.

Insert Table 12 about here

Factor analysis of the "concerned leadership" items showed that soldiers
viewed concerned leadership as two separate elements: (1) concern about
soldier feelings, thoughts and welfare (accounting for a little over one-half
of the total variance in ratings); and (2) amount of personal contact with
company leaders outside normal duties (accounting for 11% of the total
variance in item ratings; see Table 13).

Insert Table 13 about here

Sense of pride. Table 14 shows mean ratings, standard deviations, and
item-total correlations of Sense of Pride Scale items. All personnel were
presented with these items on the questionnaire. A factor analysis of scale
items showed this scale to be unidimensional. Factor 1 accounted for nearly
half of the total variance in item ratings.

Insert Tables 14 and 15 about here

Unit social climate. Table 16 reports means, standard deviations, and
item-total correlations for items on the Unit Social Climate Scale. The
appropriate pool of respondents was personnel assigned to companies with the
rank of E-4 and below. Nothing is too striking about the mean ratings and
standard deviations of these items. Item-total correlations were fairly
high. What is more interesting was the factor structure of this scale (see
Table 17), which showed showed soldiers perceived the unit's "social climate"
along three dimensions. The first factor is labeled "Trust and Caring" and
accounts for 36% of the total variance in item ratings. The second factor,
"Instrumental Support," assessed the soldier perception of the availability of
instrumental support in the unit. The "Friendship" factor assessed the time
soldiers spent with other soldiers in their unit and had friendships within
their unit.

Insert Tables 16 and 17 about here

Unit teamwork. Tables 18 and 19 respectively report descriptive
statistics (mean item ratings, standard deviations, and item-total
correlations) and factor-analytic results for the Teamwork Scale. Personnel
assigned to companies and with the rank of E-4 and below completed this

scale. Most mean item ratings once again fell at the mid-point of the 5-point Likert scale. High item-total correlations showed that items tapped the same construct. This is further demonstrated by a factor analysis of scale responses. One factor was extracted accounting for nearly 60% of the total variance in item ratings.

Insert Tables 18 and 19 about here

All "soldier will" scales were treated as unidimensional; that is, ratings to scale items were summed to obtain summative scale scores for each soldier. The logic here is twofold. First, nearly all scree tests showed that scales were unidimensional. Second, conceptually each scale seemed to be tapping one construct, and therefore, it made sense to treat it as unidimensional. On the other hand, in some instances (e.g., the Company Combat Confidence and Unit Social Climate Scales and to a lesser extent, Small-Unit Command Confidence Scale), emergent factors specified more detailed facets of the construct, and perhaps, should be used as subscales. However, to develop and to use these subscales is perhaps premature until further analyses can be performed on a larger sample of NMS units. Subsequent reports will examine the usefulness of subscales.

When summative scale scores were created, missing values were tolerated to maximize the largest N possible for analyses. On "soldier will" measures, Life Satisfaction, Army Satisfaction, and Psychological Sense of Community, one missing item rating was accepted, and on the General Well-Being Scale, two were tolerated. For respondents who had missing item ratings, ratings given to all other items were summed; this sum was then weighted by the reciprocal of the number of valid item ratings to the number of scale item (e.g., on the GWB, the reciprocal was 18/16 if the respondent did not rate two items).

Validity of the "Soldier Will" Measures

Two methods were used to establish the validity of the "soldier will" measures. The first approach (construct validity) intercorrelated the "soldier will" measures. The logic here was: If the "soldier will" scales tapped a broader, more unitary construct called unit esprit or group cohesion, then the scales should be highly interrelated. The second approach (concurrent validity) showed relationships of "soldier will" scales to measures of positive life adjustment, such as greater life satisfaction, greater Army satisfaction, greater psychological well-being, less personal distress, fewer medical problems, and more willingness to stay in the Army. The logic of this analysis: If "soldier will" scales assessed positive unit characteristics, then soldiers who report positive unit characteristics (as measured by "soldier will" scales) should also report greater positive life adjustment, less personal distress, fewer medical problems, and more willingness to reenlist.

Construct Validity: Interrelationships among Constructs

Table 20 displays intercorrelations among the soldier will measures, general well-being, life satisfaction, Army satisfaction, and spouse support.

Results showed that "soldier will" scales tapped a broader, more unitary psychological construct, like group cohesion or esprit. Over one-half (12 of 21) of the intercorrelations among the "soldier will" scales had correlations of .60 or higher (highlighted in Table 20 by a triangle). Six other correlations were nearly .50 or higher. The remaining three correlations ranged from .37 to .40, and these were between the Senior Command Confidence Scale and Concerned Leadership, between Senior Command Confidence and Unit Social Climate, and between Senior Command Confidence and Unit Teamwork.

Concurrent Validity

Relationship of "soldier will" to life satisfaction, Army satisfaction, general well-being, spouse support, and sense of community. To further establish the validity of "soldier will" measures, scales measuring life and Army satisfaction, general well-being, spouse support, and psychological sense of community were correlated with "soldier will." The logic of his analysis is: Soldiers who report greater esprit and group cohesion (in terms of the "soldier will" measures: greater company combat confidence, senior and small-unit command confidence, concerned leadership, sense of pride, unit social climate, and unit teamwork) should concurrently report greater satisfaction with life and with the Army, greater general well-being, greater spouse support, and greater psychological sense of community. Results supported these expectations (see rectangle in Table 20).

Life and Army satisfaction, general well-being, spouse support, and sense of community were significantly and positively correlated with each of the "soldier will" measures. (It should be noted that only married soldiers completed the Life and Army Satisfaction Scales, and only married soldiers living with their spouses completed the Spouse Support and Sense of Community Scales.) Army satisfaction bore the highest relationship to the "soldier will" measures; four of the seven correlations were .57 or higher. The General Well-Being Scale bore the next highest relationship with the "soldier will" scales. Measures least correlated with "soldier will" were Life Satisfaction, Spouse Support, and Sense of Community.

Relationship of "soldier will" to personal distress, medical problems, and staying in the Army. The "buffering effect" of unit esprit and cohesion on personal distress has a strong historical precedent. Research investigating social support and their "buffering effect" of negative consequences of stress on personal well-being (see Leavy, 1983) strongly suggests that soldiers who report more cohesiveness among its unit members are less likely to experience the deleterious effects of stress and to report lower levels of personal distress and medical problems. Given this, inverse relationships are expected between measures of "soldier will" and personal distress.

What is striking is that all distress measures were negatively correlated with "soldier will" measures. The number of hours in a day and weekends in a month worked bore the highest relationships to small-unit command confidence, concerned leadership, and unit social climate (highlighted by circles). Of the time-spent-at-work variables, field time had lowest, and at times, no relationships with "soldier will" (highlighted by long rectangle). Of all the distress measures, not having enough time to attend to personal, family, and recreational needs was most strongly correlated with the "soldier will" measures (highlighted by long rectangle in center of Table 21).

Seeing the doctor, taking medications for nerves, and worry interferring with work were all inversely related to "soldier will," especially to the soldier's sense of pride. Not being able to work because of worry was most strongly correlated with company combat confidence.

Wanting to stay in ne's unit after first-term enlistment and wanting to reenlist were positively correlated with the "soldier will" measures (highlighted by a rectangle toward the bottom of Table 21). Wanting to get out of the Army was significantly and negatively related to all "soldier will" measures.

Differences in "Soldier Will" between
COHORT and nonCOHORT Soldiers

Next, to ascertain whether COHORT soldiers could be discriminated from nonCOHORT soldiers in terms of unit morale and cohesion, comparisons were made between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers on the "soldier will" measures. Comparisons were first made at the individual soldier level (i.e., summing scale scores for each soldier, and computing an overall mean for COHORT soldiers and another for nonCOHORT soldiers). "Soldier will" measures were also treated as a unit level of measurement. Means were calculated for each company and compared. Results which treat "soldier will" measures at the individual soldier level are discussed first.

Individual-Level Comparisons

Simple correlations were calculated between "soldier will" scales and unit status, either COHORT or nonCOHORT. Unit status was dichotomously coded so that a value of 1 indicated a COHORT soldier and a value of 0, a nonCOHORT soldier. Table 22 reports intercorrelations among soldier will measures, unit status, and other demographic characteristics.

Insert Table 22 about here

Of particular interest is the highlighted area on Table 22 (the rectangle). COHORT soldiers reported significantly higher Company Combat Confidence, Senior and Small-Unit Command Confidence, Concerned Leadership, Pride, Unit Social Climate, and Unit Teamwork than did nonCOHORT soldiers. Effect sizes of these differences, however, were small, ranging from $(.12)^2$ to $(.20)^2$.

Other correlations of interest are highlighted by circles in Table 22. Age was significantly and positively correlated with sense of pride. Soldiers of higher rank reported both lower small-unit command confidence and unit social climate than did soldiers of lower rank. An opposite trend was observed for the Company Combat Confidence and Sense of Pride Scales: Higher-ranking soldiers had a greater combat confidence in their companies and greater sense of pride than did soldiers of lower rank. Married soldiers compared to singles had a higher sense of pride. Soldiers living in off-post housing were significantly more proud but reported less unit social climate than those living in the barracks. Those soldiers living in on-post housing reported more pride than those living in the barracks. Soldiers in armored units expressed more company combat confidence than did those in artillery units.

Race and education were not related to the seven "soldier will" measures. Of the demographic characteristics, age and rank bore the highest relationship to "soldier will," and these two demographic characteristics in themselves go hand-in-hand (i.e., the greater the age, the higher the rank). What is apparent from these results is that of the demographic variables, age and rank, are the most important to control for when comparing COHORT soldiers to nonCOHORT soldiers on "soldier will."

Mean comparison of soldier will measures between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers. Table 23 reports means and standard deviations of soldier will scales, well-being, life and Army satisfaction, and spouse support for COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers.

Insert Table 23 about here

Overall, mean comparisons were consistent with previous simple correlations between unit status and the "soldier will" measures. COHORT soldiers reported statistically significant higher Company Combat Confidence, Senior and Small-Unit Command Confidence, Concerned Leadership, Sense of Pride, Unit Social Climate, and Teamwork than did nonCOHORT soldiers. Mean differences were generally small, ranging from 1.3 to 3.4 scale points. The greatest differences between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers was on the Small-Unit Command Confidence and Unit Social Climate Scales, while the smallest was on the Unit Teamwork Scale.

Unlike results of simple correlations, General Well-Being, Life Satisfaction, and Spouse Support were unrelated to COHORT status. COHORT soldiers did report greater Army satisfaction than nonCOHORT soldiers; however, the difference was very small.

The same mean comparisons on "soldier will" and selected scales were made between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers of the rank of E-4 and below. The logic of these comparisons is: The COHORT strategy is intended to have the greatest effect at the first-termer level (E-1 through E-4); these are the personnel who go through basic and advanced individual training together. Mean differences on the Company Combat Confidence, Sense of Pride, and Unit Teamwork Scales between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers were slightly greater when comparisons were limited to soldiers of the rank E-4 and below. Also,

COHORT soldiers now reported a greater sense of well-being than did nonCOHORT soldiers. Mean differences on other scales were essentially the same as previously noted in Table 23.

Insert Table 24 about here

Mean comparisons between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers (described above) were done for the two remaining rank categories, namely, for officers and NCOs (E-5s and above). Previously observed differences became less and in some cases, reversed direction, the higher the rank category.

A series of multiple regression analyses were conducted in which "soldier will" measures served as the criterion variables and soldier and unit characteristics served as predictors. The purpose of these analyses was to ascertain the relationship of unit status—either COHORT or nonCOHORT—to the "soldier will" measures, while controlling for demographic and unit characteristics. In each analysis, demographic and unit characteristics were hierarchically entered in the regression equation in order of their historical occurrence (i.e., age, race, rank, education, marital status, type of combat arms unit, and type of residence). Unit status, either COHORT or nonCOHORT, was then entered to ascertain its contribution in variance to "soldier will" measures above and beyond personal and unit characteristics. Race, marital status, type of combat arms unit, type of residence, and unit status were "dummy coded" (Cohen & Cohen, 1975, pp. 173-176). In instances where dummy coded variables had more than two categories, one category served as the reference group and was not entered into the multiple regression equation.

Table 25 reports the results of these six separate multiple regression analyses.

Insert Table 25 about here

Although the amount of variance contributed by predictors to each of the "soldier will" measures (cumulative R^2s in the table) was significant, the magnitude was relatively small (ranging from 3.6% to 11.5%). However, the greatest proportion of variance accounted for in three of the six "soldier will" measures was whether the unit is COHORT (respectively for the Company Combat Confidence, Senior Command Confidence, and Concerned Leadership Scales, .035/.075 ($F(1,2452)$ = 92.84, p < .01), .019/.036 ($F(1,2449)$ = 48.35, p < .01), and .024/.038 ($F(1,1684)$ = 41.96, p < .01). For the other three "soldier will" scales, COHORT status was the second highest contributor to the variance in "soldier will" measures after rank or age.

Consider also the standardized beta weights (b) in Table 25. A standardized beta weight represents the amount of change in terms of standard deviations expected to occur in the criterion (in our case, a "soldier will" measure) given a unit increase in the predictor of interest (in our case, COHORT). For predictors representing groups or categories (e.g., unit status is either COHORT or nonCOHORT), the beta weight shows how the mean for one group (e.g., COHORT) on the "soldier will" measure compares to that of another

group (this group is referred to as the reference group and has a value of 0 in the mulitple regression equation; in our case, the reference group is nonCOHORT) while holding all other variables constant. All differences described below take into account variations in other variables represented in the multiple regression equation.

Company combat confidence. Higher ranks reported greater company command confidence than did lower ranks. Soldiers in armored units as opposed to infantry soldiers, and COHORT soldiers as opposed to nonCOHORT soldiers also reported greater company combat confidence. On the other hand, artillery men reported lower company combat confidence than did infantry men.

Senior command confidence. Nonwhites and soldiers of higher ranks had higher levels of senior comand confidence than did whites and lower-ranking soldiers. Again, COHORT soldiers had greater senior command confidence than did nonCOHORT soldiers, and artillery men had less than infantry men. Soldiers living in on-post and in off-post housing reported greater senior command confidence than those soldiers living in the barracks.

Small-unit command confidence. Lower-ranking soldiers had more small-unit command confidence than did soldiers of higher rank. COHORT soldiers displayed more small-unit command confidence than did soldiers in nonCOHORT units.

Concerned leadership. Soldiers in armored units reported greater concerned leadership than did those in the infantry. Once again, COHORT soldiers reported greater concerned leadership than those soldiers in nonCOHORT units.

Sense of pride. Older and higher-ranking soldiers had more pride than did younger and lower-ranking soldiers. Consistent with earlier results, while soldiers in armored units reported greater pride than did those in the infantry, artillery men displayed less than infantry men. COHORT soldiers again reported greater sense of pride than did nonCOHORT soldiers. Soldiers living in on-post and in off-post housing had greater pride than those living in the barracks.

Unit social climate. Soldiers of lower rank reported higher unit social climate than did those of higher rank. Infantry men had higher unit social climate than did artillery men. Once again, COHORT status was significantly and positively related with positive unit social climate. Soldiers living in off-post housing had lower unit social climate than did those living in the barracks.

Multiple T-tests of Item Ratings
between COHORT and nonCOHORT Soldiers

Although we have demonstrated that COHORT soldiers differed from nonCOHORT soldiers on "soldier will" in this very limited sample (in terms of the number of units sampled in the NMS "Human Dimensions" Field Evaluation), the interpratability of these differences is not yet clear. To gain a better understanding as to how COHORT soldiers differed from nonCOHORT soldiers on these soldier will measures, a series of t-tests of mean item ratings between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers were conducted for each scale. Statistically

significant differences between these ratings <u>should not</u> be emphasized. Conducting multiple t-tests among dependent measures virtually ensures that some mean ratings will be significantly different purely by chance factors. Instead, this analysis should serve as <u>a general guide for interpreting</u> mean differences in scale scores between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers.

<u>Company combat confidence.</u> Table 26 reports mean ratings, standard deviations, and t-tests between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers for items on the Company Combat Confidence Scale. Examining t-ratios (far right in the table) shows the greatest differences on scale items related to unit training and the perception that both officers and NCOs would lead well in combat. Items that discriminated less between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers referred to confidence in and use of their weaponry.

Insert Table 26 about here

<u>Senior command confidence.</u> Table 27 shows that COHORT soldiers had greater confidence in each of the senior commanders than did nonCOHORT soldiers. Observed differences become less as the senior commander was further up the chain-of-command.

Insert Table 27 about here

<u>Small-unit command confidence.</u> The greatest differences in small-unit command confidence mean item ratings between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers pertained to soldier confidence in their platoon leader, company commander, and NCOs, especially while in combat. COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers did not express a difference in confidence in oneself while in combat (see Table 28).

Insert Table 28 about here

<u>Concerned leadership.</u> Table 29 displays mean differences in item ratings on the Concerned Leadership Scale for COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers. The greatest differences were observed between the two groups of soldiers on items related to officer and NCO concern about soldier welfare, and about what soldiers think and feel.

Insert table 29 about here

<u>Sense of pride.</u> COHORT soldiers differed the most from nonCOHORT soldiers on items related to pride in the Army, company pride, believing the Army gives the opportunity to "be all you can be," and the company's role in winning future conflicts. The least discriminating item pertained to the soldiers' perceptions of how well American equipment compared to that of the Russians (see Table 30).

Insert Table 30 about here

Unit social climate. Table 31 reports mean ratings on the Unit Social Climate Scale for COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers. The greatest differences between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers related to how close, "tight," and together soldiers and officers felt, and too, the amount of time spent with unit members, and whether unit members were friends. COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers did not differ in their need to watch their belongings.

Insert Table 31 about here

Unit teamwork. T-ratios associated with differences in Unit Teamwork Scale ratings were comparable, with COHORT soldiers consistently reporting greater unit teamwork than nonCOHORT soldiers (see Table 32).

Insert Table 32 about here

Company-Level Comparisons

In these next analyses, comparisons between COHORT and nonCOHORT were made at the company level. COHORT units go through basic and advanced individual training, and travel to their duty station as intact company-sized units. At its lowest level, personnel stablization occurs within the company. Therefore, COHORT may have its strongest effect at the company level. To test this hypothesis, mean "soldier will" scale scores were calculated for each of the twenty-seven companies in the sample. For each separate "soldier will" scale, company means were then arrayed from highest to lowest.

Insert Tables 33-38 about here

If unit status is related to "soldier will," then companies should array themselves according to unit status (either COHORT or nonCOHORT), with COHORT units toward the upper end of the array. A Wilcoxon ranks sum test was conducted for each array of company "soldier will" means. The greatest differences in company means between COHORT and nonCOHORT were observed on the Senior Command Confidence Scale ($z = 3.11$, $p < .01$), Small-Unit Command Confidence Scale ($z = 2.71$, $p < .01$), Concerned Leadership Scale ($z = 2.47$, $p < .01$), and Unit Social Climate ($z = 2.47$, $p < .01$). COHORT companies consistently had higher scores on each of these measures. No differences in company means were found on the Company Combat Confidence and Sense of Pride Scales.

Another analysis was done to ascertain if companies low and high in "soldier will" could be reliably identified across the "soldier will" measures. Mean scores on Company Combat Confidence, Senior Command

Confidence, Small-Unit Command Confidence, Concerned Leadership, Sense of Pride, and Unit Social Climate Scales were derived for each of the 27 companies under study. For each scale, company means were arrayed from highest to lowest, and each company was ranked corresponding to its mean "soldier will" scale score. A rank of 1 represented the highest company mean, and a rank of 27, the lowest. Companies that fell both in the lower one-third rankings (rank of 18 through 27) and upper one-third rankings (rank of 1 through 9) across all six "soldier will" measures were identified.

Eight companies fell in the lower one-third rankings across all "soldier will" measures, and only four companies fell in the upper one-third across all the "soldier will" measures. Of eight companies that fell in the lower one-third rankings, all were nonCOHORT units. The probability of obtaining this result due to sampling or measurement error is very small (binomial test, $z = 2.00$, $p < .05$). (The binomial test requires events be independent. Although the "soldier will" scales are separate measures, it has been argued, and to some extent demonstrated that they are conceptually and empirically related. Therefore, some caution should be used when interpreting this statistical test.) Of the four companies that fell in the highest one-third rankings across the six measures, three were COHORT companies (binomial test, $z = .88$, $p < .32$). In summary, the measures reliably identified units with high and low "soldier will" across the six scales, corresponding to the unit's status, either COHORT or nonCOHORT.

Interpreting Differences in "Soldier Will" between COHORT and nonCOHORT Soldiers

Although it has been demonstrated that COHORT soldiers differ from nonCOHORT soldiers on a series of scales called "soldier will," questions remain unanswered, "What do these observed differences mean?" "What does a three-point scale difference mean?" To answer these question, a referent is needed. In other words, should these questions be answered in terms of training performance, combat performance, or the like? Essentially, these questions speak to the appropriate validational criteria of the "soldier will" measures. Referring back to Figure 1, there is a hypothesized relationship between soldier will and training performance. Changes in the former are believed to cause changes in the latter. Before a test of the cause-effect relationship between soldier will and performance can be done, there is needed: (1) reliable and valid measures of training performance; (2) a demonstrable relationship between "soldier will" and performance; and (3) data collected on soldier will and performance across time. These requirements are sequential. Without reliable and valid performance data, correlational analyses between these data and "soldier will" data cannot be done. Presently, WRAIR is attempting to integrate both individual and group performance data with questionnaire data, and conduct correlational analyses. When both these data are collected on soldiers through time, the directionality of the cause-effect relationship between "soldier will" and performance can be assessed.

In the meantime, one method of analysis was done to ascertain the meaning of mean differences on the "soldier will" measures. Units that differed substantially in training and performance (e.g., COHORT paratroopers vs. nonCOHORT infantry men) were compared on the "soldier will" measures. Five paratroop COHORT companies from another data base were added to the present

sample for this analysis. These five companies and the 27 companies in the current sample were placed in three categories based on their training, specialization, and perceived "eliteness." The categories were: Paratroop COHORT (most highly trained, specialized, and "elite"); COHORT (next most highly trained, specialized, and "elite"); and nonCOHORT (least trained, specialized, and "elite"). Means on each "soldier will" measure were calculated for each company within each category. To detect differences between company means across the three categories, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed. The level of analysis was the company. The three categories of companies significantly differed on four of the six "soldier will" measures; these were Senior Command Confidence ($F_{(2,29)}$ = 9.36, $p < .001$), Small-Unit Command Confidence ($F_{(2,29)}$ = 7.76, $p < .01$), Concerned Leadership ($F_{(2,29)}$ = 3.56, $p < .05$), and Unit Social Climate ($F_{(2,29)}$ = 7.18, $p < .01$). Companies did not differ in their combat company confidence and sense of pride.

To discern where differences lie between categories, in addition to understanding of substantive mean differences between categories in terms of training, specialization, and "eliteness," pairwise comparisons between companies were examined. Table 39 displays means and standard deviations for each status category. Mean differences and significance levels for pairwise comparisons between status categories are also reported.

Insert Table 39 about here

Company combat confidence. A 3-point mean difference in company combat confidence was noted between paratroop COHORT companies and COHORT companies ($p < .01$). A 2-point mean difference was observed between COHORT companies and nonCOHORT companies, although this difference was nonsignificant. The greatest difference in means was between paratroop COHORT and nonCOHORT (M difference = 4.89, $p < .01$).

Senior command confidence. Although paratroop and COHORT companies did not differ in senior command confidence, means became progressively larger from nonCOHORT to Paratroop COHORT companies. The mean difference between COHORT and nonCOHORT companies (M difference = 1.12, $p < .05$) was about the same as that between paratroop COHORT and nonCOHORT (M difference = 1.49, $p < .05$).

Small-unit command confidence. Paratroop and COHORT companies were very similar in small-unit command confidence, whereas both differed significantly when paired with nonCOHORT companies. Paratroop COHORT companies differed from nonCOHORT by a 4-point mean scale difference ($p < .01$). COHORT companies differed from nonCOHORT companies by a 3-point mean scale difference ($p < .01$).

Concerned leadership. The only significant pairwise comparison was that between COHORT companies and nonCOHORT companies. The difference in mean scale score between these two categories was 2 points ($p < .05$).

Sense of pride. Although pairwise comparisons were nonsignificant, means for the status categories were in the predicted direction. Means increased from nonCOHORT to COHORT to paratroop companies.

Unit social climate. Of all the "soldier will" scales, the highest mean scale differences were observed on the Unit Social Climate Scale. While paratroop and COHORT companies reported very similar unit social climate, they differed substantially from nonCOHORT companies. The mean difference between COHORT companies and nonCOHORT was 3.5 points (p < .01). The mean difference between paratroop COHORT and nonCOHORT was 5.5 points (p < .01).

To summarize, previously, it was shown that COHORT units differed from nonCOHORT on "soldier will" measures, but a problem that remained was: What do these differences actually represent? A method for evaluating mean differences in scale scores was used by showing how units with known training, specialization, and perceived "eliteness" differed from COHORT and nonCOHORT companies on "soldier will." Although mean differences were small, they reliably discriminated among units of different training, specialization, and "eliteness." Mean scale scores progressively increased from nonCOHORT to COHORT to paratroop COHORT consistently, though not always significantly. In addition, COHORT and paratroop companies were more similar in "soldier will" than were nonCOHORT and COHORT, and nonCOHORT and paratroop units. These comparisons did not control for differences in unit and demographic characteritics; therefore, differences in 'soldier will" could be attributed to systematic variations in unit and demographic characteristics. However, that demographic differences between the 27 COHORT and nonCOHORT companies under study were not great suggests this was not a major problem.

Refinement of the Concept "COHORT"

Central to the NMS Field Evaluation is how the concept COHORT is operationally defined. Therefore, it seemed important to explore various conceptual and, in turn, operational definitions of COHORT. Two alternative approaches in defining COHORT were taken in the present analysis.

Soldiers were asked questions relating to the number of soldiers in their present company who accompanied them through basic and advanced individual training. Response ranged from "none" (1) to "everyone" (5). The inter-correlation between the two ratings was high (.94). (The lead-in question to these two items was confusing and resulted in a substantial number of missing cases. This problem was remedied after data collectors brought it to the attention of WRAIR researchers.) Ratings given to the two items were summed. A mean was then calculated for each company, and companies were arrayed from highest to lowest mean score. Table 40 reports each of the twenty-seven company means, the mean of the company means and the standard error of measurement (see Table 40).

Insert Table 40 about here

One definition of COHORT is the soldier's common experience of basic and advanced individual training. Given this, COHORT companies would be expected to array themselves toward the top end of the company array. Indeed, this is

observed in Table 40. A Wilcoxon ranks sum test runs test showed that the company's nominal label was significantly related soldier perception of the number of soldiers in their present company who had accompanied through basic and advanced individual training ($z = 3.55$, $p < .01$).

Soldiers were also asked to estimate how many soldiers, NCOs, and officers joined their present company in the past six months. Responses ranged from "none" (1) to "everyone" (5). Table 41 reports inter-item correlations among the three items and Cronbach's alpha for a summative scale score comprised of the three items.

Insert Table 41 about here

Inter-item correlations and the Cronbach's alpha were somewhat low, showing that this summative scale was not internally consistent. Again, ratings given to the three items were summed, and a mean score was calculated for each company in the sample. Company means were then arrayed from highest to lowest. Higher mean ratings indicated greater company turnover.

One method to achieve a COHORT unit is stablization of personnel and ensuring low personnel turnover. Given this, most nonCOHORT units in the sample would be expected to fall toward the upper end of the array in Table 41 and COHORT units toward the lower end. Yet, the Wilcoxon ranks sum test showed that mean company turnover rates were independent of the nominal label; that is, company mean turnover estimates were randomly arrayed in relation to their nominal labels ($z = .74$, ns).

How should these results be interpreted, especially in view of previously summarized results (in Table 40)? On the one hand, the unit label was associated with the common experience of basic and advanced individual training, with COHORT units reporting greater common experience than nonCOHORT. This result suggests that the nominal label itself is sufficient for analyses that compare COHORT units to nonCOHORT. However, the fact that nominal labels were unrelated to soldier perception of company turnover casts doubt that a company's nominal label itself accurately captures the COHORT process. Even the correlation between the rank-ordering on the two measures was very low ($r = .19$).

Contradictory results may be explainable in terms of the subjective nature of these operational definitions of COHORT, the low internal reliability of soldier perception of company turnover, and the large number of missing cases on both measures. Too, soldiers could have given inconsistent item ratings across the two measures. To test this, responses to both the basic and advanced individual training items were cross-tabbed with responses given to each of three turnover questions. At the individual-level, consistency was observed between ratings given to the two separate item sets: Soldiers who rated most soldiers in their present company as having accompanied them through basic and advanced individual training also reported lower turnover among soldiers, NCOs, and officers in their present company. It would appear then that the inconsistency between the two measures is a compositional artifact, going from the individual- to the company-level.

Another explanation pertains to the reference soldiers used when giving responses regarding unit personnel turnover. Soldiers may have included themselves among the new soldiers. Therefore, almost everyone in their company was perceived as a "new soldier." The difference in soldier perception of personnel turnover between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers would not expected, as both COHORT and nonCOHORT units in the present sample were relatively new to the Army (six months or less).

What is clear from these analyses is that the method for determining which unit is COHORT is somewhat ill-defined, and needs both conceptual and operational clarity. When consideration is given to how to make units COHORT, this issue is even more serious. Which processes are sufficient to create a COHORT unit and, in turn, create the positive intended effects of COHORT? This question is more closely examined in the Discussion section below.

Soldier Comments

Although no space was provided for soldiers to write comments, some wrote in the margins and in blank areas throughout the questionnaire. Because some degree of effort was needed to write in comments on the questionnaire, remarks deserve further attention and discussion. However, it should be pointed out that a relatively low number of soldiers actually wrote-in comments (53 (32 COHORT soldiers and 21 nonCOHORT soldiers)/2830 or 1.9% of the sample), and therefore, appropriate weight should be given to these comments.

Overall, comments were quite negative, pointing out family, individual adjustment problems, and unit problems, and attributing these problems to post location, to COHORT, and to a specific person, like the Company Commander. The comments are organized within two content areas: family problems and unit morale problems.

Family problems. When COHORT soldiers talked of family problems, some viewed problems resulting from COHORT. "The rules are interfering with my personal things and wife. The Army is messed up. It's a place to get burned. This system is old. It's not working with this generation. There's no need to go on. My whole company hates this place. We are mistreated big time." "I am separated from my wife and kids." "I was proud (to be in the Army) 'til I got in COHORT." "More time is needed to care for the needs of our families."

Other comments showed soldiers did not necessarily attribute these family problems solely to COHORT but rather to post location or to unit characteristics (e.g., leaders not caring about soldiers' families): "We stayed in the field so much that it was hard to get our families settled. The NCOs place more emphasis on making themselves look good than helping young soldiers with their families." "I would just get the hell out of Ft. _____." "Unit doesn't matter; it's the unit's location." The confusion as to what actually caused these family problems is further demonstrated by a soldier who was once COHORT and is now a nonCOHORT soldier. "I was (in a COHORT unit before) and now I enjoying not being COHORT. I don't care for the system of COHORT that's why I'm getting out. COHORT brainwashed me." However, later he explained problems he had experienced were a result of post characteristics, not necessarily COHORT: "Ft. _____ is not mission-oriented; they care more

about looks than the true nature and serviceability of the equipment .... Nowhere have I seen a post as bad as this." The fact too that nonCOHORT soldiers expressed very similar family problems suggest that these problems were not unique to COHORT units. For example, one nonCOHORT soldier remarked: "The Army will ruin a marriage, especially when you go to the field for a week at a time when you could go a couple of days at a time. We come in at 0530 and rarely get off at 1730. You go home, eat and get ready for the next day. If you stay up with your family, you (are) exhausted the next day. What gets me is that they wonder why there's so many divorces in the Army." Another nonCOHORT soldier said: "By the time we get off, we are too tired from working hard to do anything (relaxation and entertainment). The Army really doesn't care about my family."

Unit morale problems. Some COHORT soldiers felt that cooperation and feeling part of team were lacking in their units as exemplified by the following comments: "... When the soldiers are threatened with Article 15s and Chapters 10s and 13s ... and threatened with details," then NCOs and officers get cooperation from soldiers. "If you're an individual in the Army, you are an outcast, a misfit.... (The Army) tries to break your individual spirit, your pride in yourself. This is against all I stand for. The Army is a bad place to be if you are an individual like me. I want out. This place is a mental strain .... Since I have come into the Army, I have been drinking too much and doing drugs that I never thought of doing while I was in the real world. The Army has screwed up relationships between a lot of men and their loved ones. This place is so screwed up that people wonder why troops (don't) go AWOL. The Army might be a good place for someone who has nowhere else to turn in life (and) on his last leg." Clearly this comment shows that this unit has failed to create a sense of "we-ness" whereby the soldier can feel he is part of a team, yet be valued and respected as a unique individual. As one soldier commented, this appears to be an important ingredient for being combat-ready: "I personally feel that before this company is ready for combat, it needs to develop more trust and respect between NCOs and privates. The NCOs seem to forget that they were once privates, and even privates have feelings."

Other soldiers expressed related feelings, for example, a general lack of purpose, need for challenges to excel, and feelings of frustration. Low-ranking soldiers "... receive dumb orders .. that have no purpose." "The Army has no challenges for me." "When the going gets tough for you, the Army won't help. They'll just add more problems." "I just plan (to get) out. (I) hate the Army, and I really hate this COHORT stuff." "I would definitely get out of COHORT."

Although soldiers attribute these problems to perhaps the most salient aspect of their Army life (COHORT), nonCOHORT soldiers too expressed very similar concerns. Lack of teamwork and cooperation in nonCOHORT units is demonstrated by the following comments: "If we could fight without officers being there," then we would be combat-ready. "You can't talk to officers in this unit." Other comments related the soldiers' feeling of purposelessness and not being allowed "to be all he can be." For example, one nonCOHORT soldier remarked: "(There is) a complete failure of the US Army to distinguish the important from the unimportant in terms of training."

BDM Contractors' Observations

Data collectors were asked to describe conditions under which questionnaires were administered and reactions of soldiers to the survey. These comments are summarized below.

The survey was given to companies comprising one battalion during early morning hours in the same week. While some companies' moods were described as being from "fair" to "very good," others were described as being "reserved" and "very regimented." Soldiers also expressed concern that their responses and identities would be later matched and reported.

Five of six companies comprising another battalion took the survey on the same day. Some companies began the survey around 0715 hours and others in early afternoon hours. The sixth company of the battalion completed the survey about two weeks later. Data collectors remarked that unit morale ranged from "good" to "outstanding." One company, though, was described as "operating without a (leadership) structure, especially among the NCO ranks."

Companies of a third battalion completed questionnaires within the same week. Surveys were administered from morning to mid-afternoon hours. Troops were described as being very "receptive." Most companies expected that results would have a significant impact on their unit, though one company was described as more skeptical. One company was described as having a negative toward the survey. Data collectors attributed this attitude to the openly expressed negativity of the Company Commander and Platoon Leaders toward the survey.

The remaining two battalions were given the survey on the same day, one during morning hours, and another during afternoon hours. The general attitude of both battalions was described as "positive." Battalions were not inconvenienced, as battalion commanders chose the time at which the survey was administered. Some soldiers expressed concern that their responses would be matched with their identities. Battalion commanders were apprehensive that their battalions would be compared with other battalions.

Data collectors estimated the average time to complete the survey ranged from 25 to 30 minutes, with 47 minutes being the greatest amount of time taken. Data collectors remarked that many soldiers had poor reading skills, and this added considerable time to complete the questionnaire.

4. Discussion

Summary

It has been demonstrated that "soldier will" can be reliably measured. "Soldier will" scales had high internal consistency and displayed both empirical and conceptual coherency as demonstrated by factor analytic results. Stated in simpler terms, soldier attitudes were reliably measured, and based on item content, these sets of attitudes were named as measuring specific aspects of "soldier will;" these are: Company Combat Confidence, Senior Command Confidence, Small-Unit Command Confidence, Concerned Leadership, Sense of Pride, Unit Social Climate, and Unit Teamwork.

The validity of the "soldier will" measures was shown by their high degree of interrelationship. Although the "soldier will" scales measured different aspects of "soldier will," conceptually they are subsumed under a broader, more unitary psychological construct, perhaps called soldier morale, esprit, or will, and therefore, a high degree of interrelaitionship would be expected. Also, it was expected that "soldier will" measures should bear relationships to measures of life adjustment and stress. "Soldier will" was positively related to positive life adjustment (namely, life and Army satisfaction, and psychological well-being) and negatively related to personal distress, medical problems, and wanting to get out of the Army.

The "soldier will" scales discriminated between COHORT and nonCOHORT soldiers. These scales were also expected to differentiate soldiers from units that have undergone different unit assignment, training, and deployment (namely, COHORT) designed to enhance "soldier will." COHORT soldiers consistently showed higher levels of "soldier will" (in terms of the "soldier will" measures) than did nonCOHORT soldiers. Differences were greatest for first-termers (E-4s and below) and on scales measuring small-unit command confidence and unit social climate. Differences were less apparent, and in some cases, reversed direction for officers and for NCOs. These results made sense because COHORT was intended to have its greatest effect at the first-termer-level. Soldiers (E-4 and below) go through basic and advanced individual training together. Officers and NCOs do not.

Previous discussion of results has been limited to the individual soldier. COHORT, however, is not necessarily an individual-level phenomenon. COHORT is operationalized at the company-level. Soldiers in the same company go through basic and advanced individual training together, and personnel are stablizied within the company. Given this, COHORT companies were expected to have greater "soldier will" than nonCOHORT units. This was born out on four of the six "soldier will" scales. In addition, of all 27 companies under study, companies that fell in the lower one-third on "soldier will" were nonCOHORT. In another analysis, paratroop COHORT, COHORT, and nonCOHORT companies were compared on "soldier will" as a method of evaluating mean scale score differences. Mean "soldier will" scores increased in magnitude from nonCOHORT to COHORT to paratroop COHORT companies consistently, though not always significantly.

Also worth mentioning are demographic characteristics that bore significant relationships to "soldier will." Whereas race and education were not correlated with the "soldier will" measures, age, rank, marital status, place of residency, and type of combat arms unit were. When controls for other unit and demographic charterisitics were applied in comparisons, race, rank, type of combat arms unit, and place of residency were significant predictors of "soldier will.". Generally, older soldiers, and those soldiers in armored units, and who lived either in on-post housing and in off-post housing fared better on the "soldier will" measures than younger, artillery men who lived in the barracks. Soldiers of higher rank reported greater company combat confidence, greater senior command confidence, greater sense of pride, and greater unit social climate, but soldiers of lower rank reported greater small-unit command confidence.

Directions for Future Research

Caution should be used in generalizing results summarized in this first report to all units. The sample from which these results were obtained was limited to two posts, and to three nonCOHORT and two COHORT battalions. Results that are most generalizable relate to our newly constructed "soldier will" scales. These scales are believed to measure universally demonstrable psychological constructs, and therefore, should not qualitatively deviate when taking measurements from soldiers in different units. However, soldiers from different units and from different posts would be expected to quantitatively differ on these measurements. Therefore, results that are less generalizable are those that compare COHORT soldiers to nonCOHORT on the "soldier will" measures. As data from other units and posts are incorporated into the data base, results will be updated and reported.

Despite the apparent success in achieving reliable and valid measures of soldier will, two issues remain for future research. The first issue is the appropriate operational definition of the concept of COHORT, and the second is providing behavioral referents (e.g., training performance) for our "soldier will" measures. A direction for future research is to incorporate training performance data into the attitudinal data base. The combined data base will enable translation "soldier will" into measurable performance. In addition, by taking measurements of attitudes and performance over time, cause-effect relationships among COHORT, soldier will, and training performance can be specified (see Figure 1).

The NMS Field Evaluation has been preoccupied with outcome measures, trying to develop measures on which COHORT soldiers differ most from nonCOHORT soliders. These differences are then attributed to one unit being COHORT and the other nonCOHORT. Such conclusions have obvious methodological problems. However, even if unit and demographic differences between units were held constant in comparisons, there are no guarantees that units under study did receive the COHORT experience (or "treatment"). Emphasis is needed on monitoring the processes of COHORT: Do COHORT units receive the COHORT "experience," and to what degree? To evaluate the processes that make a unit COHORT requires measurable aspects of the COHORT "treatment." A major aspect of the COHORT experience was to enhance the quality of interpersonal relationships (through personnel stablization), enabling coping with stress and moderate its deleterious effects on psychological and physical well-being and job performance. WRAIR is presently assessing differences in friendships, interpersonal support, and bonding among soldiers and their relationship to personal distress, "soldier will," and psychological and physical well-being between COHORT and nonCOHORT units.

It should evident from this work that there exist many definitions of COHORT. One definition is the common experience of basic and advanced individual training. Another is stabilization of personnel during a unit's life cycle. A third is some companies (not necessarily all) within the same battalion are COHORT. What further confounds interpretation of results is that many COHORT units have been created using more than one of these definitions. What also should be clear is what is defined as two discrete categories of unit organization, training, and deployment (namely, either COHORT or nonCOHORT) is more likely a matter of degree. This first report has

attempted to more accurately capture degrees of "COHORTness" by asking soldiers how many company members accompanied them through basic and advanced individual training, in addition to their perception of company personnel turnover.

To summarize, to specify which aspect of the COHORT process gives what changes in "soldier will," training performance, logistics, or whatever the outcome measure, different operational definitions of COHORT must be clearly articulated and measured for each unit under study. To compare COHORT to nonCOHORT units does not tell Army leaders in the vaguest way which aspect of the COHORT process gives the most positive outcomes.

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Figure 1

The Analytic Model

Table 1

Sampling Frame of the New Manning System "Human Dimensions" Field Evaluation

| | Companies | | | | Battalions[a] | | Totals |
| | Beginning-of-Life-Cycle | | Mid-Life-Cycle | | | | |
Type of Unit	COHORT	nonCOHORT	COHORT	nonCOHORT	COHORT	nonCOHORT	
Infantry	8	8	3	2	33	16	70
Field Artillery	1	1	4	3	14	10	33
Armor	5	5	4	0	10	10	34
Totals	14	14	11	5	57	36	137

aThe number of companies comprising the battalions in the survey is indicated in the table.

Table 2

Description of Units Comprising the Sample

| Type of Unit | Battalions (N = 5)[a] | | |
	COHORT	nonCOHORT	Totals
Infantry	6(N=775)	6(N=619)	12(N=1394)
Field Artillery	5(N=537)	5(N=537)	10(N=1074)
Armor	0	5(N=362)	5(N=362)
Totals	11(N=1312)	16(N=1518)	26(N=2830)

[a]The number of companies comprising the battalions in the survey is indicated in the table.

Table 3

Response Rates for First-Termers, NCOs, and Officers within COHORT and NonCOHORT Units

| Rank | Response Rates | | |
Category	COHORT	nonCOHORT	z
First-Termers (E1-E4)	84.6% (942/1113)	78.3% (980/1252)	3.94*
NCOs (E5-E9)	78.1% (311/398)	66.8% (471/705)	4.14*
Officers	65.1% (56/86)	53.0% (61/115)	1.75

Note. Nine soldiers did not report their rank. Overall Chi-square for those First-termers, NCOs, and officers not surveyed in COHORT and nonCOHORT units = 45.74, df = 2, p < .001.
*p < .01, two-tailed.

Table 4

Demographic Comparison between COHORT and NonCOHORT Soldiers in the Sample

Demographic	Unit Status				Chi-square
Characteristic	COHORT		nonCOHORT		
	%	N	%	N	
Race					
White	59.46	776	59.33	887	
Black	29.27	382	27.89	417	
Mexican American	4.21	55	3.28	49	
Puerto Rican	2.76	36	4.15	62	
Other	4.29	56	5.35	80	
Total	100.00	1305	100.00	1495	7.56
Missing data = 30					
Marital Status					
Not Married	54.59	707	44.14	652	
Divorced	2.93	38	3.39	50	
Separated	2.32	30	3.11	46	
Married	40.15	520	49.36	729	
Total	100.00	1295	100.00	1477	30.39*
Missing Data = 58					
Type of Residence					
Barracks	59.49	743	48.27	697	
On-post Housing	10.57	132	13.71	198	
Off-post Housing	29.94	374	38.02	549	
Total	100.00	1249	100.00	1444	33.91*
Missing Data = 137					
Education					
Less than High School	7.96	104	7.37	111	
High School Graduate	66.16	864	63.50	957	
Some College	25.88	338	29.13	439	
Total	100.00	1306	100.00	1507	3.76
Missing Data = 17					
Rank					
Junior Enlisted (E1-E4)	71.96	942	64.81	980	
Junior Officer (O1-O3)	2.67	35	2.38	36	
Senior Enlisted (E5-E9)	23.76	311	31.15	471	
Senior Officer (O4,O5)	1.53	20	1.65	25	
Warrant Officers	0.08	1	0.00	0	
Total	100.00	1309	100.00	1512	20.56*
Missing Data = 9					

Table 4 (continued)

Demographic Comparison between COHORT and NonCOHORT Soldiers in the Sample

Demographic Characteristic	Unit Status							t
	COHORT			nonCOHORT				
	$\underline{M}$	$\underline{SD}$	$\underline{N}$	$\underline{M}$	$\underline{SD}$	$\underline{N}$		
Age Missing Data = 383	23.08	5.10	1271	24.24	5.11	1476		-5.92**
Years Service Missing Data = 459	2.15	3.07	1041	2.26	3.04	1330		-.83

*$\underline{p}$ < .01, two-tailed. **$\underline{p}$ < .001, two-tailed.

Table 5

Summary of Factor Analyses of Traditional Scales

Traditional Scale	N	% Variance	Items Loading on Factor	Name of New Scale on Which Items were Placed
Unit Cohesion and Morale Scale (U)				
Factor 1: "Senior Cmd Confidence"	1692/1932	37.2	8,9,10,11,12	Senior Command Confidence
Factor 2: "Unit Cohesion"		10.9	1,4,5,15,16,18	Split among 3 scales
Modified Field Forces Scale (F)	2556/2702			
Factor 1: "Pride"		33.6	1,2,3,4,10,13,14,15	Sense of Pride
Factor 2: "Teamwork"		7.4	5,6,7,8,9	Unit Teamwork
Factor 3: "Time"		5.4	16,17,18	Not used
Company Perceptions Scale (P)				
Factor 1: "Company combat confidence"	2391/2702	33.1	1,2,3,4,12,19,20,32,33,35	Company Combat Confidence
Factor 2: "Unit social climate"		5.0	8,24,25,29,30,31	Unit Social Climate
Squad Platoon Scale (S)				
Factor 1: "Small-unit combat confidence"	1694/1932	35.0	1,2,18,19,20,21,22,25	Small-Unit Combat Confidence
Factor 2: "Concerned leadership"		8.2	11,12,13,14,15,16,17,24,28	Concerned Leadership
Factor 3: "Social support"		6.3	7,8,9,10	Unit Social Climate

Table 6

Company Combat Confidence Scale Items

Scale Item	M	SD	Item-Total Correlation
P1. This company is one of the best in the Army.a	2.80	1.10	.66
P3. The officers in this company really seem to know their stuff.a	2.87	1.03	.56
P4. I think this company would do a better job in combat than most other Army units.a	3.08	.98	.70
P19. I have real confidence in our company's ability to use our weapons.a	3.35	.97	.67
P20. I think the level of training in this company is very high.a	3.23	1.08	.61
P32. I think we are better trained than most other companies in the Army.a	3.05	1.03	.67
P33. The officers in this company would lead well in combat.a	2.85	1.00	.66
P34. The NCOs in this company would lead well in combat.a	3.23	1.02	.58
P35. Soldiers in this company have enough skills that I would trust them with my life in combat.a	2.75	1.13	.63
P18. I have a lot of confifidence in our weapons.a	3.29	1.05	.54
P21. If I have to go into combat, I have a lot of confidence in myself.a	3.98	.89	.33

Table 6 (continued)

Company Combat Confidence Scale Items

Scale Item	M	SD	Item-Total Correlation
U2. How would you describe your company's readiness for combat?b	3.05	.97	.62
U3. How would you describe your fellow soldier's readiness to fight if and when it is necessary?b	3.10	.97	.54
U13. How much confidence do you have in your unit's major weapons systems (tanks, APCs, and so on)?b	3.13	1.14	.57
U14. How would you rate your own skills and abilities as a soldier (using your weapons operating and maintaining your equipment, and so on)?b	3.90	.77	.28
U17. How would you describe the condition of your unit's major weapons systems (tanks, APCs, and so on)? In other words, what kind of shape are they in?c	3.29	.97	.52
U5. In the event of combat, how would describe your confidence in your Company Commander?b	3.34	1.14	.53

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 2537; Total N possible = 2809 (% of missing cases = 9.7). Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the scale = .91.
aResponses ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).
bResponses ranged from "very low" (1) to "very high" (5).
cResponses ranged from "very bad" (1) to "very good" (5).

Table 7

Factor Loadings of Company Combat Confidence Scale Items

Scale Item	Factor 1 General	Factor 2 Weaponry	Factor 3 Self
Percent of Variance Accounted:	40.8%	8.7%	6.8%
P1. This company is one of the best in the US Army.	.74		
P3. The officers in this company really seem to know their stuff.	.73		
P4. I think this company would do a better job in combat than most other Army units.	.74		
P19. I have real confidence in our company's ability to use our weapons.	.53		
P20. I think the level of training in this company is very high.	.62		
P32. I think we are better trained than most other companies in the Army.	.74		
P33. The officers in this company would lead well in combat.	.80		
P34. The NCOs in this company would lead well in combat.	.59		
P35. Soldiers in this company have enough skills that I would trust them with my life in combat.	.62		
P18. I have a lot of confidence in our weapons.		.74	
P21. If I have to go into combat, I have a lot of confidence in myself.			.78

Table 7 (continued)

Factor Loadings of Company Combat Confidence Items

Scale Item	Factor 1 General	Factor 2 Weaponry	Factor 3 Self
Percent of Variance Accounted:	40.8%	8.7%	6.8%
U2. How would you describe your company's readiness for combat?	.54		
U3. How would you describe your fellow soldier's readiness to fight if and when it is necessary?	.46		
U13. How much confidence do you have in your unit's major weapons systems (tanks, APCs, and so on)?		.82	
U14. How would you rate your own skills and abilities as a soldier (using your weapons operating and maintaining your equipment, and so on)?			.75
U17. How would you describe the condition of your unit's major weapons systems (tanks, APCs, and so on)? In other words, what kind of shape are they in?		.81	
U5. In the event of combat, how would describe your confidence in your Company Commander?	.59		

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 2537; Total N possible = 2808.

Table 8

Senior Command Confidence Scale Items

Scale Item	M	SD	Item-Total Correlation
How would you describe your confidence in the tactical decisions of the following:			
U8. your Battalion Commander?a	3.64	1.07	.73
U9. your Brigade Commander?	3.69	.96	.88
U10. your Division Commander?	3.69	.95	.91
U11. your Corps Commander?	3.63	.97	.89
U12. the Army General Staff?	3.62	1.02	.82

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 2660; Total N possible = 2830 (% of missing cases = 6.1). Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the scale = .94.
aResponses to all items ranged from "very low" (1) to "very high" (5).

Table 9

Factor Loadings of Senior Command Confidence Scale Items

Scale Item	Factor 1
Percent of Variance Accounted:	81.8%
How would you describe your confidence in the tactical decisions of the following:	
U8. your Battalion Commander?	.82
U9. your Brigade Commander?	.92
U10. your Division Commander?	.94
U11. your Corps Commander?	.93
U12. the Army General Staff?	.89

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 2660; Total N possible = 2830.

Table 10

Small-Unit Command Confidence Scale Items

Scale Item	M	SD	Item-Total Correlation
S18. My squad leader knows his (her) stuff.a	3.46	1.10	.54
S19. My platoon sergeant knows his(her) stuff.a	3.47	1.11	.59
S20. My platoon leader knows his(her) stuff.a	3.30	1.11	.60
S21. If we went to war tomorrow, I would feel good with my squad.a	3.11	1.14	.65
S22. If we went to war tomorrow, I would feel good with my platoon.a	3.02	1.13	.68
S25. NCOs in my company are the kind I would want to serve under in combat.a	2.99	1.08	.65
S24. Officers in my company are the kind I would want to serve under in combat.a	2.76	1.03	.57
In the event of combat, how would you describe your confidence in the following:			
U4. your platoon leader?b	3.25	1.22	.59
U5. your Company Commander?b	3.31	1.15	.47
U6. your crew/squad members?b	3.37	1.04	.54
U7. yourself?b	3.86	.94	.36

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 1771; Total N possible = 1922 (% of missing cases = 7.9). Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the scale = .87.
aResponses ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).
bResponses ranged fr m "very low" (1) to "very high" (5).

Table 11

Factor Loadings of Small-Unit Command Confidence Scale Items

Scale Item	Factor 1 Sqd/Plt Leaders	Factor 2 Officer	Factor 3 Crew/self
Percent of Variance Accounted:	43.7%	11.4%	9.6%
S18. My squad leader knows his stuff.	.75		
S19. My platoon sergeant knows his stuff.	.77		
S20. My platoon leader knows his stuff.	.67		
S21. If we went to war tomorrow, I would feel good with my squad.	.55		.64
S22. If we went to war tomorrow, I would feel good with my platoon.	.54		.51
S25. NCOs in my company are the kind I would want to serve under in combat.	.54		
S24. Officers in my company are the kind I would want to serve under in combat.		.71	
In the event of combat, how would you describe your confidence in the following:			
U4. your platoon leader?		.69	
U5. your Company Commander?		.81	
U6. your crew/squad members?			.77
U7. yourself?			.75

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 1771; Total N possible = 1922.

Table 12

Concerned Leadership Scale Items

Scale Item	M	SD	Item-Total Correlation
S11. My platoon sergeant talks to me personally outside normal duties.a	2.73	1.18	.57
S12. My platoon leader talks to me personally outside normal duties.	2.59	1.16	.60
S13. The company commander talks to me personally outside normal duties.	2.23	1.03	.55
S14. My officers are interested in my personal welfare.	2.69	1.08	.67
S15. My NCOs are interested in what I think and how I feel about things.	2.98	1.15	.68
S16. My officers are interested in what I think and how I feel about things.	2.61	1.06	.70
S17. My NCOs are interested in what I think and how I feel about things.	2.85	1.11	.69
S28. My chain-of-command works well.	2.83	1.12	.58
P26. My superiors make a real attempt to treat me as a person.	2.81	1.21	.60

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 1799; Total N possible = 1922 (% of missing cases = 6.4). Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the scale = .88.
aResponses to all items ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).

Table 13

Factor Loadings of Concerned Leadership Scale Items

Scale Item	Factor 1 Soldier Welfare	Factor 2 Personal Contact
Percent of Variance Accounted:	51.5%	11.4%
S11. My platoon sergeant talks to me personally outside normal duties.		.82
S12. My platoon leader talks to me personally outside normal duties.		.84
S13. The company commander talks to me personally outside normal duties.		.66
S14. My officers are interested in my personal welfare.	.66	
S15. My NCOs are interested in what I think and how I feel about things.	.79	
S16. My officers are interested in what I think and how I feel about things.	.71	
S17. My NCOs are interested in what I think and how I feel about things.	.80	
S28. My chain-of-command works well.	.69	
P26. My superiors make a real attempt to treat me as a person.	.72	

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 1799; Total N possible = 1922.

Table 14

Sense of Pride Scale Items

Scale Item	M	SD	Item-Total Correlation
F1. I am proud to be in the Army.[a]	3.86	1.07	.55
F2. I am proud of my company.	3.23	1.14	.70
F3. I really feel that I belong in my company.	2.95	1.23	.67
F4. I am an important part of my company.	3.45	1.19	.58
F10. What I do in the Army is worthwhile.	3.41	1.22	.63
F13. On the whole, the Army gives me a chance to "be all I can be."	2.50	1.26	.54
F14. The equipment of the American Army is better than that of the Russian Army.	3.38	1.04	.38
F15. My company will play a part in winning future conflicts	3.49	.97	.56

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 2701; Total N possible = 2809 (% of missing cases = 3.9). Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the scale = .84.
[a]Responses to all items ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).

Table 15

Factor Loadings of Sense of Pride Scale Items

Scale Items	Factor 1
Percent of Variance Accounted:	48.2%
F1. I am proud to be in the Army.	.66
F2. I am proud of my company.	.81
F3. I really feel that I belong in my company.	.78
F4. I am an important part of my company.	.70
F10. What I do in the Army is worthwhile.	.74
F13. On the whole, the Army gives me a chance to "be all I can be."	.65
F14. The equipment of the American Army is better than that of the Russian Army.	.48
F15. My company will play a part in winning future conflicts.	.68

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 2701; Total N possible = 2809.

Table 16

Unit Social Climate Scale Items

Scale Item	M	SD	Item-Total Correlation
P24. Most of the people in this company can be trusted.a	2.77	1.04	.55
P25. I want to spend my entire enlistment in this company.a	2.08	1.21	.48
P2. People in this company feel very close to each other.a	2.70	.97	.60
P29. I like being in this company.a	2.53	1.25	.60
P30. In this company, you don't have to watch your belongings.a	2.12	1.09	.40
P31. In this company, people really look out for each other.a	2.63	1.05	.65
S7. I can go to most people in my squad for help when I have a personal problem, like being in debt.a	2.91	1.11	.56
S8. I can go to most people in my platoon for help when I have a personal problem, like being in debt.a	2.84	1.06	.60
S9. Most people in my squad would lend me money in an emergency.a	3.36	1.06	.51

Table 16 (continued)

Unit Social Climate Scale Items

Scale Item	M	SD	Item-Total Correlation
S10. Most people in my platoon would lend me money in an emergency.[a]	3.17	1.03	.53
P9. I spend my after-duty hours with people in this company.[a]	3.16	1.21	.36
P10. My closest friendships are with the people I work with.[a]	3.10	1.25	.42
P17. I would go for help with a personal problem to people in the company chain.[a]	2.69	1.43	.42
U15. How would you describe your unit's togetherness, or how "tight" are members of your unit?[b]	3.01	1.00	.55
U16. How would you described the relationships between officers and the enlisted in your unit?[c]	3.23	.97	.40

Note. Listwise deletion was employed; N = 1705; Total N possible = 1922 (% of missing cases = 11.3). Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the scale = .86.
[a]Responses ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).
[b]Responses ranged from "very low" (1) to "very high" (5).
[c]Responses ranged from "very bad" (1) to "very good" (5).

Table 17

Factor Loadings of Unit Social Climate Scale Items

Scale Items	Factor 1 Trust & Caring	Factor 2 Instrumental Support	Factor 3 Friendships
Percent of Variance Accounted:	35.6%	12.2%	7.8%
P24. Most of the people in this company can be trusted.	.62		
P25. I want to spend my entire enlistment in this company.	.70		
P2. People in this company feel very close to each other.	.70		
P29. I like being in this company.	.77		
P30. In this company, you don't have to watch your belongings.	.57		
P31. In this company, people really look out for each other.	.70		
S7. I can go to most people in my squad for help when I have a personal problem, like being in debt.		.75	
S8. I can go to most people in my platoon for help when I have a personal problem, like being in debt.		.78	
S9. Most people in my squad would lend me money in an emergency.		.83	

Table 17 (continued)

Factor Loadings of Unit Social Climate Scale Items

Scale Item	Factor 1 Trust & Caring	Factor 2 Instrumental Support	Factor 3 Friendships
Percent of Variance Accounted:	35.6%	12.2%	7.8%
S10. Most people in my <u>platoon</u> would lend me money in an emergency.		.83	
P9. I spend my after-duty hours with people in this company.			.83
P10. My closest friendships are with the people I work with.			.80
P17. I would go for help with a personal problem to people in the company chain.	.48		
U15. How would you describe your unit's togetherness, or how "tight" are members of your unit?	.62		
U18. How would you described the relationships between officers and the enlisted in your unit?	.55		

<u>Note.</u> Listwise deletion was employed; N = 1705; Total N possible = 1922.

Table 18

Unit Teamwork Scale Items

Scale Item	M	SD	Item-Total Correlation
F5. There is a lot of team-work and cooperation among soldiers in my company.a	3.06	1.14	.56
F6. Officers most always get willing and whole-hearted cooperation from soldiers.	3.15	1.08	.64
F7. NCOs most always get willing and whole-hearted cooperation from soldiers.	3.17	1.12	.66
F8. Outside normal company duties, soldiers in my company would do most anything for their officers.	2.63	1.09	.64
F9. Outside normal company duties, soldiers in my company would do most anything for their NCOs.	2.92	1.10	.61

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 2760; Total N possible = 2809 (% of missing cases = 1.7). Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the scale = .83.
aResponses to all items ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).

Table 19

Factor Loadings of Unit Teamwork Scale Items

Scale Item	Factor 1
Percent of Variance Accounted:	59.1%
F5. There is a lot of team-work and cooperation among soldiers in my company.	.71
F6. Officers most always get willing and whole-hearted cooperation from soldiers.	.78
F7. NCOs most always get willing and whole-hearted cooperation from soldiers.	.80
F8. Outside normal company duties, soldiers in my company would do most anything for their officers.	.78
F9. Outside normal company duties, soldiers in my company would do most anything for their NCOs.	.76

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 2760; Total N possible = 2809.

Table 20

Relationships Among "Soldier Will," General Well-Being, Life and Army Satisfaction, Spouse Support, and Psychological Sense of Community

Intercorrelations

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
"Soldier Will" Measures												
1. Comp Combat Conf	100											
2. Sen Cmd Conf	53	100										
3. Sm-Unit Cmd Conf	76	48	100									
4. Concerned Leadership	63	37	67	100								
5. Sense of Pride	73	46	62	58	100							
6. Unit Social Climate	67	37	64	68	58	100						
7. Unit Teamwork	66	40	59	58	63	61	100					
8. Well-Being	42	27	34	38	48	42	38	100				
9. Life Satisfaction	30	27	26	22	33	31	28	46	100			
10. Army Satisfaction	59	45	53	57	64	57	50	55	56	100		
11. Spouse Support	37	20	33	37	33	31	29	28	28	39	100	
12. Sense of Community	27	26	25	28	26	30	28	28	24	42	41	100

Note. Listwise deletion was employed; N ranged from 1036 to 2804 depending on the level of analysis (e.g., company-level, squad-level, married personnel, or married personnel living with spouse) and too, some variables had missing values. In reporting correlation coefficients, decimals have been omitted. All correlations were significant at the $p < .001$-level.

Table 21

Relationship of "Soldier Will" to Measures of Personal Distress, Medical Problems, and Re-enlistment

Stress Measure	Company Cmbt Confidence	Senior Cmd Confidence	Small-Unt Cmd Conf	Concern Leaders	Sense of Pride	Social Climate	Teamwork
How many hours do you work in a day?	-09	-06	-14	-17	-03	-19	-05
How many days do you work in a week?	-03	-06	-09	-05	-07	-06	-03
How many weekends a month do you work?	-08	-06	-13	-11	-10	-12	-08
How many days a month do you spend in the field?	-00	-01	01	-02	-04	-02	01
Do you have enough time:[a]							
To take care of your personal needs?	-24	-18	-23	-27	-23	-25	-19
Spend with your family and friends?	-22	-19	-20	-21	-22	-23	-19
For relaxation and entertainment?	-25	-19	-24	-28	-24	-28	-23
How many times have you seen a doctor in the past year?	-09	-06	-06	-07	-12	-08	-09
How often do you take medications for nerves?[b]	-10	-04	-06	-06	-12	-07	-08
How often can't you work because of worry?[b]	-15	-09	-12	-10	-15	-12	-11
Do you want to stay in this unit after your first-term enlistment?[c]	45	27	38	40	49	47	40
Will you re-enlist?[c]	35	26	31	30	47	29	31
If you could, would you get out of the Army?[c]	-42	-32	-39	-36	-54	-35	-36

Note. Listwise deletion was used; N ranged from 1678 to 2804, depending on the appropriate respondent pool and the number of missing cases.
[a]Response categories ranged from 1 ("need a lot less time") to 5 ("need a lot more time").
[b]Response categories ranged from 1 ("never") to 5 ("always").
[c]Response categories ranged from 1 ("definitely no") to 5 ("definitely yes").

Intercorrelations among "Soldier Will," Life Adjustment, and Soldier and Unit Characteristics

Intercorrelations

Variable	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
"Soldier Will" Measures																
1. Comp Combat Conf	14	04	03	08	04	16	01	08	04	-06	09	15	12	08	13	-07
2. Sen Cmd Conf	07	10	01	03	01	06	01	05	02	-04	-05	-01	13	05	09	-06
3. Sm Cmd Conf	-05	-04	-02	-06	-03	-21	-04	-02	04	-04	-06	-04	22	-02	-05	07
4. Concerned Ldr	-01	-01	00	-05	-05	-11	-02	-00	02	-02	-02	00	18	-02	-04	05
5. Pride	23	02	05	09	04	26	03	15	07	-03	04	06	12	15	20	-09
6. Unt Soc Clim	-10	-02	-00	-09	-07	-21	-05	-13	-03	-10	-05	03	20	-15	-06	-00
7. Unt Teamwork	13	05	01	03	02	13	-00	08	06	-07	03	09	15	05	13	-10
8. Well-Being	19	05	04	11	08	21	01	12	07	-05	03	07	03	14	14	-03
9. Life Sat	13	10	05	07	02	20	--	--	--	-06	01	07	01	11	19	-06
10. Army Sat	25	06	07	12	06	26	--	--	--	-07	07	13	07	05	17	-10
11. Spouse Supp	13	-09	03	10	09	25	--	--	07	07	01	-05	02	06	10	-06
12. Sense Comm	19	12	03	06	04	19	--	--	--	-00	01	01	03	-05	-05	-18
13. Age	100	08	08	33	29	63	50	53	-05	05	12	08	-11	43	61	-25
14. White/Other[a]		100	11	15	-00	00	02	04	00	01	-03	-04	-00	-07	09	-17
15. < Hi Sch/Hi Sch			100	--	00	12	-04	04	07	04	03	-00	-01	05	04	-02
16. < Hi Sch/Some Coll				100	--	30	04	18	08	10	09	01	-04	21	19	-03
17. Hi Sch/Some Coll					100	31	09	14	00	05	06	01	-04	17	15	-01
18. Rank						100	23	42	08	16	19	06	-20	46	63	-23
19. Sngl/Div & Sep							100	--	--	03	05	02	-07	30	25	
20. Sngl/Married								100	--	08	11	05	-10	79	82	
21. Div & Sep/Marr									100	03	02	01	00	42	52	
22. IN/FA										100	--	--	-06	04	13	-11
23. IN/AR											100	--	-45	13	07	03
24. FA/AR												100	-45	10	-04	13
25. nonCHT/COHORT													100	-11	-09	00
26. Barr/Off-post														100	--	--
27. Barr/On-post															100	--
28. On-post/Off-post																100

Note. Listwise deletion was employed; N ranged from 992 to 2830, depending on the level of analysis (e.g., company-, squad-level, etc.) and too, missing variable values. In reporting correlation coefficients, decimals have been omitted

[a]Variables numbered 14-28 were dichotomously coded. For each variable-pair, the variable preceding the "/" was coded as "0," and the variable after the "/" was coded as "1."

Table 23

Comparison of COHORT to nonCOHORT Soldiers on "Soldier Will", Well-Being, Satisfaction, and Spouse Support

| | Unit Status | | | | | | | |
| Comparison Measures | COHORT | | | nonCOHORT | | | Missing | t |
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N		
"Soldier Will"								
Company Combat Confidence	55.69	10.40	1263	52.98	11.30	1451	95(3.4%)	6.51*
Senior Cmd Confidence	18.86	4.30	1274	17.73	4.58	1436	117(4.1%)	6.64**
Small-Unit Cmd Confidence	37.64	7.64	897	34.21	7.80	928	97(5.0%)	9.50**
Concerned Leadership	25.62	6.96	912	23.04	7.16	945	65(3.4%)	7.89**
Sense of Pride	27.03	6.04	1302	25.47	6.46	1502	5(0.2%)	6.62**
Unit Social Climate	44.27	9.54	891	40.28	9.53	930	101(5.3%)	8.92**
Unit Teamwork	15.63	4.06	1303	14.33	4.31	1496	31(1.1%)	8.16**
General Well-Being	62.67	19.19	1283	61.35	19.93	1497	50(1.8%)	1.77
General Life Satisfaction	45.08	8.11	495	44.85	8.38	708	156(11.5%)	0.49
Army Satisfaction	42.86	11.18	494	41.23	11.44	704	161(11.8%)	2.47*
Spouse Support	16.52	3.74	423	16.35	3.75	615	43(4.0%)	0.82

*$p < .05$, two-tailed. **$p < .01$, two-tailed.

Table 24

Comparison of COHORT to nonCOHORT Soldiers on "Soldier Will", Well-Being, Satisfaction, and Spouse Support: E4s and Below Only

Comparison Measures	COHORT			nonCOHORT				t
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	Missing	
"Soldier Will"								
Company Combat Confidence	55.04	10.52	902	51.04	10.73	938	82(4.3%)	8.08**
Senior Cmd Confidence	18.67	4.38	916	17.42	4.59	928	78(4.1%)	5.98**
Small-Unit Cmd Confidence	37.64	7.64	897	34.21	7.80	928	97(5.0%)	9.50**
Concerned Leadership	25.62	6.96	912	23.04	7.16	945	65(3.4%)	7.89**
Sense of Pride	26.21	5.88	936	24.02	6.03	973	13(0.7%)	8.02**
Unit Social Climate	44.27	9.54	891	40.28	9.53	930	101(5.3%)	8.92**
Unit Teamwork	15.33	4.02	937	13.54	4.17	967	18(0.9%)	9.51**
General Well-Being	60.69	19.26	919	58.68	19.43	967	36(1.9%)	2.26*
General Life Satisfaction	44.05	8.32	219	43.44	8.32	321	34(5.9%)	0.84
Army Satisfaction	40.72	11.23	218	38.57	10.65	315	41(7.1%)	2.23*
Spouse Support	16.21	3.50	172	15.72	3.40	271	27(5.7%)	1.45

*p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed.

Table 25

Multiple Regression Analyses in which "Soldier Will" Measures are Regressed on Soldier and Unit Characteristics

Criterion Variable

Predictor Variables	Company Combat Confidence		Senior Command Confidence		Small-Unit Command Confidence		Concerned Leadership		Sense of Pride		Unit Social Climate	
	b	R^2 Added	b	R^2 Added	b	R^2 Added	b	R^2 Added	b	R^2 Added	b	R^2 Added
Age	038	018**	029	005**	022	003*	035	000	102**	052**	-002	009**
Race[a]	036	000	088**	007**	-040	001	-013	000	014	000	-024	001
Rank[b]	155**	009**	059*	001	-148**	042**	-038	014**	219**	020**	-109**	034**
Education	001	000	-024	000	002	000	-015	000	-029	000	-019	001
Single[c]	012	000	047	000	-044	000	-046	000	042	000	017	006**
Divorced/Sep[c]	-004	000	009	000	-040	000	-028	000	-019	002*	-005	000
Artillery[d]	-078**	010**	-045*	002*	009	000	006	000	-055**	003**	-056*	003*
Armor[d]	127**	002*	011	001	050	000	062*	000	066**	000	051	000
COHORT[e]	203**	035**	149**	019**	166**	019**	183**	024**	208**	016**	154**	018**
On-post[f]	047	001	067*	000	-021	001	-013	000	060*	000	-003	000
Off-post[f]	025	000	065*	001	-016	000	-042	000	063*	002*	-096*	002*
Cum R^2	075**		036**		066**		018*		115**		074**	
	$F(11,2450) = 17.9?$		$F(11,2447) = 8.37$		$F(11,1655) = 10.5R$		$F(11,1682) = 6.00$		$F(11,2531) = 29.80$		$F(11,1651) = 11.97$	

Note. In reporting standardized beta weights and R^2 Added, decimals were omitted.

[a] Race was dichotomously coded so that whites = "0" and nonwhites = "1."

[b] Rank was coded so that E-1 = "1," E-2 = "2," ... 0-1 = "10," 0-2 = "11," etc.

[c] Marital status was trichotomized, with married serving as the reference group. Single and Divorced/Separated were dummy coded so that "1" = inclusion in a group and "0" = exclusion from a group.

[d] Unit type (Infantry, Armor, and Artillery) was trichotomized, with Infantry serving as the reference group. Artillery and armor units were dummy coded so that "1" = inclusion in a group and "0" = exclusion from a group.

[e] COHORT was dichotomously coded so that COHORT = "1" and nonCOHORT = "0."

[f] Residence was trichotomized, with Barracks serving as the reference group. On-post and Off-post were dummy coded so that "1" = inclusion in a group and "0" = exclusion from a group.

*p < .05. **p < .01.

Table 26

Company Combat Confidence Scale: T-Tests of Mean Item Ratings between COHORT
and nonCOHORT Soldiers

| Scale Item | COHORT | | | nonCOHORT | | | |
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	t
P1. This company is one of the best in the Army.a	2.98	1.06	1298	2.66	1.11	1504	7.12*
P3. The officers in this company really seem to know their stuff.a	2.98	1.02	1293	2.79	1.04	1501	5.02*
P4. I think this company would do a better job in combat than most other Army units.a	3.19	0.98	1297	2.98	0.98	1503	5.60*
P19. I have real confidence in our company's ability to use our weapons.a	3.45	0.93	1288	3.26	1.01	1494	5.03*
P20. I think the level of training in this company is very high.a	3.31	1.05	1292	3.15	1.10	1498	4.09*
P32. I thin* we are better trained than most other companies in the Army.a	3.19	1.01	1278	2.93	1.03	1486	6.78*
P33. The officers in this company would lead well in combat.a	2.98	0.96	1275	2.73	1.03	1488	6.55*
P34. The NCOs in this company would lead well in combat.a	3.36	1.01	1277	3.11	1.03	1484	6.31*
P35. Soldiers in this company have enough skills that I would trust them with my life in combat.a	2.82	1.11	1276	2.70	1.14	1480	2.85*
P18. I have a lot of confifidence in our weapons.a	3.28	1.04	1283	3.28	1.07	1502	0.02
P21. If I have to go into combat, I have a lot of confidence in myself.a	4.00	0.89	1294	3.93	0.92	1503	1.91

Table 26 (continued)

Company Combat Confidence Scale: T-Tests of Mean Item Ratings between COHORT and nonCOHORT Soldiers

Scale Item	COHORT			nonCOHORT			
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	t
U2. How would you describe your company's readiness for combat?b	3.09	0.97	1302	2.99	0.98	1487	2.72*
U3. How would you describe your fellow soldier's readiness to fight if and when it is necessary?b	3.13	1.00	1294	3.08	0.96	1493	1.27
U13. How much confidence do you have in your unit's major weapons systems (tanks, APCs, and so on)?b	3.17	1.09	1278	3.10	1.19	1468	1.67
U14. How would you rate your own skills and abilities as a soldier (using your weapons operating and maintaining your equipment, and so on)?b	3.91	0.75	1307	3.90	0.78	1509	0.47
U17. How would you describe the condition of your unit's major weapons systems (tanks, APCs, and so on)? In other words, what kind of shape are they in?c	3.28	0.91	1304	3.30	1.01	1505	-0.49
U5. In the event of combat, how would describe your confidence in your Company Commander?b	3.57	1.03	1292	3.13	1.19	1470	10.63*

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 2537; Total N possible = 2809 (% of missing cases = 9.7).
aResponses ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).
bResponses ranged from "very low" (1) to "very high" (5).
cResponses ranged from "very bad" (1) to "very good" (5).
*p < .01, two-tailed.

Table 27

Senior Command Confidence Scale: T-Tests of Mean Item Ratings between COHORT and nonCOHORT Soldiers

Scale Item	COHORT			nonCOHORT			
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	t
How would you describe your confidence in the tactical decisions of the following:							
U8. your Battalion Commander?a	3.85	1.01	1293	3.46	1.09	1486	9.74*
U9. your Brigade Commander?	3.82	0.92	1285	3.57	0.98	1450	6.77*
U10. your Division Commander?	3.80	0.91	1280	3.60	0.98	1453	5.67*
U11. your Corps Commander?	3.71	0.94	1268	3.56	0.99	1428	4.10*
U12. the Army General Staff?	3.70	1.00	1277	3.54	1.04	1441	3.98*

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 2660; Total N possible = 2830 (% of missing cases = 6.1).
aResponses to all items ranged from "very low" (1) to "very high" (5).
*p < .01, two-tailed.

Table 28

Small-Unit Command Confidence Scale: T-Tests of Mean Item Ratings between
COHORT and nonCOHORT Soldiers

Scale Item	COHORT			nonCOHORT			
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	t
S18. My squad leader knows his (her) stuff.a	3.60	1.05	907	3.30	1.15	941	5.83*
S19. My platoon sergeant knows his(her) stuff.a	3.63	1.06	910	3.31	1.14	941	6.21*
S20. My platoon leader knows his(her) stuff.a	3.49	1.02	906	3.11	1.15	940	7.57*
S21. If we went to war tomorrow, I would feel good with my squad.a	3.20	1.13	911	3.02	1.13	946	3.47*
S22. If we went to war tomorrow, I would feel good with my platoon.a	3.15	1.10	910	2.90	1.13	943	4.91*
S25. NCOs in my company are the kind I would want to serve under in combat.a	3.19	1.01	906	2.81	1.05	942	7.56*
S24. Officers in my company are the kind I would want to serve under in combat.a	2.96	1.00	908	2.58	1.02	940	8.07*
In the event of combat, how would you describe your confidence in the following:							
U4. your platoon leader?b	3.44	1.15	1230	3.00	1.21	1416	9.43*
U5. your Company Commander?b	3.57	1.03	1292	3.13	1.19	1470	10.63*
U6. your crew/squad members?b	3.45	1.01	930	1.04	0.03	972	2.88*
U7. yourself?b	3.96	0.90	1298	3.95	0.91	1494	0.23

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 1771; Total N possible = 1922 (% of missing cases = 7.9).
aResponses ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).
bResponses ranged from "very low" (1) to "very high" (5).
*p < .01, two-tailed.

Table 29

Concerned Leadership Scale: T-Tests of Mean Item Ratings between COHORT and nonCOHORT Soldiers

Scale Item	COHORT			nonCOHORT			
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	t
S11. My platoon sergeant talks to me personally outside normal duties.a	2.86	1.17	903	2.61	1.18	943	4.61*
S12. My platoon leader talks to me personally outside normal duties.	2.75	1.16	910	2.45	1.15	945	5.49*
S13. The company commander talks to me personally outside normal duties.	2.33	1.02	910	2.14	1.03	943	4.03*
S14. My officers are interested in my personal welfare.	2.84	1.05	911	2.54	1.08	943	6.20*
S15. My NCOs are interested in what I think and how I feel about things.	3.15	1.09	909	2.81	1.11	946	6.65*
S16. My officers are interested in what I think and how I feel about things.	2.77	1.04	911	2.46	1.06	945	6.39*
S17. My NCOs are interested in what I think and how I feel about things.	3.00	1.11	911	2.69	1.09	944	6.03*
S28. My chain-of-command works well.	2.97	1.08	906	2.68	1.14	935	5.59*
P26. My superiors make a real attempt to treat me as a person.	3.06	1.17	1293	2.86	1.23	1505	4.48*

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 1799; Total N possible = 1922 (% of missing cases = 6.4).

aResponses to all items ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).

*p < .01, two-tailed.

Table 30

Sense of Pride Scale: T-Tests of Mean Item ratings between COHORT and nonCOHORT Soldiers

Scale Item	COHORT			nonCOHORT			
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	t
F1. I am proud to be in the Army.a	3.96	1.01	1310	3.75	1.13	1510	5.21**
F2. I am proud of my company.	3.40	1.09	1306	3.08	1.16	1501	7.42**
F3. I really feel that I belong in my company.	3.06	1.22	1307	2.84	1.24	1501	4.80**
F4. I am an important part of my company.	3.51	1.14	1297	3.39	1.24	1498	2.57*
F10. What I do in the Army is worthwhile.	3.30	1.20	1294	3.34	1.23	1501	3.48**
F13. On the whole, the Army gives me a chance to "be all I can be."	2.65	1.25	1302	2.38	1.26	1507	5.72**
F14. The equipment of the American Army is better than that of the Russian Army.	3.36	1.01	1300	3.37	1.06	1501	−0.25
F15. My company will play a part in winning future conflicts	3.61	0.94	1291	3.36	0.99	1495	6.76**

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 2701; Total N possible = 2809 (% of missing cases = 3.9).
aResponses to all items ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).
*p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed.

Table 31

Unit Social Climate Scale: T-Tests of Mean Item Ratings between COHORT and nonCOHORT Soldiers

Scale Item	COHORT			nonCOHORT			
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	t
P24. Most of the people in this company can be trusted.[a]	2.96	1.04	1288	2.85	1.06	1497	2.60**
P25. I want to spend my entire enlistment in this company.[a]	2.20	1.41	1234	1.89	1.14	1440	6.74**
P2. People in this company feel very close to each other.[a]	2.85	0.95	1297	2.66	0.99	1501	5.36**
P29. I like being in this company.[a]	2.80	1.27	1282	2.52	1.26	1488	5.76**
P30. In this company, you don't have to watch your belongings.[a]	2.20	1.10	1281	2.18	1.07	1490	0.66
P31. In this company, people really look out for each other.[a]	2.81	1.03	1272	2.61	1.05	1482	5.22**
S7. I can go to most people in my squad for help when I have a personal problem, like being in debt.[a]	3.00	1.12	905	2.82	1.10	942	3.53**
S8. I can go to most people in my platoon for help when I have a personal problem, like being in debt.[a]	2.92	1.07	903	2.78	1.06	941	2.75**
S9. Most people in my squad would lend me money in an emergency.[a]	3.50	1.03	908	3.22	1.07	942	5.85**

Table 31 (continued)

Unit Social Climate Scale: T-Tests of Mean Item Ratings between COHORT and nonCOHORT Soldiers

Scale Item	COHORT			nonCOHORT			
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	t
S10. Most people in my platoon would lend me money in an emergency.a	3.25	1.02	903	3.10	1.03	940	3.25**
P9. I spend my after-duty hours with people in this company.a	3.11	1.21	1278	2.81	1.24	1495	6.37**
P10. My closest friendships are with the people I work with.a	3.10	1.24	1291	2.82	1.26	1502	5.85**
P17. I would go for help with a personal problem to people in the company chain.a	2.86	1.23	1286	2.75	1.26	1488	2.40*
U15. How would you describe your unit's togetherness, or how "tight" are members of your unit?b	3.17	0.97	1301	2.96	0.99	1502	5.47**
U18. How would you described the relationships between officers and the enlisted in your unit?c	3.40	0.91	1295	3.18	1.02	1497	6.13**

Note. Listwise deletion was employed; N = 1705; Total N possible = 1922 (% of missing cases = 11.3).
aResponses ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).
bResponses ranged from "very low" (1) to "very high" (5).
cResponses ranged from "very bad" (1) to "very good" (5).
*p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed.

Table 32

Unit Teamwork Scale Items: T-Tests of Mean Item Ratings between COHORT and nonCOHORT Soldiers

| Scale Item | COHORT | | | nonCOHORT | | | |
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	t
F5. There is a lot of team-work and cooperation among soldiers in my company.a	3.18	1.10	1304	2.96	1.16	1502	5.12*
F6. Officers most always get willing and whole-hearted cooperation from soldiers.	3.30	1.06	1304	3.04	1.09	1503	6.31*
F7. NCOs most always get willing and whole-hearted cooperation from soldiers.	3.31	1.08	1306	3.06	1.14	1501	5.87*
F8. Outside normal company duties, soldiers in my company would do most anything for their officers.	2.79	1.05	1304	2.49	1.09	1496	7.48*
F9. Outside normal company duties, soldiers in my company would do most anything for their NCOs.	3.06	1.08	1300	2.80	1.11	1492	6.30*

Note. Listwise deletion was employed, N = 2760; Total N possible = 2809 (% of missing cases = 1.7).

aResponses to all items ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).

*p < .01, two-tailed.

Table 33

Companies Arrayed by Mean Company Combat Confidence Scale Scores

Unit Nominal Label	M	f
1. NonCohort	66.76	33
2. NonCohort	59.09	44
3. Cohort	58.27	60
4. NonCohort	58.21	42
5. Cohort	58.00	225
6. Cohort	57.02	119
7. Cohort	56.78	81
8. Cohort	56.58	120
9. Cohort	56.10	115
10. Cohort	55.78	69
11. NonCohort	55.59	70
12. NonCohort	55.36	83
13. Cohort	55.33	92
14. NonCohort	55.06	194
15. NonCohort	54.39	120
16. Cohort	54.39	186
17. NonCohort	53.50	38
18. NonCohort	52.76	104
19. Cohort	52.62	107
20. NonCohort	52.52	106
21. NonCohort	52.23	204
22. NonCohort	50.52	81
23. Cohort	50.39	90
24. NonCohort	49.49	93
25. NonCohort	49.08	88
26. NonCohort	48.47	78
27. NonCohort	46.47	73
Total N		2715

M of Co = 54.47
$\overline{SEM}$ = 0.79
Missing cases = 115

Note. Wilcoxon ranks sum test, z = 1.73, ns, two-tailed.

Table 34

Companies Arrayed by Mean Senior Command Confidence Scale Scores

Unit Nominal Label	M	f
1. Cohort	20.11	64
2. Cohort	20.10	231
3. Cohort	19.47	120
4. Cohort	18.97	116
5. Cohort	18.92	119
6. NonCohort	18.78	120
7. Cohort	18.77	66
8. Cohort	18.56	81
9. NonCohort	18.52	85
10. NonCohort	18.34	107
11. Cohort	18.30	185
12. NonCohort	18.23	193
13. Cohort	18.16	90
14. NonCohort	18.06	34
15. Cohort	17.81	91
16. NonCohort	17.73	41
17. NonCohort	17.65	78
18. NonCohort	17.59	44
19. NonCohort	17.52	82
20. NonCohort	17.45	101
21. NonCohort	17.42	207
22. Cohort	17.38	111
23. NonCohort	17.31	39
24. NonCohort	17.24	72
25. NonCohort	17.12	69
26. NonCohort	17.04	79
27. NonCohort	16.60	85
Total N		2710

$\underline{M}$ of Co = 18.12
$\overline{SEM}$ = 0.17
Missing cases = 120

Note. Wilcoxon ranks sum test, $\underline{z}$ = 3.11, $\underline{p}$ < .01, two-tailed.

Table 35

Companies Arrayed by Mean Small-Unit Command Confidence Scale Scores

Unit Nominal Label		M	f
1.	Cohort	41.03	86
2.	Cohort	40.93	41
3.	NonCohort	39.43	14
4.	Cohort	39.08	86
5.	Cohort	38.41	81
6.	NonCohort	37.95	93
7.	Cohort	37.90	60
8.	Cohort	37.44	115
9.	Cohort	37.22	45
10.	NonCohort	37.00	16
11.	NonCohort	36.95	40
12.	NonCohort	36.90	21
13.	Cohort	36.79	89
14.	Cohort	36.57	158
15.	Cohort	36.19	69
16.	NonCohort	36.02	41
17.	NonCohort	35.78	69
18.	NonCohort	35.12	49
19.	NonCohort	34.64	80
20.	NonCohort	34.26	135
21.	Cohort	34.07	67
22.	NonCohort	32.88	17
23.	NonCohort	32.44	54
24.	NonCohort	32.20	49
25.	NonCohort	32.17	145
26.	NonCohort	31.00	52
27.	NonCohort	30.04	53
Total N			1825

$\underline{M}$ of Co = 35.94
$\overline{SEM}$ = 0.55
Missing cases = 97

Note. Wilcoxon ranks sum test, $\underline{z}$ = 2.71, $\underline{p}$ < .01.

Table 36

Companies Arrayed by Mean Concerned Leadership Scale Scores

Unit Nominal Label	M	f
1. Cohort	28.45	42
2. NonCohort	28.21	14
3. NonCohort	27.50	18
4. Cohort	27.36	45
5. Cohort	26.86	87
6. Cohort	26.52	82
7. Cohort	26.00	116
8. Cohort	25.48	162
9. NonCohort	25.48	69
10. NonCohort	25.44	41
11. Cohort	25.32	71
12. Cohort	25.27	90
13. Cohort	25.26	61
14. NonCohort	25.24	21
15. NonCohort	24.63	41
16. NonCohort	24.61	93
17. Cohort	24.48	88
18. NonCohort	23.67	18
19. NonCohort	23.16	135
20. Cohort	22.34	68
21. NonCohort	22.28	149
22. NonCohort	22.10	83
23. NonCohort	21.86	50
24. NonCohort	21.23	53
25. NonCohort	21.02	53
26. NonCohort	20.96	50
27. NonCohort	20.42	57
Total N		1857

$\underline{M}$ of Co = 24.49
$\overline{SEM}$ = 0.45
Missing cases = 65

Note. Wilcoxon ranks sum test, $\underline{z}$ = 2.47, $\underline{p}$ < .01, two-tailed.

Table 37

Companies Arrayed by Mean Sense of Pride Scale Scores

Unit Nominal Label	M	f
1. NonCohort	30.06	34
2. Cohort	28.59	64
3. Cohort	28.48	122
4. NonCohort	28.35	43
5. Cohort	28.14	118
6. Cohort	28.12	68
7. NonCohort	28.09	44
8. Cohort	27.78	232
9. Cohort	27.55	121
10. NonCohort	27.10	73
11. Cohort	26.82	189
12. NonCohort	26.66	86
13. NonCohort	26.50	125
14. Cohort	26.38	85
15. NonCohort	26.34	110
16. Cohort	26.25	93
17. NonCohort	25.90	196
18. NonCohort	25.70	40
19. NonCohort	25.08	215
20. Cohort	24.88	95
21. NonCohort	24.88	109
22. NonCohort	24.85	88
23. Cohort	24.05	115
24. NonCohort	23.78	86
25. NonCohort	23.76	99
26. NonCohort	22.95	76
27. NonCohort	22.62	78
Total N		2804

$\underline{M}$ of Co = 26.28
$\overline{SEM}$ = 0.37
Missing cases = 26

Note. Wilcoxon ranks sum test, $\underline{z}$ = 1.83, ns, two-tailed.

Table 38

Companies Arrayed by Mean Unit Social Climate Scale Scores

Unit Nominal Label	M	f	
1. Cohort	48.73	41	
2. NonCohort	47.15	13	
3. NonCohort	46.37	41	
4. Cohort	46.36	86	
5. Cohort	46.20	45	
6. Cohort	45.50	161	
7. NonCohort	44.98	42	
8. Cohort	44.80	80	
9. Cohort	43.91	87	
10. Cohort	43.46	113	
11. NonCohort	43.39	18	
12. Cohort	43.19	68	
13. Cohort	42.93	85	
14. NonCohort	42.90	21	
15. Cohort	42.90	59	
			M of Co = 42.28
16. NonCohort	42.20	90	SEM = 0.67
17. NonCohort	41.19	135	Missing cases = 101
18. NonCohort	40.79	68	
19. NonCohort	39.93	147	
20. NonCohort	39.88	17	
21. Cohort	39.77	66	
22. NonCohort	38.73	79	
23. NonCohort	38.30	49	
24. NonCohort	37.89	53	
25. NonCohort	37.79	53	
26. NonCohort	37.22	49	
27. NonCohort	35.05	55	
Total N		1821	

Note. Wilcoxon ranks sum test, z = 2.47, p < .01, two-tailed.

Table 39

"Soldier Will" Means for Paratroop COHORT, COHORT, and nonCOHORT Companies

"Soldier Will" Scale	Paratroopers(P)		COHORT(C)		nonCOHORT(NC)		Pairwise Comparisons: Differences between Means		
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	P/C	C/NC	P/NC
Company Combat Confidence	58.56	3.35	55.58	2.24	53.67	4.76	2.98**	NS	4.89**
Senior Command Confidence	19.15	1.01	18.78	0.83	17.66	0.57	NS	1.12*	1.49*
Small-Unit Command Confidence	38.87	1.39	37.77	1.95	34.65	2.60	NS	3.13**	4.22**
Concerned Leadership	24.89	1.79	25.75	1.53	23.58	2.31	NS	2.17*	NS
Sense of Pride	27.34	1.95	27.01	1.43	25.77	1.97	NS	NS	NS
Unit Social Climate	46.24	1.29	44.34	2.25	40.83	3.33	NS	3.51**	5.41**

*p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed.

Table 40

Companies Arrayed by Soldier Self-Report of Common Experience of Basic and Advanced Individual Training

| Unit Nominal Label	M	f	
1. Cohort	6.47	88	Inter-item r(1940) = .94;
2. Cohort	6.27	48	
3. Cohort	5.89	94	
4. Cohort	5.66	99	
5. Cohort	5.44	78	
6. Cohort	5.32	69	
7. NonCohort	5.17	72	
8. Cohort	4.94	63	
9. Cohort	4.27	56	
			M of Co M = 3.71
10. Cohort	3.33	120	SEM = 0.26
11. Cohort	3.31	173	Missing data = 964
12. NonCohort	3.14	22	
13. NonCohort	3.11	63	
14. NonCohort	2.94	71	
15. NonCohort	2.84	19	
16. NonCohort	2.82	17	
17. NonCohort	2.82	66	
18. NonCohort	2.79	56	
19. NonCohort	2.69	75	
20. NonCohort	2.67	49	
21. NonCohort	2.67	24	
22. NonCohort	2.66	53	
23. Cohort	2.62	52	
24. NonCohort	2.60	53	
25. NonCohort	2.59	49	
26. NonCohort	2.55	167	
27. NonCohort	2.51	146	
Total N		1942	

Note. Possible range of values on the summative scale was from 2 to 10. Questions asked soldiers to estimate how many soldiers in their present company accompanied them through basic and advanced individual training. Responses on both items ranged from "none" (1) to "everyone" (5). The Wilcoxon ranks sum test showed Company M ratings were related to their nominal labels (z = 3.55, p < .01).

Table 41

Companies Arrayed by Soldier Perception of Company Personnel Turnover

Unit Nominal Label	M	f	
1. NonCohort	9.60	10	Inter-item Correlations:
2. NonCohort	9.22	9	Soldier Turnover = .33
3. NonCohort	8.20	5	NCO Turnover = .45
4. Cohort	8.01	105	Officer Turnover = .35
5. NonCohort	8.00	33	
6. Cohort	7.76	83	Cronbach's Alpha = .55
7. NonCohort	7.63	16	
8. NonCohort	7.58	45	
9. Cohort	7.46	48	
10. NonCohort	7.24	50	
11. NonCohort	7.22	49	
			M of Co = 7.16
12. Cohort	7.15	59	SEM = 0.18
13. NonCohort	7.15	54	Missing data = 273
14. Cohort	7.00	30	
15. Cohort	6.94	35	
16. Cohort	6.90	51	
17. NonCohort	6.86	93	
18. NonCohort	6.78	41	
19. Cohort	6.72	68	
20. NonCohort	6.67	66	
21. NonCohort	6.65	94	
22. NonCohort	6.57	47	
23. Cohort	6.46	61	
24. NonCohort	6.24	59	
25. Cohort	6.19	84	
26. Cohort	5.96	85	
27. NonCohort	5.16	105	
Total N		1455	

Note. Possible range of values on the summative scale was from 3 to 15.
Questions asked soldiers (with six or more months in their present companies)
to estimate how many new soldiers, NCOs and officers joined their present
company in the last six months. Responses to all three items ranged from
"none" (1) to "everyone" (5). The Wilcoxon ranks sum test showed unit label
was unrelated to perceived personnel turnover (z = .74, ns).

Appendix I: Questionnaire Instrument

ITERATION NO.   001

QUESTIONNAIRE NO.

THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM:

ATTITUDINAL AND BEHAVIORAL SURVEY

(SOLDIER STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE)

Department of Military Psychiatry

Walter Reed Army Institute of Research

Walter Reed Army Medical Center

Washington, D. C. 20307-5100

INSTRUCTIONS

You and other service members of the U.S. Army have been selected so that we might learn your opinions on several issues of concern to Army leaders. Results of this survey will be used to assess the impact of several new ways of organizing the Army on you, on your unit, and on your family. THEREFORE, IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU PARTICIPATE.

There are no right or no wrong answers to our questions. Just answer questions the way you feel about them. The important thing is TO ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS COMPLETELY AND ANSWER THEM HONESTLY AND FRANKLY. Most questions can be answered by circling a number corresponding to a ready-made answer.

No one will know what you specifically have said; your answers will not be reported with your name nor with any other identifying information. This is guaranteed in a statement that you will sign in a few minutes.

GENERAL INFORMATION

First we need a few facts about you, like your age, education, rank and so on, so that we can compare the opinions of older soldiers to younger, opinions of privates to those of sergeants, and those of sergeants to officers and so on. Please answer the questions below by either writing in your response or circ ng the response corresponding to your answer.

1. What is your unit? _____ Company or _____ Battery
   _____ Battalion
   _____ Regiment

2. (Circle one number) Are you: 1. Male?   2. Female?

3. How old are you (in years)? _____

4. What is the highest level of education that you've completed? (Circle one number)
   1. LESS THAN 8 YEARS
   2. 8 YEARS
   3. 9-11 YEARS
   4. 12 YEARS
   5. MORE THAN 12 YEARS

5. What is your racial background? (Circle one number)
   1. WHITE
   2. BLACK
   3. MEXICAN AMERICAN
   4. PUERTO RICAN
   5. OTHER

6. Is English your native language? (Circle one number)
   1. YES (Go to Question 8)
   2. NO (Go to Question 7)

7. If English is not your native language, what is?
   1. SPANISH
   2. OTHER, Specify below:
   _____

   Go to Question 8

8. What is your present pay grade, for example, E-2, E-3, E-4, or O-1, O-2, etc.? Write your answer in the blank below.
   E- _____ OR O- _____

9. How many years have you been on active duty? IF LESS THAN 6 MONTHS, PLACE A "0" IN THIS BLANK. IF 6 MONTHS OR MORE, PLACE A "1" IN THIS BLANK. _____

10. What is your MOS? _____ _____
    (numbers)   (letter)

161

11. What is your <u>present</u> marital status?

    1. NOT MARRIED
    2. DIVORCED   (Go to
    3. SEPARATED Question 16)
    4. WIDOWED
    5. MARRIED
      (Go to Question 12)

12. Does your spouse presently live with you?

    1. YES
    2. NO

13. How many years of schooling has your spouse completed?

    1. LESS THAN
       8 YEARS
    2. 8 YEARS
    3. 9-12 YEARS
    4. 12 YEARS
    5. MORE THAN 12 YEARS

14. How old is your spouse? (in years) _____

15. What is your spouse's present employment status?

    1. FULL-TIME EMPLOYED
    2. PART-TIME EMPLOYED
    3. SEEKING WORK, NOT
      EMPLOYED
    4. NOT EMPLOYED AT ALL
      BY OWN CHOICE
    5. OTHER, Specify
      below:

      _____

Go to Question 16

16. Where do you live?

    1. IN THE BARRACKS
      (Go to Question 20)
    2. ON-POST HOUSING
      (Go to Question 17)
    3. OFF-POST HOUSING
      (Go to Question 17)

17. How many people live in your home? _____

18. Of all the people living in your home, how many are your relatives? _____

19. Of all the people living in your home, how many are your friends? _____

Go to Question 20

20. How many _days_ do you usually work in a week? (Circle your answer)

1. 1 DAY
2. 2 DAYS
3. 3 DAYS
4. 4 DAYS
5. 5 DAYS
6. 6 DAYS
7. 7 DAYS
8. 0 DAYS

21. How many _hours_ do you usually work in a day?

Write your answer in this blank ____ HRS A DAY

22. How many days a month do you spend out in the field?

Write your answer in this blank ____ DAYS A MONTH.

23. How many weekends a month do you usually work?

1. NEVER WORK WEEKENDS
2. ONE A MONTH
3. TWO A MONTH
4. THREE A MONTH
5. WORK EVERY WEEKEND

24. Do you have enough time to take care of your personal needs such as going to medical appointments, commissary shopping, going to the cleaners, getting a hair cut and things like that?

1. NEED A LOT LESS TIME
2. NEED A LITTLE LESS TIME
3. JUST ENOUGH TIME
4. NEED A LITTLE MORE TIME
5. NEED A LOT MORE TIME

25. Do you have enough time to spend with family members and friends?

1. NEED A LOT LESS TIME
2. NEED A LITTLE LESS TIME
3. JUST ENOUGH TIME
4. NEED A LITTLE MORE TIME
5. NEED A LOT MORE TIME

26. Do you have enough time for relaxation and entertainment?

1. NEED A LOT LESS TIME
2. NEED A LITTLE LESS TIME
3. JUST ENOUGH TIME
4. NEED A LITTLE MORE TIME
5. NEED A LOT MORE TIME

27. Did you go through OSUT Training?

1. YES (Go to Question 30)
2. NO (Go to Question 28)

28. About how many of the soldiers in your present <u>company</u> went through <u>Basic Training</u> with you?

              1. NONE
              2. A FEW
              3. ABOUT HALF
              4. MOST ALL
              5. EVERYONE

29. About how many of the soldiers in your present <u>company</u> went through <u>Advanced Individual Training (AIT)</u> with you?

              1. NO?
              2. A FEW
              3. ABOUT HALF
              4. MOST ALL
              5. EVERYONE

Go to Question 30

30. About how long have you been in your present company?

How many years? _____ AND

How many months? _____ .

31. In the past six months, about how many <u>new soldiers</u> have joined your <u>platoon</u>?

              1. NONE
              2. A FEW
              3. ABOUT HALF
              4. MOST ALL
              5. EVERYONE

32. In the past six months, about how many <u>new soldiers</u> have joined your <u>company</u>?

              1. NONE
              2. A FEW
              3. ABOUT HALF
              4. MOST ALL
              5. EVERYONE

33. In the past six months, about how many <u>new NCOs</u> have joined your your company?

              1. NONE
              2. A FEW
              3. ABOUT HALF
              4. MOST ALL
              5. EVERYONE

34. In the past six months, about how many new officers have joined your company?

        1.   NONE
        2.   A FEW
        3.   ABOUT HALF
        4.   MOST ALL
        5.   EVERYONE

35. About how many field exercises have you been on?

        Write the number of
        field exercises in this
        blank _____.

36. Of these field exercises that you have been on, how many have been with members of your present company?

        Write the number of
        field exercises in this
        blank _____.

37. If you could, would you get out of the Army today?

        1.   DEFINITELY NO
        2.   NO
        3.   NOT SURE
        4.   YES
        5.   DEFINITELY YES

38. Do you want to serve in this unit after your initial enlistment?

        1.   DEFINITELY YES
        2.   YES
        3.   NOT SURE
        4.   NO
        5.   DEFINITELY NO

39. Will you re-enlist?

        1.   DEFINITELY YES
        2.   YES
        3.   NOT SURE
        4.   NO
        5.   DEFINITELY NOT

40. Listed below are several reasons why you might re-enlist.
    Circle THREE letters corresponding to the THREE most
    important reasons for re-enlisting.

        A. GOOD JOB SECURITY
        B. GOOD PAY
        C. GOOD MEDICAL BENEFITS AND MEDICAL CARE
        D. SCHOOL/EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE
        E. EARLY RETIREMENT
        F. TRAVEL OPPORTUNITIES
        G. FREQUENT MOVES
        H. CHOICE OF ASSIGNMENT
        I. WANT CHALLENGES AND DO SOMETHING DIFFERENT
        J. DOING WHAT I WANT TO DO
        K. AWARDS, DECORATIONS, AND RECOGNITION FOR WORK DONE
        L. LIKE BEING A MEMBER OF GROUP WITH DISTINCT IDENTITY
        M. LIKE MILITARY LIFESTYLE
        N. SERVE MY COUNTRY
        O. PEOPLE IN MY UNIT REALLY CARE ABOUT THEIR WORK
        P. PEOPLE IN MY UNIT REALLY CARE FOR EACH OTHER
        Q. ABLE TO PROVIDE FOR FAMILY
        R. ARMY REALLY CARES ABOUT MY FAMILY
        S. SPOUSE WANTS ME TO STAY IN
        T. JOB OPPORTUNITIES FOR SPOUSE

41. Listed below are several reasons why you might not re-
    enlist. Circle THREE letters corresponding to the THREE most
    important reasons for not re-enlisting.

        A. FINDING A BETTER CIVILIAN JOB
        B. POOR PAY
        C. TOO MANY MOVES
        D. LITTLE CHOICE OF ASSIGNMENT
        E. SEPARATED FROM FAMILY AND FRIENDS
        F. WANT OTHER CHALLENGES
        G. WANT TO DO SOMETHING DIFFERENT
        H. DON'T LIKE MILITARY LIFESTYLE
        I. PEOPLE IN MY UNIT DON'T CARE ABOUT THEIR WORK
        J. PEOPLE IN MY UNIT DON'T CARE FOR EACH OTHER
        K. DON'T DO WHAT I WAS TRAINED FOR
        L. TOO MANY ADDITIONAL DUTIES, LIKE CQ, POLICE CALL
        M. TOO MANY RULES AND REGULATIONS
        N. BEING TOLD WHAT TO DO
        O. LITTLE PERSONAL CHOICE AND FREEDOM
        P. TOO MUCH PHYSICAL TRAINING
        Q. UNABLE TO PROVIDE FOR FAMILY
        R. ARMY DOESN'T CARE ABOUT MY FAMILY
        S. SPOUSE WANTS ME TO GET OUT
        T. NO JOBS FOR SPOUSE

UNIT COHESION AND MORALE

In this next section, we ask you several questions about your feelings toward your equipment and your unit. Read each statement carefully, and then circle the number corresponding to the answer that best describes your feeling.

	VERY HIGH	HIGH	MODERATE	LOW	VERY LOW
1. What is the level of morale in your company?	1	2	3	4	5
2. How would you describe your company's readiness for combat?	1	2	3	4	5
3. How would you describe your fellow soldiers' readiness to fight if and when it is necessary?	1	2	3	4	5

In the event of combat, how would you describe your confidence in the following:

	VERY HIGH	HIGH	MODERATE	LOW	VERY LOW
4. your platoon leader	1	2	3	4	5
5. your Company Commander	1	2	3	4	5
6. your crew/squad members	1	2	3	4	5
7. yourself	1	2	3	4	5

How would you describe your confidence in the tactical decisions of the following:

	VERY HIGH	HIGH	MODERATE	LOW	VERY LOW
8. your Battalion Commander	1	2	3	4	5
9. your Brigade Commander	1	2	3	4	5
10. your Division Commander	1	2	3	4	5
11. your Corps Commander	1	2	3	4	5
12. the Army General Staff	1	2	3	4	5
13. How much confidence do you have in your unit's major weapons systems (tanks, APCs, etc.)?	1	2	3	4	5

	VERY HIGH	HIGH	MODERATE	LOW	VERY LOW

14. How would you rate your own skills and abilities as a soldier (using your weapons, operating and maintaining your equipment, etc.)?   1   2   3   4   5

15. How would you describe your unit's togetherness, or how "tight" are members of your unit?   1   .2   3   4   5

16. What is the level of your personal morale?   1   2   3   4   5

17. How would you describe the condition of your unit's major weapons systems (tanks, APCs, etc.)? In other words, what kind of shape are they in?
1. VERY GOOD
2. GOOD
3. SO-SO
4. BAD
5. VERY BAD

18. The relationships between officers and the enlisted in your unit are:
1. VERY GOOD
2. GOOD
3. SO-SO
4. BAD
5. VERY BAD

19. How often do you worry about what might happen to you personally, if and when your unit goes into combat?
1. ALWAYS
2. OFTEN
3. SOMETIMES
4. RARELY
5. NEVER

MODIFIED FIELD FORCES QUESTIONNAIRE

We would like to know your opinions toward others in your unit. Read each statement carefully, and then circle the number corresponding to the answer that best describes how you feel. There are five possible answers; these are:

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Can't say	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

1. I am proud to be in the Army.   1 2 3 4 5

2. I am proud of my company.   1 2 3 4 5

3. I really feel that I belong
    in my company.   1 2 3 4 5

4. I am an important part of
    my company.   1 2 3 4 5

5. There is a lot of teamwork and
    cooperation among soldiers in my company.   1 2 3 4 5

6. Officers most always get willing and
    whole-hearted cooperation from soldiers.   1 2 3 4 5

7. NCOs most always get willing and
    whole-hearted cooperation from soldiers.   1 2 3 4 5

8. Outside normal company duties,
    soldiers in my company would do
    most anything for their officers.   1 2 3 4 5

9. Outside normal company duties,
    soldiers in my company would do
    most anything for their NCOs.   1 2 3 4 5

10. What I do in the Army is worthwhile.   1 2 3 4 5

11. I get praise and recognition when I
    do a particularly good job.   1 2 3 4 5

12. In my company, the best soldiers
    get the "breaks."   1 2 3 4 5

13. On the whole, the Army gives
    me a chance to "be all I can be."   1 2 3 4 5

14. The equipment of the American Army is
    better than that of the Russian Army.   1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Can't say	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

15. My company will play a part in winning future conflicts.

   1 2 3 4 5

16. I have enough time to take care of my personal needs such as going to medical appointments, commissary shopping, going to the cleaners, getting a hair cut, and things like that.

   1 2 3 4 5

17. I have enough time for relaxation and entertainment.

   1 2 3 4 5

18. I have enough time to spend with family members and friends.

   1 2 3 4 5

19. I often have good ideas but my leaders never consider them.

   1 2 3 4 5

20. It's worthwhile to make suggestions to my leaders.

   1 2 3 4 5

21. My unit is really "messed up."

   1 2 3 4 5

22. Compared to other units, it's difficult to get something done in my unit.

   1 2 3 4 5

23. When I first arrived, leaders helped me a lot to get settled.

   1 2 3 4 5

24. My leaders are better than the leaders of other units.

   1 2 3 4 5

25. My unit is better than other units in getting the job done.

   1 2 3 4 5

WELL-BEING AND INTERPERSONAL SUPPORT

Now we would like to ask you questions about stresses and strains which you may have experienced lately. We also ask you about those people who help you when you have personal problems. Read each question below carefully, and then circle the number corresponding to the answer that best describes how you feel.

1. During the past month, how have you been feeling in general?

   1. IN EXCELLENT SPIRITS
   2. IN VERY GOOD SPIRITS
   3. IN GOOD SPIRITS MOSTLY
   4. I HAVE BEEN UP AND DOWN IN SPIRITS A LOT
   5. IN LOW SPIRITS MOSTLY
   6. IN VERY LOW SPIRITS

2. During the past month, have you been bothered by nervousness or your "nerves?"

   1. EXTREMELY SO, TO THE POINT WHERE I COULD NOT WORK OR TAKE CARE OF THINGS
   2. VERY MUCH SO
   3. QUITE A BIT
   4. SOME, ENOUGH TO BOTHER ME
   5. A LITTLE
   6. NOT AT ALL

3. During the past month, have you been in firm control of your behavior, thoughts, emotions, or feelings?

   1. YES, DEFINITELY SO
   2. YES, FOR THE MOST PART
   3. GENERALLY SO
   4. NOT TOO WELL
   5. NO, AND I AM SOMEWHAT DISTURBED
   6. NO, AND I AM VERY DISTURBED

4. During the past month, have you felt so sad, discouraged, hopeless, or had so many problems that you wondered if anything was worthwhile?

   1. EXTREMELY SO, TO THE POINT I HAVE JUST GIVEN UP
   2. VERY MUCH SO
   3. QUITE A BIT
   4. SOME, ENOUGH TO BOTHER ME
   5. A LITTLE BIT
   6. NOT AT ALL

5. During the past month, have you been under or felt you were under any strain, stress, or pressure?

   1. YES, ALMOST MORE THAN I COULD BEAR OR STAND
   2. YES, QUITE A BIT OF PRESSURE
   3. YES, SOME MORE THAN USUAL
   4. YES, SOME BUT ABOUT USUAL
   5. YES, A LITTLE
   6. NOT AT ALL

-13-

6. During the past month,
   how happy, satisfied, or
   pleased have you been with
   your personal life?

   1. EXTREMELY HAPPY, COULD
         NOT HAVE BEEN MORE
         SATISFIED OR PLEASED
   2. VERY HAPPY
   3. FAIRLY HAPPY
   4. SATISFIED, PLEASED
   5. SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED
   6. VERY DISSATISFIED

7. During the past month,
   have you had any reason to
   wonder if you were losing
   your mind, or losing control
   over the way you act, talk,
   think, feel, or of your
   memory?

   1. NOT AT ALL
   2. ONLY A LITTLE
   3. SOME, BUT NOT ENOUGH
         TO BE CONCERNED WITH
   4. SOME, AND I HAVE BEEN A
         LITTLE CONCERNED
   5. SOME, AND I AM QUITE
         CONCERNED
   6. YES, VERY MUCH SO AND
         I AM VERY CONCERNED

8. During the past month,
   have you been anxious,
   worried or upset?

   1. EXTREMELY SO, TO THE
         POINT OF BEING SICK
         OR ALMOST SICK
   2. VERY MUCH SO
   3. QUITE A BIT
   4. SOME, ENOUGH TO BOTHER ME
   5. A LITTLE BIT
   6. NOT AT ALL

9. During the past month,
   have you been waking up
   fresh and rested?

   1. EVERY DAY
   2. MOST EVERY DAY
   3. FAIRLY OFTEN
   4. LESS THAN HALF THE TIME
   5. RARELY
   6. NONE OF THE TIME

10. During the past month,
    have you been bothered by
    any illness, bodily
    disorders, pains, or fears
    about your health?

    1. ALL THE TIME
    2. MOST OF THE TIME
    3. A GOOD BIT OF THE TIME
    4. SOME OF THE TIME
    5. A LITTLE OF THE TIME
    6. NONE OF THE TIME

11. During the past month,
    has your daily life been
    full of things that were
    interesting to you?

    1. ALL THE TIME
    2. MOST OF THE TIME
    3. A GOOD BIT OF THE TIME
    4. SOME OF THE TIME
    5. A LITTLE OF THE TIME
    6. NONE OF THE TIME

12. During the past month, have you felt downhearted and blue?

1. ALL OF THE TIME
2. MOST OF THE TIME
3. A GOOD BIT OF THE TIME
4. SOME OF THE TIME
5. A LITTLE OF THE TIME
6. NONE OF THE TIME

13. During the past month, have you been feeling emotionally stable and sure of yourself?

1. ALL OF THE TIME
2. MOST OF THE TIME
3. A GOOD BIT OF THE TIME
4. SOME OF THE TIME
5. A LITTLE OF THE TIME
6. NONE OF THE TIME

14. During the past month, have you felt tired, worn out, used-up, or exhausted?

1. ALL OF THE TIME
2. MOST OF THE TIME
3. A GOOD BIT OF THE TIME
4. SOME OF THE TIME
5. A LITTLE OF THE TIME
6. NONE OF THE TIME

For each of the four scales below, note that the words at each end of the 0-to-10 scale describe opposite feelings. Circle the number along the line which is closest to how you have generally felt DURING THE PAST MONTH.

15. During the past month, how concerned or worried about your health have you been?

```
           0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
NOT AT ALL                                    VERY CONCERNED
CONCERNED
```

16. During the past month, how relaxed or tense have you been?

```
           0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
VERY RELAXED                                  VERY TENSE
```

17. During the past month, how much energy, pep, vitality, have you felt?

```
           0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
NO ENERGY AT                                  VERY ENERGETIC
ALL, LISTLESS                                 DYNAMIC
```

18. During the past month, how depressed or cheerful have you been?

```
           0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
VERY DEPRESSED                                VERY CHEERFUL
```

-15-

19. Not counting checkups, how many times during the past year did you see a doctor for a problem you had?

1. NONE
2. ONCE
3. 4-5 TIMES
4. 5-10 TIMES
5. MORE THAN 10 TIMES

20. During the last year, how often have you taken any medications for a nervous condition?

1. NEVER
2. RARELY
3. SOMETIMES
4. OFTEN
5. ALWAYS

21. During the last year, how often have you been unable to work or carry out your usual activities because of health problems related to worry and nervousness?

1. NEVER
2. RARELY
3. SOMETIMES
4. OFTEN
5. ALWAYS

22. Do you discuss your personal problems with family members?

1. NO (Go to Question 27)
2. YES (Go to Questions below)

23. Who do you talk to most?

1. WIFE/HUSBAND
2. MOTHER/FATHER
3. SISTER/BROTHER
4. OTHER RELATIVE

24. How much did it help to talk with these family members about your problems?

1. MADE THINGS MUCH BETTER
2. MADE THINGS BETTER
3. MADE NO DIFFERENCE
4. MADE THINGS WORSE
5. MADE THINGS A LOT WORSE

25. How satisfied are you with the help that you get from these family members?

1. VERY SATISFIED
2. SATISFIED
3. NOT SURE
4. DISSATISFIED
5. VERY DISSATISFIED

26. About how many of these family members who really help you come to you when they have personal problems?

1. ALL OF THEM
2. MOST
3. ABOUT HALF
4. A FEW
5. NONE OF THEM

Go to Question 27

-16-

27. Do you discuss your
personal problems with
your friends?

    1. NO (Go to Question 32)
    2. YES (Go to Questions below)

28. Who do you talk to
most?

    1. MALE FRIENDS IN SAME UNIT
    2. MALE FRIENDS IN OTHER UNIT
    3. CIVILIAN MALE FRIENDS
    4. FEMALE FRIENDS IN SAME UNIT
    5. FEMALE FRIENDS IN OTHER UNIT
    6. CIVILIAN FEMALE FRIENDS

29. How much did it help
to talk with these
friends about your
problems?

    1. MADE THINGS A LOT BETTER
    2. MADE THINGS BETTER
    3. MADE NO DIFFERENCE
    4. MADE THINGS WORSE
    5. MADE THINGS A LOT WORSE

30. How satisfied are
you with the help
that these friends
provide you?

    1. VERY SATISFIED
    2. SATISFIED
    3. NOT SURE
    4. DISSATISFIED
    5. VERY DISSATISFIED

31. How many of these
friends who really
help you come to you
when they have
personal problems?

    1. ALL OF THEM
    2. MOST
    3. SOME
    4. A FEW
    5. NONE OF THEM

Go to Question 32

32. When you experience
personal problems, how
often do you gain
strength or comfort from
religious beliefs and
practices?

    1. NEVER
    2. RARELY
    3. SOMETIMES
    4. OFTEN
    5. ALWAYS

COMPANY PERCEPTIONS

Now, we would like to ask you some more questions about your unit. Below appear statements that you can agree or disagree with. Carefully read each statement and then <u>circle the number to the right of the statement that best describes your feeling.</u> There are five numbers corresponding to five possible answers; these are:

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Can't say	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

1. This company is one of the best in the US Army.   1 2 3 4 5

2. People in this company feel very close to each other.   1 2 3 4 5

3. The officers in this company really seem to know their stuff.   1 2 3 4 5

4. I think this company would do a better job in combat than most other Army units.   1 2 3 4 5

5. The soldiers I work with always try to do a good job.   1 2 3 4 5

6. The NCOs in this company really seem to know their stuff.   1 2 3 4 5

7. I really know the people I work with.   1 2 3 4 5

8. There are many people in this company who are just out for themselves and don't care about others.   1 2 3 4 5

9. I spend my after-duty hours with people in this company.   1 2 3 4 5

10. My closest friendships are with the people I work with.   1 2 3 4 5

11. The officers in this company don't spend enough time with troops.   1 2 3 4 5

12. I am impressed by the quality of leadership in this company.   1 2 3 4 5

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Can't say	Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5

13. If I have to go to war, the soldiers I regularly work with are the ones I want with me.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

14. The NCOs in this company don't spend enough time with the troops.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

15. I really like the work I do.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

16. I think this company's job is one of the most important in the Army.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

17. I would go for help with a personal problem to people in the company chain-of-command.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

18. I have a lot of confidence in our weapons.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

19. I have real confidence in our company's ability to use our weapons.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

20. I think the level of training in this company is very high.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

21. If I have to go into combat, I have a lot of confidence in myself.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

22. In this company, people of different races mix during duty hours.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

23. In this company, people of different races mix after duty hours.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

24. Most of the people in this company can be trusted.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

25. I want to spend my entire enlistment in this company.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

26. My superiors make a real attempt to treat me as a person.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

27. People in my company would support me in difficult situations.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

28. As time goes on, people in this company will get even tighter.　　　　1　2　3　4　5

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Can't say	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

29. I like being in this company.   1   2   3   4   5

30. In this company, you don't have to watch your belongings.   1   2   3   4   5

31. In this company, people really look out for each other.   1   2   3   4   5

32. I think we are better trained than most other companies in the Army.   1   2   3   4   5

33. The officers in this company would lead well in combat.   1   2   3   4   5

34. The NCOs in this company would lead well in combat.   1   2   3   4   5

35. Soldiers in this company have enough skills that I would trust them with my life in combat.   1   2   3   4   5

SQUAD/PLATOON PERCEPTIONS

E4s AND BELOW COMPLETE THIS SECTION.

E5s AND ABOVE GO T ?. '', "FAMILY LIFE."

The questions below ask you about your feelings toward your squad and platoon. Read each statement carefully, and then circle the number corresponding to the answer that best describes how you feel. There are five possible answers; these are:

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Can't say	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

1. I like being in this platoon.   1 2 3 4 5

2. I like being in this squad.   1 2 3 4 5

3. I spend a lot of time with members of my squad after duty hours.   1 2 3 4 5

4. I spend a lot of time with members of my platoon after duty hours.   1 2 3 4 5

5. After duty hours, blacks tend to hang out with blacks, and whites with whites, and so on.   1 2 3 4 5

6. My squad leader is often included in after-duty activities of other squad members.   1 2 3 4 5

7. I can go to most people in my squad for help when I have a personal problem, like being in debt.   1 2 3 4 5

8. I can go to most people in my platoon for help when I have a personal problem, like being in debt.   1 2 3 4 5

9. Most people in my squad would lend me money in an emergency.   1 2 3 4 5

10. Most people in my platoon would lend me money in an emergency.   1 2 3 4 5

11. My platoon sergeant talks to me personally outside normal duties.   1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Can't say	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

12. My platoon leader talks to me
personally outside normal duties.   1 2 3 4 5

13. The company commander talks to me
personally outside normal duties.   1 2 3 4 5

14. My officers are interested in my
personal welfare.   1 2 3 4 5

15. My NCOs are interested in my
personal welfare.   1 2 3 4 5

16. My officers are interested in what I
think and how I feel about things.   1 2 3   5

17. My NCOs are interested in what I
think and how I feel about things.   1 2 3 4 5

18. My squad leader knows his(her) stuff.   1 2 3 4 5

19. My platoon sergeant knows his(her) stuff.   1 2 3 4 5

20. My platoon leader knows his(her) stuff.   1 2 3 4 5

21. If we went to war tomor: , I would
feel good about going with my squad.   1 2 3 4 5

22. If we went to war tomorrow, I would
feel good about going with my platoon.   1 2 3 4 5

23. Most soldiers in my platoon would do
a good job if they were given a squad of
soldiers and told to take charge of them
in a combat mission under enemy fire.   1 2 3 4 5

24. Officers in my company are the kind I
would want to serve under in combat.   1 2 3 4 5

25. NCOs in my company are the kind I
would want to se ve under in combat.   1 2 3 4 5

26. My leaders expect too much from me.   1 2 3 4 5

27. Most company leaders have confidence
in my abilities.   1 2 3 4 5

28. My chain-of-command works well.   1 2 3 4 5

GO TO THE NEXT PAGE.

FAMILY LIFE

These questions are only to be answered by married individuals. Please rate how you feel about each of these issues as they affect your own life. There are five possible answers; these are listed below. Circle the number corresponding to the answer that best describes how you feel about each aspect of your life.

Completely Dissatisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Can't Say	Somewhat Satisfied	Completely Satisfied
1	2	3	4	5

1. Marriage......................................	1	2	3	4	5
2. Family life..................................	1	2	3	4	5
3. Health...	1	2	3	4	5
4. Neighborhood.............................	1	2	3	4	5
5. Friendships................................	1	2	3	4	5
6. Community..................................	1	2	3	4	5
7. Housing......................................	1	2	3	4	5
8. Standard of living......................	1	2	3	4	5
9. Family Income............................	1	2	3	4	5
10. Amount of education..................	1	2	3	4	5
11. Savings....................................	1	2	3	4	5
12. Life as a whole.........................	1	2	3	4	5
13. The unit I am assigned to...........	1	2	3	4	5
14. My duty hours...........................	1	2	3	4	5
15. The location of this post...........	1	2	3	4	5
16. My unit's leave/time off policies...	1	2	3	4	5
17. My unit's training and field exercise schedule.....................	1	2	3	4	5

	Completely Dissatisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Can't Say	Somewhat Satisfied	Completely Satisfied
	1	2	3	4	5

18. The concern my unit has for families............................. 1   2   3   4   5

19. Army pay and allowances............. 1   2   3   4   5

20. The Army way of life................ 1   2   3   4   5

21. The respect the Army shows wives.... 1   2   3   4   5

22. The job security in the Army........ 1   2   3   4   5

23. The standard of living in the Army.. 1   2   3   4   5

24. The Army's retirement benefits...... 1   2   3   4   5

25. The family life you can have in the Army............................... 1   2   3   4   5

26. How my wife would feel if I decided to make the Army a career........... 1   2   3   4   5

27. If you could get out of the Army tomorrow, would you?

Definitely No	No	Not Sure	Yes	Definitely Yes
1	2	3	4	5

If you are currently living with you wife, answer questions 28 through 38. If you are not currently living with your wife, you are finished with the survey.

Below are listed several potential helpers. When you are away from home (for example, in the field), who can your wife count on for help? You should answer by using one of five numbers on the scale below to indicate on whom your wife can depend:

Definitely No	No	Not Sure	Yes	Definitely Yes
1	2	3	4	5

28. Some other wife in your unit........ 1   2   3   4   5

29. A neighbor (someone other than another wife in your unit)................... 1   2   3   4   5

30. A friend (someone other than another wife in your unit)................... 1   2   3   4   5

31. Someone in your chain-of-command (like the Rear Detachment, Battalion, etc.)............................ 1   2   3   4   5

32. A local military agency (like the Chaplain, Army Community Service, etc.)............................ 1   2   3   4   5 .

33. Has your wife made any friends   1. NO
among the wives of soldiers from   2. YES
your unit? (Circle only one number)

These are some questions about the community where you live.
There are five possible answers to each question; these are
listed on the scale below:

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Can't Say	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

Using the scale above, circle the number that best describes how
you feel about each statement.

34. People here have no say about what
    actions this community takes........ 1   2   3   4   5.

35. My role in this community is
    active and involved................. 1   2   3   4   5

36. We can trust our community leaders.. 1   2   3   4   5

37. If there were a serious problem in
    this community, the people here could
    get together and solve it........... 1   2   3   4   5

38. If I had an emergency, even people I
    do not know in this community
    would be willing to help........... 1   2   3   4   5

VOLUNTEER AGREEMENT

1. NATURE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this research is to assess the psychological and behavioral effects of new unit organization on soldiers.

2. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY

You will have no direct benefit from this study. Information gathered in this study will help Army leaders determine positive and negative consequences of new unit organization, training and deployment for the benefit of future soldiers and units.

3. DURATION OF THE STUDY

The study requires administering this questionnaire to soldiers of selected units five times over a three year period.

4. RISKS, INCONVENIENCES, AND DISCOMFORTS

Taking this survey involves no known risks, inconveniences, and discomforts.

5. CONFIDENTIALITY OF RESEARCH RESULTS

All information about you and your answers obtained from this questionnaire will be treated as confidential medical information and protected by the Privacy Act statement of 1974.

6. SAFEGUARDS

Taking this survey involves no known health risks which require safeguards. Results that are reported will be done in such a way that your answers given here cannot be associated with your name or any other identifying information.

7. ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY

If you consent to participate, you will receive no pay or no special treatment for participation. In addition, if you consent to participate, you agree that your answers can be used by the staff of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research in order to assess the effects of new unit organization.

You do have the right to withdraw consent to participate in this study at any time. If you decline to participate or leave the study, this will in no way count against you, and you will incur no loss of benefits to which you are entitled.

8. COST TO YOU FROM PARTICIPATING

The only cost to participating in this study is the time it takes to fill out the questionnaire.

9. NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS IN THE STUDY

Over the three year period, approximately 50,000 soldiers will have been surveyed.

10. VOLUNTEER STATEMENT

I hereby volunteer to participate in the New Manning System Field Evaluation being conducted by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington, D.C.

_____   _____
(Participant's Signature)   (Date)

_____   _____
(Principal Investigator's Signature)   (Date)

PRIVACY ACT

1. AUTHORITY FOR COLLECTING INFORMATION

10 USC 176, 10 USC 3012, 10 USC 5031, and 10 USC 8012.

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED

The purpose of requesting information is to assist the Army in understanding the psychological and behavioral issues that affect soldiers and unit readiness.

3. ROUTINE USES OF INFORMATION

The information obtained in this survey will be combined with data obtained from other soldiers and their families participating in the New Manning System Field Evaluation study. The entire set of information will be analyzed by the Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research and then be used by the Office of the Deputy, Chief of Staff for Personnel to evaluate psychological and behavioral effects of the New Maning System on soldiers, their families, and communities. Your name and Social Security Number will be used by researchers as a means of tracking changes in attitudes of soldiers over time. Your name and Social Security Number will also be used to match information obtained in this questionnaire to other data sources. Results of this study will be reported in such a way that you are not personally identified nor your answers associated with your name.

4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND THE EFFECT ON THE INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING THIS INFORMATION

The disclosure of the requested information and participation in this study is voluntary. Nothing will happen to you if the requested data are not furnished.

This form along with a copy of the Volunteer Agreement will be retained by the principal investigators as evidence of your participation in this research project as required by AR 70-25. All information of personal nature will be compiled in statistical form along with an anonymous identification code so that your answers cannot be traced back to you. A copy of this Privacy Act statement and Volunteer Agreement can be obtained from the person administering the survey questionniare.

You have read and understand the Privacy Act statement above:

_____
(Signature)

_____
(Social Security Number)

_____
(Today's date)

QUESTIONNAIRE NO.

Appendix II: Instruction Sheet for Administering Questionnaires

THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM FIELD EVALUATION: SOLDIER SURVEY

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADMINISTERING QUESTIONNAIRES

In this memorandum, we will inform you of the procedures involved in getting the questionnaires to you, the mechanics of administering the questionnaire to soldiers, and finally procedures for returning the completed questionnaires.

Receipt of the Questionnaires

You should receive a shipment of uncompeleted (blank) questionnaires from Soldier Support Center. This box will contain the following elements:

(1) uncompleted (blank) questionnaires;
(2) extra copies of the Privacy Act and Volunteer Agreement statements;
(3) return mail label; and
(4) Data Collectors Observation/Reaction Sheet.

If you do not receive these elements, please contact Mr. Lew Wright, US Army Soldier Support Center, ATTN: ATSG-DSA-NM, Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IN 46216 (AUTOVON 699-4784) or CPT James Griffith, Ph.D., Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington, D.C. 20307-5100 (AUTOVON 291-5312/5261; Commercial 202-427-5312/5261).

Coordinating the Where and When of Questionnaire Administration

As you are aware, one of the most important aspects of any study like this is to maintain the goodwill of leaders in those units which are surveyed. We therefore strongly suggest you coordinate the time and location of the questionnaire administration at the convenience of each unit's First Sergeant at least four weeks prior to the requested date. You can draw on the Concept Paper (see enclosure) which outlines the nature and purpose of the study to emphasize the importance of this research effort.

It is imperative that you not administer the questionnaire immediately after major unit events (e.g., right after ARTEPs, coming in from the field), or during nonduty and odd duty hours (e.g., before breakfast or after supper) or on weekends.

Our goal is to achieve a 100% sampling of all soldiers available for duty on the day that the survey is administered. At a minimum, 80% of the entire unit should be surveyed. Achieving the required 80% sampling may require a make-up session. Only one make-up session should be held even if the 80% sample is not obtained. Our past experience has shown that visiting a unit more than two times during a data collection period jeopardizes cooperation and rapport with unit leaders.

Procedures for Administration: Directions and Informed Consent

Depending on time constraints, you may wish to start with a very brief summary of the study's aim; this can be gleaned from a concept paper which you will be sent to you prior to the first questionnaire administration.

Express our gratitude to the soldiers for their participation in this important study, e.g., "Without your help, Army leaders will not know how to improve the quality of life of soldiers."

Have each soldier page through the questionnaire instrument to ensure that all pages are present; TOTAL PAGE COUNT = 28.

You then should read aloud the Instructions (p. 2).

You then should move to the back two pages of the questionnaire instrument. Read the Volunteer Agreement statement first (p. 27). Have the soldiers sign it, and tell them that this page and the last page will be physically separated from the questionnaire instrument so that no one will be able to associate their names with the information they give on the questionnaires. Next, read the Privacy Act statement (p. 28). It is very important that soldiers provide their Social Security Number, as data like PT scores, marksmanship scores and so on obtained through other sources (for example, through TCATA) will be matched against the information they provide in the questionnaire instrument. Again, emphasize confidentiality and the fact that this page too will be physically separated from the questionnaire instrument. Demonstrate to soldiers that both the Volunteer Agreement and Privacy Act statements (pp. 27-28) will be physically torn from the questionnaire instrument and placed in your brief case or some other container separate from the completed questionnaires.

Ask if there are any questions.

Mention to soldiers that blank copies of the Volunteer Agreement and Privacy Act statements can be obtained from you. You will be provided with blank Volunteer Agreement and Privacy Act statements in the box you receive.

General Information Section

To eliminate time-consuming data cleaning and keypunching error, soldiers should complete Item 1 in the "General Information" section as correctly as possible. Company or Battery should be indicated as "A," "B," "C," or "HHC." Battalion should be indicated as "1," "2," or "3." Regiment should be indicated on the third line next to the word "Regiment." Make sure that soldiers do not place something like ""2/85" in the Battalion blank; this should be "2 Battalion" and "85 Regiment." Please bring this to the soldiers' attention.

E4s and Below Who Complete the Questionnaire

Make an announcement that only E4s and below take the "Squad/Platoon Perceptions" Scale; indicate page numbers (pp. 21-22). All other soldiers (E5s and above) should proceed to the "Family Life" section (p. 23) after having reached the "Squad/Platoon Perceptions" Scale.

Married Soldiers Completing the Questionnaire

All married soldiers should complete the "Family Life" section of this questionnaire (pp. 23-26). Soldiers not currently living with their wives should not complete the last few questions in the "Family Life" section (namely, Questions 28-38 on p. 25-26). In other words, married soldiers not currently living with their wives are finished with the survey at Question 27 (p. 24).

Verification of Respondent's Answers

When you receive the completed questionnaires, you should make every attempt to quickly page through the entire questionnaire instrument to ensure that soldiers have not failed to complete whole sections when they should have. You also should pay particular attention to key soldier information, for example, the soldier's unit, rank, and especially, the Social Security Number on the Privacy Act statement. If the soldier does not fill out his(her) Social Security Number for fear of reprisal, emphasize the confidentiality of results.

Data Collectors Observation/Reaction Sheet

Because of resource constraints, our staff cannot be at every administration of the questionnaire. You will be our "eyes" in the field by making observations. Please fill out the Data Collectors Observation/Reaction Sheet (enclosed) and note any current events that might bear on data analyses and interpretation of results (e.g., recent change-of-command, recent community catastrophe, etc.). This information will then be included in our data analysis.

Return of the Completed Questionnaires

When returning the questionnaires, we ask that you return the following in the same box (or similar box) in which the questionnaires arrived:

(1) the completed questionnaires;
(2) uncompleted questionnaires; ·
(3) Privacy Act. statements;
(4) Volunteer Agreement statements;
(5) current unit alpha roster (having Social Security Numbers, rank, marital status and number of dependents);
(6) and the Data Collectors Observation/Reaction Sheet.

These six elements should be distinctly separated and demarcated in the box. Ensure that no soldiers are present when you enclose both the completed questionnaires and the Volunteer Agreement and Privacy Act statements. After these elements are placed in the box, package the box and securely fasten the address label to the outside; this label was sent along with the uncompleted questionnaires.

Reporting of Results

You, the data collectors, will be informed of results of the NMS Soldier Study. The enclosed Concept Paper describes the nature and purpose of the study so that you will be able to explain these aspects to inquisitive soldiers. Brief reports of results will then follow for your information as well as for inquiring soldiers.

Chapter VI

THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM AND FAMILY ISSUES

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Chapter VI

THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM AND FAMILY ISSUES

1. Introduction

a. HQDA (ODCSPER-DAPE-PSB Ltr 5 Aug 85) has asked WRAIR to address three family issues as part of our NMS study efforts. These issues are as follows:

(1) The adequacy of existing Army family support systems to meet the special needs created by the COHORT system.

(2) The role of the family in the development of unit cohesion and readiness in COHORT units.

(3) The identification of COHORT impacts on nonCOHORT personnel and their families at the installation and community levels.

b. This section addresses the first issue by reviewing early NMS family policy and program initiatives, highlighting information from two WRAIR NMS family studies, and by commenting on WRAIR's initial involvement in the current battalion rotation initiative. The second HQDA issue is discussed in terms of WRAIR's ongoing family research activities and includes some preliminary findings. WRAIR has only limited information on the third HQDA issue. Observations (Lewis, 1985) of one COHORT company's movement and integration into an OCONUS community provide the basis for comment at this time.

2. Family Support and COHORT

a. The development of unit-family relationships.

(1) The current attention being given to the rotation of soldiers and families in COHORT battalions is important, and the issues are complex. It is just as important, however, to remember that rotation is just one event in the "Unit Lifecycle" which includes forming, training, sustaining, and deploying combat units. In some units (and higher commands), individuals talk about their unit "COHORTing," when in reality they describe only the actual rotation of their unit to an overseas station. Attention is exclusively event-focused and individuals have lost sight of the larger context within which various NMS lifecycle events occur. They have also lost sight of the opportunities the COHORT unit lifecycle provides for the development and maintenance of unit-family relationships.

(2) Our concern for the needs of COHORT families should consider more than just the experience of certain unit-related events. We also need to focus our attention on the context of

these experiences. For example, the stability and predictability of a COHORT unit's lifecycle provides an ongoing opportunity for the development of family bonds well as family identification with the unit and with the unit's mission. The development of such bonds and unit loyalty should help to buffer these families from some of the stressful life occurrences that are a normal part of a military lifestyle (e.g., frequent field duty, training deployments, overseas rotation, and the normal fears that family members have for the well being and safety of their husbands and fathers when faced with potential or actual combat deployment).

(3) As previously reported (Martin, 1985), our initial research suggests that this bonding and identification can enhance the general well being and life satisfaction of unit wives. WRAIR research findings from a sample of COHORT companies suggest that this bonding and identification does occur when units take advantage of the full COHORT lifecycle to reach out and build relationships among families and between the unit and its families.

(4) Unfortunately, this research also suggests that many units are not taking advantage of the COHORT lifecycle opportunities. Newly arriving families are often not welcomed to the unit, there is usually no family involvement in rites which mark the unit's establishment, and there is typically no ongoing plan for developing and sustaining family involvement in unit based activities.

(5) As with unit training, leaders do not see these units any different than traditional individual replacement units; they have no vision of how to capitalize on COHORT unit stability. Military training activities in COHORT units often remain fixed on the next task (e.g., ARTEP, NTC, REFORGER, etc), and not on enhanced opportunities for progressive individual and cross training, or even less "days in the field." In the same way, unit-family relationships often center on the narrowest aspects of critical events like obtaining passports for an OCONUS move. Units fail to build on the opportunities these lifecycle events present for the continuous involvement of family members in planning and carrying out unit-based responses to normal military family life demands, such as preparing for an extended field exercise.

b. Formal family supports

(1) In 1982, The Adjutant General's Office (TAGO), acting as the official proponent for NMS family issues, developed an elaborate model for ensuring formal support services for the family members of soldiers assigned to COHORT units. This unit lifecycle model centered on the enhancement of family-unit-community relationships. It was designed to capitalize on the personnel stability of these units as well as the units' predictable schedules. Under the auspice of the Army Community Service Division at TAGO, an effort was made to implement a "Long

Range Family Support Plan" (LRFSP) in FORSCOM and USAREUR NMS COHORT units.

(2) When the LRFSP was originally developed, the hope was that the local catalyst for this initiative would be a Family Support Officer (FSO) designated for each parent regiment. Subsequently, modifications were made to the implementation of the regimental aspects of the NMS, and the FSO position (or something comparable at the brigade or division level) never materialized. Without an FSO, the coordination of the LRFSP initiatives became the responsibility of the local Army Community Service (ACS) Officers. Based on our limited observations, FORSCOM and USAREUR ACS programs have lacked the staff, command support and interest in assuming the responsibilities necessary to implement the LRFSP as it was originally conceived.

(3) With the decision to develop an NMS COHORT Battalion Rotation initiative, HQDA adopted the original LRFSP as the New Manning System Family Support Plan (NMSFSP). As with the earlier initiative, this plan directed ACS to be the focal point for NMS family support services and the local ACS officer to be the point of contact for coordination and planning of all support to NMS families. In addition, a HQDA ODCSPER Policy Letter (4 June 1985) directed senior COHORT Commanders to appoint a Family Services Support Officer (FSSO). The FSSO is to develop a Unit-Family Support Plan in addition to his/her other duties. The policy letter also required the FSSO to serve as the focal point within the battalion for family matters, and to serve as a liaison to the installation ACS.

(4) During our initial contacts with 6 of the rotating battalions and the CONUS and USAREUR communities supporting the battalion rotation initiative, we found a general lack of awareness of the existence of the NMSFSP among both command and community officials. We have not seen an FSSO and we have not found an ACS program that has undertaken the role as focal point for NMS family support initiatives.

(5) This does not mean that the units and/or communities have been ignoring the family issues associated with battalion rotation. In fact, most units and installations have spent considerable time and energy on issues that relate to family movement overseas and back to CONUS. In most cases a division staff officer, and the battalion S-1 and/or Chaplain are playing critical roles in this planning process. In some cases, there has been a key installation staff officer assuming responsibility for the coordination of many other family support issues.

(6) Although situations are continually improving, there appear to be two deficits in planning formal family support of the battalion rotation initiative:

(a) There is no assurance that an appropriate staff officer at the unit and installation levels has been appointed to coordinate all aspects of family support for battalion rotation. Ideally, these individuals should have had access to "lessons learned" from the numerous company level rotations that have already taken place as part of the NMS. There should also have been information available to the officers coordinating rotation planning at the unit and installation from some of the other battalion (and above) deployments that have taken place in the Army over the past few years. Instead of developing everything from step one as if nothing came before, we should have been able to build on past experiences. At this point we have not been able to do this. An "institutional memory" just does not exist. The concern now is to insure that we create this memory as a resource for future rotations.

(b) While most commands/units have paid a great deal of attention to the "logistical" aspects of moving families to and from USAREUR, less attention has been paid to some of the "people" aspects of the rotation. For example:

-- Only a few units have actively sought to involve family members in the rotation planning process. Units are not taking advantage of the experience that exists among family members. For example, soldiers and their wives who have lived in the gaining commands/communities or who speak the local language could play a role in the preparation of other families for the rotation. Units are also missing the opportunity to use these preparations as a vehicle for bringing families together around a common life experience. Such collective activities provide the opportunity for self-help initiatives and the promotion of bonds among families and between the unit and its families.

-- There have been many command and community plans developed in support of the family aspects of rotation, but very little of this information has reached the soldier and his wife and children. While it is true that prematurely providing "facts" only to change them a few days or weeks later can be very damaging, it is even worse to let ignorance and rumor prevail. Some units have recognized that their families can tolerate an "I don't know" as long as they feel that their leaders are working on the issues and keeping them informed. Units that have held family briefings, and or mailed family newsletters directly to unit wives, have significantly reduced fears, rumors and stress, and have at the same time fostered a positive mindset about the rotation. This sharing of information has also been an important contribution to the development of positive unit-family relationships.

-- Most units have not been taking advantage of the pre-rotation period to better prepare family members for overseas living. For example, this would be an ideal time for the unit, in coorperation with the local Education Center, to

sponsor cultural and language training programs. Many of the
units will be experiencing long field training exercises during
the months prior to rotation. This provides an ideal time for
these kinds of family rotation preparations. A cooperative
effort between various community agencies like the Education
Center and the unit might provide these wives with some positive
experiences: a chance to get to know one another, a needed
opportunity to get out of the house and away from their children
for a few hours a week, an opportunity to gain a positive
attitude about their new community, and some practical skills
that will ease their transition into a new culture.

                    -- At present, there is limited coordination
between the battalions who are switching locations, but no
coordination at all among other rotating battalions. Each of
these units is going through the same learning process, and
developing plans for disseminating information, involving wives'
groups, or developing a family support plan. Although each
location requires some unique considerations, the majority of the
planning issues are the same. A conference for some of the
planners, like staff officers and key unit wives, would be very
helpful and would allow the opportunity for sharing useful
information and ideas. For example, one group of wives started a
"USAREURIZATION" program for wives. The information they have
prepared would be useful for all wives moving to Europe,
regardless of location. Sharing this information among the CONUS
battalions would save considerable time and effort at other
locations.

                    (c) In addition to all of these informal and
formal support issues, there are some policy-driven issues that
seem to be having an important impact on married soldiers and
their families (in some cases these impacts also extend to single
soldiers). Each issue warrants some individual discussion.

                    -- In recent interviews with unit cadre and
first-term soldiers (including single soldiers) from rotating
COHORT battalions, continual mention was made of the problem
married first-term soldiers face in deciding about extending
their enlistments in order to take their spouses on a command-
sponsored OCONUS tour. Most of the soldiers faced with this
decision feel that they are not being fairly treated because this
situation was not explained to them when they enlisted (obviously
it is not possible to know what was or was not promised by the
individual recruiters). Regardless of the decision they plan to
make, there is almost a universal feeling that this situation is
blackmailing them into extended military service. They also feel
that it interferes with their future plans, like continued
civilian education.

                    -- Even worse, many of these soldiers believe
that if they take their wives to USAREUR at their own expense,
the wives will not be eligible to use any government
facilities. While the source of this misinformation is not

clear, it appears that some of it has originated from inaccurate and incomplete unit briefings as well as from comments made by unit NCO cadre members. Both the feelings of being coerced and the belief that benefits will be unfairly taken away, are blamed on COHORT. This has set many first term soldiers against any thought of reenlistment.

-- While it may be very difficult to justify providing COHORT first term soldiers with an 18 month accompanied OCONUS tour, it is critical that they receive a complete, factual presentation of the options from which they have to choose. It is also important that these types of Army policies be explained to the soldier in a way that clarifies the fact that they have nothing to do with a COHORT unit assignment.

-- A continual complaint among first-term COHORT soldiers, especially career-oriented married soldiers, is their perception that they are prohibited from any other Army training. While the reality (which is known by very few first term soldiers) may be that some opportunities are available (e.g., OCS, West Point, etc.), the perceived lack of training opportunities like ranger school create the belief that being a COHORT soldier prevents one from getting all the promotion enhancing training that other soldiers can obtain. If we can assume that relatively few soldiers are actually going to apply COHORT soldiers does nothing more than create an unnecessary psychological sense of discrimination and fosters negative feelings about COHORT.

-- The perceived lack of training opportunities has an added impact on married soldiers because of the negative feelings about COHORT that are fostered among their wives. Based on our experience with the wives of first-term soldiers, it is clear that their perceptions of how their husbands are treated by the Army (the unit) are the primary source of their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with Army life. They see the Army as more than benefits. For many of these young families, joining the Army has been an opportunity to make something of their lives. Something as simple as the perceived denial of career-enhancing the individual soldier would ever apply or not, becomes a cornerstone of the wife's belief that the Army is trying to her husband from bettering himself and is often one of the she gives for encouraging her husband to leave the Army after his initial enlistment.

3. The Family And The Development Of Unit Cohesion And Unit Readiness

a. Previous WRAIR research suggests the importance of family issues to soldier and unit readiness. Soldiers experiencing family-related problems have been observed to lose duty time, demonstrate reduced performance, and seem to be at risk for physical and behavioral difficulties. Family problems have been a major cause of soldiers' failure to complete field training

exercises, and information from the Israeli Defense Force suggests that soldiers with family problems are at higher risk for breakdown in combat (Noy, 1978).

b. Studies also suggest that families play an important role in promoting unit cohesion and in maintaining unit readiness. In a study of married soldiers, Schneider and Gilly (1984) reported that wives' support for their husbands'careers played an important part in husbands' decisions to remain in the service. In a study of Special Forces troops and families (Manning, 1985), an important relationship was found between spouses' marital satisfaction and health perceptions. Current civilian literature (Barling, 1984) also indicates that husbands' job satisfaction is correlated with wives' reported marital satisfaction. Such relationships are especially important to the military if spouse adjustment and satisfaction in turn play a role in soldiers' retention, stress resistance and willingness to fight.

c. Until now all these relationships have been based on observations taken at only one point in time, so it has not been possible to attribute causal relationships between these family issues and soldier-unit issues. All we know is that one seems to be related to the other.

d. The current soldier and family related research initiatives at WRAIR will provide the kind of panel data taken over time that will allow better understanding of the nature of these relationships. In addition, our research efforts should allow us to gain an appreciation of how unit and installation functioning relates to family functioning, an area of concern that until now has received little if any formal scientific attention.

e. Based on current research observations, it is apparent that the more cohesive and better perform ng units have active family participation in unit-sponsored a ivities. Family members in these units tend to be involved with one another and are often a source of mutual support in times of crisis. An assumption to be tested is a belief that such family participation and family bonding is a direct result of leadership initiatives at the company and battalion level.

4. Real and Perceived Impacts of COHORT Initiatives on nonCOHORT Families

a. To date, the only information WRAIR has on this subject comes from a study of the OCONUS rotation of one COHORT company into a small USAREUR community. Based on this study (Lewis, 1985), it appears that the rotation of a COHORT unit can have both actual and perceived negative consequences on nonCOHORT families in the same command. The actual impacts come about from the demands placed on the installation support system by the rotating unit. In a small community with limited resources, the services required can severely tax the capabilities of the

existing staff. When the rotating COHORT unit receives priority
on the use of installation services and facilities, it can have a
direct negative effect on other community residents who also have
need for the same services.

b. The perception of "special treatment" for COHORT unit
members and their families will continue to be important
especially in smaller communities. In a large community, units
the size of a battalion can arrive and depart with little public
notice. However, in a small command, such an event would be the
"talk of the town."

c. Based on our limited experience, it is important that the
COHORT unit not receive assistance that has a direct negative
impact on other community residents (e.g., moving nonCOHORT
families out of temporary quarters to make room for incoming
COHORT families). When special treatments are provided (e.g.,
assistance in locating economy quarters), it is critical that
local residents receive factual information about these actions
through the community public information system. This
information must provide a reasonable explanation for the special
COHORT actions and should demonstrate to all residents the need,
and potential generalized value of these initiatives for all Army
families.

d. WRAIR's current battalion rotation research will provide
considerable information about COHORT impacts on nonCOHORT
residents. Initial information from this aspect of our NMS
research activities will be available by the third quarter of FY
86.

NOTE: The references cited in this chapter are available from
WRAIR upon request.

Chapter VII

NEW MANNING SYSTEM LIGHT INFANTRY ISSUES

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Table of Contents

Chapter VII.

NEW MANNING SYSTEM LIGHT INFANTRY ISSUES

1. Introduction

a. This report describes results of the reconnaissance phase of interview and observation conducted at the 7th Infantry Division (Light) and Fort Ord, California, during Fiscal Year 1985. It also projects the direction of research activities in the near future.

b. While the primary theme of the report is a study of the impact of COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training), OSUT (One-station Unit Training), and other New Manning System initiatives at Fort Ord, other factors--such as the Light Fighter concept, revised FM 22-100 on "Military Leadership" and the Chief of Staff's 1985 White Paper on "Leadership," and the growing role of military families--clearly influenced the performance, satisfaction, career-planning, and day-to-day lives of Fort Ord soldiers and their families. Where possible, the report identifies which factors are operative and postulates cause and effect.

c. The report has three sections: Methodology, Research Issues, and Study Projections.

2. Methodology

a. The two primary methods of data collecting used in the LID evaluation were naturalistic observations and interviews. Naturalistic observations consisted of two phases. Phase one involved informal introductory interviews with senior commanders and staff officers to explain the purpose of the study, solicit their cooperation, and refine the relevant concepts for later attention; phase two included interviews and participant observation. The second method of data collecting was open-ended individual and group interviews of soldiers and family members. These interviews provided contextual themes and background information concerning soldier and family adjustment in relation to the unit, the post, and the division. Interviews focused on and defined specific aspects of soldier life, such as structure of the work day, recreational activities, behavioral norms and expectations of soldiers and leaders, soldiers perceptions of fellow soldiers and leaders, relational patterns among soldiers

and soldiers' families, and their perceptions of unit organization, command climate, and unit performance. Family interviews examined family stress, family coping patterns, trends toward mutual aid and support, group organization, and uses of community support services.

b. During the reconnaissance phase, the research team focused in three main areas: (1) the concentrated study of one COHORT battalion early in its life cycle; (2) the study of the interface among soldiers, their units, their families, and community support systems; and (3) the comparative study of the relationships among leaders and their soldiers in several COHORT and nonCOHORT battalions and companies. Thus far, all activities studied have been combat arms units or post facilities directly concerned with family matters, such as the Army Community Services and the Post Housing Office.

c. As a means of formalizing the research partnership between the WRAIR and the 7th ID(L) and Fort Ord, representatives of WRAIR proposed and the Commanding General, 7th ID(L) and Fort Ord, approved the formation of a Study Advisory Group (SAG) and secured a charter for the SAG as an official Fort Ord command/advisory committee. The purposes of the SAG are to advise on, support, and review the HQDA-directed research through and interactive process that includes reviewing drafts of written reports and observations, discussing the implications of the study findings for the Division and the Army, offering comments on concept papers, and proposing topics for further study.

3. Research Issues:

a. Issue: Relationship Between COHORT and Military Effectiveness and Efficiency in the 7th Infantry Division (Light).

(1) Observations: Commanders at brigade, battalion, and company levels report that COHORT units under their command reached exceptionally high levels of military proficiency and readiness for combat in very short periods. Some specific examples are:

(a) One infantry battalion, and one artillery battery, were able to go from completion of OSUT through completion of company/battery ARTEP in 90 days.

(b) A brigade commander reported that one of his battalions, composed of mature (more than one year into the COHORT cycle) COHORT companies, performed exercises as well as a Ranger battalion. One battalion commander described his battalion as approaching Ranger standards, and another said his battalion was better prepared for combat after 90 days of training than any units of the 82nd Airborne Division at any stage of training. (He had served five years in the 82nd.)

(c) Artillery commanders in two battalions reported that their units could deliver fire within 30 seconds after receipt of the observer's fire request, and error rates were of the order of one per 200 to 300 missions. Team work and speed in occupying position were judged exceptional by senior commanders.

The commanders interviewed cited three factors as contributing to the remarkable competence of their subordinate units.

-- The COHORT system.

- Accretive training. Commanders reported that their COHORT units surpassed in 60 to 90 days the competence of individual replacement units, and kept on improving.

- Mutual support. Commanders and junior leaders said that in COHORT units all of the soldiers have a stake in supporting the development of one another's military proficiency, and help each other.

- Expectation to fight as a unit. Commanders and NCOs felt pressure from the junior members of this unit to teach them progressively more advanced combat techniques.

-- The command climate in the 7th Infantry Division.

- Trust. Commanders said they trusted their superiors, felt they were trusted, and as a consequences could forget about "covering their asses" and get on with the business of preparing for war.

- Innovation. Commanders said their superiors supported them in experimental approaches and would tolerate "mistakes of growth" as the price of creativity.

- Security. Confident that they would not be relieved for trivial or peripheral issues, commanders and leaders reported that they felt secure enough to allow their subordinates to learn by doing, with minimal supervision.

- Communications. Commanders believed they could tell their superiors the unvarnished truth without being punished or criticized.

- Enthusiasm. Interviewees described the command climate in the division as "revolutionary," "a vision come true," and "an opportunity to be part of a really superb military unit."

-- The soldiers in first-term COHORT packages.

- Intelligence. Commanders and first sergeants said first-term soldiers are dramatically more intelligent than the men they had led five years ago.

- Motivation. Commanders, first sergeants and section/squad leaders reported that their men clamored for additional training and studied manuals when off duty.

- Professional competence. Officers and NCOs said they entrusted privates with independent tasks and could count on excellent results.

- Horizontal bonding. Junior officers and NCOs said COHORT soldiers policed each other's conduct, helped each other to learn and adapt, and supported each other's grievances.

(2) <u>Discussion</u>: The salient preliminary finding is that the COHORT infantry and artillery units in the 7th ID(L) are, in the opinion of their commanders, remarkably competent, spirited, and cohesive. The officers and NCOs interviewed during the reconnaissance phase of the research (N = 60, in all 4 COHORT battalions and in 5 battalions composed of COHORT companies) were unanimous in praise of the motivation, enthusiasm, and intelligence of the COHORT soldiers. The research team confirmed by participant observation the strong motivation and enthusiasm of most infantry and artillery soldiers during physical training and field exercises.

(a) It is reasonable to expect higher intelligence among the COHORT soldiers in 1985 compared to recruits five years ago. New accessions in mental categories I and II rose from 15.2% of the total in 1980 to 37.1% in 1984. Concurrently, new assessions in category IV fell from 50.1% in 1980 to 10.2% in 1984. The 7th ID(L) clearly has more capable personnel than did units five years ago, but there is no evidence that the soldiers received by the 7th ID(L) are different from those received by other commands in 1984-85.

(b) Several officers and NCOs, particularly in artillery units, commented that their COHORT soldiers were poorly trained during OSUT. However, the same leaders reported that their men learned very quickly and were soon able to function without supervision. The research team, in questioning a very small number of privates selected at random, found that their military knowledge of tactics, techniques, and the purpose, use, and maintenance of equipment, was equivalent to that of squad leaders/section chiefs in other divisions.

(c) The COHORT system received praise from 19 out of 20 infantry and artillery commanders interviewed. The one officer who criticized COHORT said it was defective because the logistical system did not provide the necessary supplies, equipment, furniture and barracks necessary to support the arrival of a large number of men at one time--issues extrinsic to the COHORT system. Other criticisms concerned the quality of NCOs and opportunities for career development outside the unit-- issues that involve fine tuning of the system, not the basic philosophy of COHORT.

(d) The COHORT system, according to commanders and NCOs in the 7th ID(L), delivers substantially more than was expected of it. Expected were the possibility of accretive training and strong horizontal bonding among junior enlisted personnel. Unexpected benefits include a powerful and continuing collective demand for progressively more advanced and sophisticated training, mutual support in learning military tasks, collective concern for troubled individuals, and group pressures against misconduct. The cumulative effects of these processes are likely to be even stronger cohesion in combat than was anticipated.

(e) The extent to which horizontal cohesiveness is harnessed to institutional goals appears to be a function of the credibility of the mission, the perceived competence, concern, and honesty of leaders, and the readiness of leaders to trust their subordinates. Evidence from other commands, and preliminary observations in the very few units of the 7th Infantry Division in which the leadership is deficient, indicates that COHORT soldiers become extremely competent even under weak, indifferent, or authoritarian commanders, but they may be alienated from those commanders. The presence of several battalions of bright, eager soldiers organized under the COHORT principle and led by competent, concerned, forthright officers offers an opportunity to study the processes by which superb units are created and sustained.

(3) <u>Future Research</u>: What began as an evaluation of the COHORT unit replacement system has become a more important and complex investigation of the fundamental human dynamics of military excellence.

(a) The central questions are:

-- How did the units in the 7th ID(L) become so good?

-- Why did it happen to the units in the 7th ID(L) and not to units in other commands?

-- Can the processes be replicated in other commands and other locales?

-- Are the levels of excellence in the 7th ID(L) sustainable?

(b) COHORT, an influx of talented soldiers, implementation of the Chief of Staff's new leadership model, and growing emphasis on integrating military families are four positive factors affecting military efficiency in the 7th ID(L). Each affects the success of the others. It will be possible, by using multivariate research techniques supported by on-site observers, to identify the processes by which the four factors interact to foster military efficiency. The research resources are already in place and functioning, the necessary liaison has been established with commanders at all echelons, and the primary research fields are identified.

b. Issue: __Leadership in the 7th Infantry Division (Light).__

(1) __Observations__: Many commanders are practicing a style of leadership characterized by caring, trust, and open communication with their subordinates. This style of leadership, which was found to be associated with esprit and efficiency, took a variety of forms:

(a) Trust. Most of the commanders and NCOs interviewed said they would give a subordinate a job and let him do it, without telling him how to do it. Later they would use the After Action Review technique to elicit self-assessment and self-criticism.

(b) Respect. Though no leader mentioned respect for his subordinates specifically, the research team observed evidence of it in collegial interactions between battalion and company commanders, between officers and NCOs, and between NCOs and privates. In these interactions men of differing ranks were friendly, professional, and candid in discussing a problem, task, or experimental approach. Several subordinates mentioned that it was important to them to have leaders who would listen to their ideas and suggestions.

(c) Predictability. A few battalion and brigade commanders expressed the view that if their men know what is coming it gives them a sense of control over their lives. They took pains to see that their subordinates had their own copies of training schedules, and did everything they could to avoid changes. Company and battalion commanders were uneasy that a higher headquarters would pull the rug out from under them by issuing capricious last-minute directives that would compromise their efforts to give their men knowledge of future activities.

(d) Protection. Several battalion and brigade commanders assumed responsibility for protecting their subordinates against last-minute changes, encroachments on training time, harassment by higher echelon staffs, reporting and other non mission-related requirements, and criticism for innovation.

(e) Candor. Several company, battalion, and brigade commanders, and some sergeants major, first sergeants, and platoon sergeants, emphasized the importance of accepting bad news from subordinates in a non-punitive manner, and of telling subordinates the whol: truth. They described honesty as the foundation of trust between echelons, and as essential to their getting accurate feedback from below.

(f) Caring. All commanders and senior NCOs interviewed mentioned their commitment to caring about the personal and familial welfare, and the professional development, of their subordinates. The research team observed a great many instances

of effective, genuine caring behavior by company commanders, NCOs, and squad/section leaders. The team also observed that in COHORT units command treatment of one soldier's personal problem (e.g., sending or not sending a man home from an FTX when a family member is seriously ill) becomes a source of satisfaction or grievance for all of his fellows.

(g) Sharing hardships. Though interviewees rarely mentioned it, the research team observed that all officer and most NCO leaders took part in any physical training, field exercise, or deprivation of food, water, sleep, or comfort that their subordinates experienced.

(2) Discussion:

(a) The research team derived from its observations of leadership styles a continuum of "autonomy--authoritarianism." Leaders close to the autonomy end of the continuum were more psychologically secure--they could handle the uncertainty entailed by trusting their subordinates, they did not need to be reminded of their superior position by deferential acts, and they were prepared to resist demands by higher headquarters that would distract their subordinates from the mission or disorient their programs. Their respect for their subordinates stemmed from knowledge of the subordinates' capabilities, and from awareness that their success as leaders was a function of their subordinates' performance. Preliminary observations indicate that autonomous leaders are associated with superior units. Officers perceived as being autonomous leaders also gave the impression of being comfortable in their roles and enjoying the experience of command.

(b) Leaders close to the authoritarian end of the continuum supervised their subordinates closely, called for frequent reports, preoccupied themselves with details, and were impatient with subordinates' ideas. These leaders, in their leadership behavior, betrayed personal insecurity. As they felt their moral authority erode, they fell back on formal authority. The leaders most vulnerable to authoritarianism were squad/section leaders who felt the pressure of gifted privates overtaking them in professional knowledge. Authoritarian behavior in the few units in which it was observed stifled initiative, shut off communications, ruptured trust, and set in motion series of mutual reenforcing events that destroyed vertical cohesion.

(3) Future Research:

(a) The central research questions on leadership are:

-- How did the autonomous leaders who have command integrity get it?

211

-- Does the Army have or can it develop enough autonomous leaders to lead all its units?

-- Can an authoritarian leader be developed into an autonomous leader? If so, how?

-- How do junior enlisted men view leaders perceived by the research team as being autonomous?

-- Which echelons of leadership are most critical?

(b) Evidence from comparative analyses of units in the 7th ID(L) and COHORT units manned by recent accessions in other commands indicates that leadership is the factor that makes the difference between ordinary units and outstanding units. The command climate, and the commanders selected for the 7th ID(L), may differ markedly from the climate and the leaders in other divisions. The research team will devote its main effort to finding out, through serial surveying, longitudinal observation, concentric interviewing of subordinates of commanders and leaders at both ends of the continuum, and detailed biographical study of those same commanders, why the leaders in the 7th ID(L) are so remarkably effective. The research team will solicit ideas on these central research questions from leaders in the 7th ID(L) through a concept paper.

(c) The question of what constitutes a familial crisis warranting sending a soldier home from a field exercise is vexing. The research team will monitor this issue in an effort to define boundaries of compassionate concern and the training mission, and to identify ways in which commanders can receive messages from their troops about who has a real problem and who is trying to manipulate the system.

c. Issue: Leadership and Time Management in the 7th Infantry Division (Light).

(1) Observations: Management of soldiers' time is a delicate factor affecting morale, esprit, and vertical cohesion. The problem has several facets:

(a) Most soldiers of all ranks said they were willing to put in the time required by the mission.

(b) Junior personnel expressed an expectation that their leaders would manage the garrison work in such a way that it could be done in the minimum time.

(c) Junior enlisted personnel, and the wives of soldiers of all ranks, complained bitterly about garrison work hours being extended beyond the predicted limits.

(d) The most bitter complaints concerned being held on post after the assigned work had been completed--because others were still working, or just in case another task came up.

(e) A few battalion and company commanders expressed concern that sudden directives from higher headquaters to keep their men on duty beyond the schedule time could discredit them as officers who cared for their men.

(f) The research team observed one brigade commander turn down a divisional staff officer's suggestion that a garrison activity be scheduled on a Saturday with the words, "I'm not in the business of working my men on weekends."

(2) Discussion:

(a) The tempo of training and the frequency of field exercises in the 7th ID(L) is so intense that days in garrison, and the off-duty hours associated with those days, are jealously prized.

(b) The research team formed a tentative impression that soldiers would respond positively to legitimate emergencies, but were able to tell when overtime was brought on by mismanagement, lack of planning, or a superior's fear of being found lacking in zeal. Closely related to, but possibly separate from, the question of the number of hours required in garrison was the predictability of those hours--especially to family men and their spouses.

(3) Future Research: Observers with units and the family/community team have begun to collect data systematically on soldiers' and spouses' attitudes toward overtime work. The research team will solicit the ideas of soldiers and spouses through a concept paper.

d. **Issue:** Leadership and Collective Behavior in COHORT Units.

(1) **Observations:** COHORT soldiers usually police each other's conduct, but when they do misbehave they do so in groups. This arouses the spectre of mutiny, and several commanders expressed concern on the following points:

(a) One battalion commander said he never had a single soldier go AWOL; they always went in groups. A review of AWOL in other battalions revealed similar patterns. In one company, 14 men planned to go AWOL together, with their weapons. Their platoon sergeant detected the plot and intervened.

(b) One commander noted that misconduct involving drugs and prostitution requires a cohesive group if it is to be carried out without detection.

(c) Two commanders expressed concern that the bonding generated by the COHORT system provides a seed bed for criminal conspiracies.

(d) Some commanders have decided to experiment with what one calls controlled indiscipline. Their view is that future battlefields will require junior enlisted soldiers to fight as small groups or individuals, and that uniformity and strict adherance to regulations is less important than initiative and self-reliance. Essentially the commanders are raising the question whether organized violation of certain regulations is damaging to the foundations of discipline in the traditional sense or enhancing to discipline in another sense.

(2) **Discussion:** Commanders report that the COHORT system generates strong horizontal cohesion, and the research team confirmed their observations. This cohesion can be used against command as well as for it. In other commands there have been a few situations in COHORT units in which the first-term soldiers united against specific abusive officers or NCOs, but have remained loyal to the Army and the mission. Instances of mass AWOL may indicate that leadership is deficient. The motivation behind misconduct in a COHORT unit may be different from that in an individual replacement unit. In the example cited above of 14 soldiers going AWOL, the platoon sergeant stopped the misconduct but did not investigate the reasons behind it. Reevaluation of the concepts of conspiracy, mutiny, and the criminalizing of some military offenses in specific settings may be indicated. Some misconduct, such as members of a COHORT wrecking a bar that had defrauded soldiers or fighting members of another unit, could be manifestations of the combat effectiveness of the unit. Community relations, the reputation of the Army, and the possibility of injuries must, of course, be considered.

(3) _Future Research_: The research team will assemble comparative data on misconduct and punishments in COHORT and individual replacement units, then present the issues to officers, NCOs, and first-term soldiers in the 7th ID(L) in a concept paper for their consideration. Interviewers will collect data from soldiers who engage in misconduct, and from their families, to discover their motivation. These data will then be compared with data on the command climate in the soldiers' units.

e.   Issue: Problems Peculiar to Phases of the COHORT Life
Cycle.

(1)   Observations: Commanders of battalions with mature
COHORT companies reported that there are variations in
motivation, discipline and performance at various points in the
lives of COHORT units.   They mentioned the following issues:

(a)   Discipline.

-- Two battalion commanders described the
following cycles: a surge of enthusiasm and commitment for 6 to
9 months followed by a slump during which there is widespread
misconduct, then partial recovery to a plateau with intermittent
pulses of misconduct.

-- Two company commanders said they each
experienced a pulse of misconduct after the initial training
phase.   The men, suddenly allowed off base, discovered drugs,
liquor, and women downtown and lost their self-control.

(b)   Training.

-- Two company commanders commented on training
their cadre personnel before the COHORT troops arrived.   One had
only five days to shake down his cadre, and as a result the NCOs
were not prepared.   His training program failed and had to be
redone.   The other commander had his NCOs on hand for five months
and they went stir-crazy.   Three commanders of COHORT battalions
said they had their cadre personnel for three months, and this
period was ideal.

-- Two commanders of battalions with mature
companies described their plans for training during their
companies' final 18 months.   Both said they believed that
intellectually and professionally challenging and interesting
experiences were essential to sustain the enthusiasm and skills
of their men.   One had laid out a varied and progressively more
sophisticated program that was costly in transportation.   The
other had a program that appeared to be repetitious, though
innovation at company and platoon levels might make the training
progressive.   A company commander said that the primary obstacle
to progressive training was lack of funding for air
transportation.

-- Battalion and company commanders of mature
units noted that in their definition of progressively more
demanding training they did not intend to increase physical
demands.   They said advanced training should be interesting,
challenging, and professional, but not be at the hell-for-leather
pace of the initial training-up program.   These commanders
perceived that their men will work hard but are not interested in
exhausting themselves physically over and over again.   Their men

are concerned with safety and are aware of the heightened risk of injury when fatigued.

-- Several wives complained that their husbands were so exhausted that they went right to sleep in the evenings and slept most of the day on weekends.

(2) Discussion: The ability to predict cycles in a COHORT unit, and to either implement counter-cyclic programs or accommodate down-cycles by scheduling non-critical activities, is necessary to sustain combat effectiveness, and to avoid burning units out. No one has yet described or charted the cycles in the life of a COHORT unit. Counter-cyclic programs might include less concentrated initial training so that soldiers could get acquainted with temptations in town more gradually. However, an intense period of training followed by an intense period of misconduct may be more conducive to combat effectiveness.

(a) Training programs proposed by battalion commanders for the last 18 months of their COHORT units include mountain, jungle, and arctic exercises, maneuvers against armies of other countries, advanced aerial or seaborne assaults, insertion into unfamiliar terrain, and exercises requiring prolonged independent action by small units. Most of these are costly. Junior commanders and leaders at company, platoons, and squad level may suggest exercises of progressive sophistication that could be supported with local resources. If funding cutbacks curb commanders' adventurous training programs, the burden will fall on the leaders. There will be temptation to fall back on more testing of physical limits, more meticulous housekeeping, and eyewash. These measures would destroy the sense of professional pride in being supremely capable of performing a difficult and essential mission--the pride that provides the psychological driving force behind the eagerness to learn and readiness to expend effort observed in the 7th ID(L).

(b) Training programs that progressively degrade the physical condition of soldiers are directly counterproductive in terms of combat effectiveness. Further, physically exhausting programs, or programs that keep units in the field for long periods, may erode the support of families, and indirectly lead to soldiers coming to resent their units. The Army and the family are in direct competition for the soldier's time and energy. Each must be accommodated.

(3) Future research: The foremost research task is to observe and chart the cycles in the lives of COHORT units in the 7th ID(L) and other commands. The research team will derive a provisional model of the cycles by observing different units in their first, second and third years, and by making use of institutional memories--the recollections of men who have been with older units from the beginning. To verify and refine the model, the research team will circulate it in the form of a concept paper to senior and junior leaders.

(a) Respondents will be asked to confirm or modify the model based on their perceptions, and to suggest counter-cyclic, accomodating, or enhancing measures. As commanders respond to cycles in their units, the research team will record what works and fails, as demonstrated by unit performance, attitudes, and misconduct, and will circulate a second concept paper to stimulate further thinking.

(b) The research team will observe programs of training for mature units, and record the effects on performance, attitudes, and discipline. The team will chart the limits of junior leader creativity at different levels, and identify resources that could enhance that creativity. In situations in which funding reductions provoke makework and sterile testing of physical limits, the research team will record the consequences to vertical cohesion, and soldier will. The team will circulate a concept paper on this topic as a means of cross-pollenating ideas and generating new ones.

(c) The research team will compare patterns of wives' reports about their husband's exhaustion (from interviews by the family/community team) with patterns of unit activity (from training schedules), and with patterns of soldiers' and spouses' attitudes toward the Army and the soldiers' units (from soldier surveys and spouses' surveys).

f. **Issue: Effects of the COHORT System on Junior Officers' Careers.**

(1) <u>Observations</u>: There is no coherent program for training lieutenants.

(a) The divisional Directorate for Plans, Training, and Mobilization staff operates a five-day orientation program for new lieutenants.

(b) Battalion commanders each have initiated some program for training their lieutenants as a group. These programs vary from occasional lectures to the battalion commander organizing his lieutenants into a provisional platoon to practice basic tactical maneuvers.

(c) None of the company commanders interviewed had a plan for training lieutenants.

(2) <u>Discussion</u>: WRAIR has investigated training of lieutenants in units in other commands. In some companies the commander, or the first sergeant, or one or more platoon sergeants undertook to train lieutenants, usually on a sporadic basis. In most units the expectation was that the lieutenants would train themselves. Company commanders said they were preoccupied with learning their own jobs. In the 7th ID(L) training of lieutenants is no worse than it is in other commands. In some companies the platoon sergeants insist on running the platoons, and the lieutenants are left in limbo. The 7th ID(L) cannot afford to have leaders in trainee status.

(3) <u>Future Research</u>: The research team will replicate in the 7th ID(L) the WRAIR interview program carried out in USAREUR (company commanders, first sergeants, lieutenants, and platoon sergeants) to identify the processes by which lieutenants become functioning parts of their companies. The findings will be laid out in a concept paper for general distribution to company officers and NCOs to stimulate discussion and interaction between units and the research team.

g.   Issue: Effects of Assignment Policies on Senior NCO
Careers.

(1)   Observations: Policies and procedures for assigning
senior NCOs have led to dissatisfaction among NCOs and to a
disproportionate percentage of reliefs for cause.

(a)   Senior NCOs reported, and their commanders
confirmed, that many of the NCOs had been assigned or diverted to
the 7th ID(L) on short notice, without explanation, and under
threat of being barred from reenlisting.

(b)   Senior NCOs' spouses expressed resentment at the
lack of respect for their husbands by the Army as an institution,
and the lack of consideration for their families.

(c)   Battalion and company commanders interviewed
reported that, on the average, one out of three men assigned as
first sergeants and platoon sergeants were replaced.   Two company
commanders had to relieve half of their senior NCOs.

(d)   Commanders in one battalion believed they could not
transfer NCOs who were promoted by DA to grades for which there
were no vacancies in the unit.   One company had seven platoon
sergeants (E-7) for three authorized positions.

(2)   Discussion: Resentment among senior NCOs assigned or
diverted to the 7th ID(L) arose primarily from a sudden,
unexpected assignment to duty they did not want.   That resentment
could not be avoided.   However, it was inflamed by the failure to
advise the affected NCOs of the importance of their assignment in
a letter from some respected authority, such as the DCSPER or
from the Sergeant Major of the Army, and by the threat of a bar
to reenlistment.

(a)   The reasons for most of the senior NCO reliefs were
known to DA prior to their assignment to the 7th ID(L).   These
included physical incapacitation, history of alcoholism,
excessive age for assignment to a light infantry rifle company,
and previous selection for elimination from the service.
Subsequent unsatisfactory performance in the 7th ID(L) degraded
company command integrity during the initial intensive training
period, disrupted emergent vertical bonding, and presented young
soldiers with confusing role models.

(b)   Most brigade and battalion sergeants major in the
7th ID(L) were active in placing NCOs promoted out of their
positions into appropriate assignments.   When the brigade and/or
battalion sergeants major did not address this matter vigorously,
freshly promoted sergeants first class languished in squad leader
positions or in excess status.

(c) The consensus among commanders was that when NCOs leave their companies because of promotion, it strengthens the feeling of pride in the company ("our platoon sergeant is going to take over as first sergeant of A/X/Y, and straighten out those yardbirds"). Such transfers also provide openings for a few NCOs to assume more responsible positions in their units during their COHORT tours. These transfers are not seen as disruptive. On the other hand, holding a sergeant first class in the squad leader position is perceived as harmful to the moral of the individual and to the other NCOs in the company, and as a source of tension.

(d) A member of the G-1 staff of the 7th ID(L) stated in mid-July that NCOs now get 6 to 8 months advance notice of reassignment, and that 50% of NCO's assigned to units in the the Division are one grade lower than the vacancy to which they are assigned--to allow for promotions during the COHORT life cycle. Another division staff member questioned whether this was an accurate statement of policy in early November. Whatever policies are finally adopted, they should consider the importance of assigning for the start-up of a COHORT unit NCOs physically, mentally, and morally capable of carrying through with the unit.

(3) Future Research: A comparatively small number of senior NCOs and wives were interviewed during the preliminary phase of this research. The number and magnitude of problems associated with them mandates extensive interviewing. The purpose is to obtain information from which to construct a comprehensive picture of what can reasonably be expected of NCOs assigned to COHORT units in a light infantry division, and what measures should be taken to assure their welfare and professional development. A concept paper on these topics will be circulated among senior NCOs and commanders to verify its accuracy and provoke discussion.

h. **Issue: Effects of COHORT on Junior NCOs.**

(1) <u>Observations</u>: Junior NCOs find themselves under pressure from superiors and subordinates, and many are unable to handle the strain.

    (a) A few commanders perceived some squad leaders to be men who had developed habits of just getting by. These commanders see such NCOs are a layer of resistance to company commanders' efforts to develop professionalism and a sense of mission in the first-term soldiers.

    (b) Most battalion and company commanders reported their squad leaders and team leaders to be of average or below average ability and motivation. They cited lack of relevant experience, histories of substance abuse, and previous selection for elimination. One company commander said that half of his squad leaders were either passed over for promotion or selected for elimination.

    (c) A few battalion and company commanders in mature COHORT units said a substantial number of their squad/section leaders were "burned out." This type of burnout occurs when an NCO has taught his subordinates all he knows, has run out of ideas, and feels himself being overtaken by the bright, motivated first-term soldiers under him. NCOs suffering from burnout are demoralized, critical of the COHORT system, and eager to get out of their units.

    (d) All the commanders interviewed expressed concern about some aspect of personnel management policies affecting the morale and commitment of their junior NCOs. Some junior NCOs are beginning their third consecutive COHORT tour, and others fear being locked in. Rampant rumors, coupled with rapidly evolving policy, about COHORT NCOs' eligibility for schooling, choice of assignment, and reenlistment opportunities arouse great anxiety among NCOs already suffering from burnout.

(2) <u>Discussion</u>:

    (a) The transition from individual replacement units, in which NCOs are responsible only for repeated cycles of elementary training, to COHORT units, in which training becomes progressively more sophisticated for three years, is most stressful for the first-line supervisors. In addition, the first-term soldiers of 1985 are much more professionally demanding than those many NCOs are accustomed to leading. Several inevitable processes will improve the competence of the junior NCO corps as a whole and their ability to succeed in the COHORT environment. Those least able to adapt will be eliminated by administrative action or by their own choice; they will be replaced by emergent leaders from the COHORT packages. The strain of the novelty of COHORT training programs will recede as

duty in COHORT units becomes the common rather than the exceptional experience.

(b)   Command recognition of the changing demands on NCOs and programs to strengthen the ability of junior NCOs to handle the strain of duty in COHORT units are essential to the success of the COHORT units.   Current policies on schooling for NCOs during COHORT cycles, reassignment and reenlistment options, and training intensity should be reevaluated.

(3)   Future Research:

(a)   The research team, in its preliminary interviewing, developed different perceptions about junior NCOs from those reported by commanders.   The NCOs the researchers observed and interviewed were models of professional competence; they were deeply and sincerely dedicated to the professional development and personal and familial welfare of their men.   Rather than burning out because their subordinates were catching up with them, they challenged their subordinates to overtake them.   The research team picked its subjects at random, without interference by commanders, but the number was small.   In 1986 the research will increase the number of NCOs interviewed or observed, and will sample a proportion regarding their attitudes on questionnaires.

(b)   As the team refines its understanding of NCOs' problems and concerns, it will circulate one or more concept papers describing them.   These concept papers will stimulate discussion among commanders, staff officers and NCOs of measures to support the competence of junior NCOs and protect them against burnout.   The concept papers may include for consideration summaries of anti-burnout techniques developed to support police, drug treatment, and medical personnel.

i.   Issue: Soldiers' Misperceptions about COHORT

(1) Observations: First-term soldiers in COHORT units who have complaints about any aspect of the Army, their units, or arrangements for their families tend to see the solution as "getting out of COHORT."

(a) Interviews with first-term soldiers revealed that variations between battalions in policies, and absence of information, have given rise to perceptions in some units that being in a COHORT unit means a dearth of opportunities for promotion, schooling, leadership assignments, and reenlistment options; and that COHORT is something from which it is impossible to escape. Soldiers see their careers being blighted fatally at the outset while men in individual replacement units get promoted faster, can move to interesting assignments, and can control their fates.

(b) Commanders and NCOs stated in interviews that their better first-term soldiers develop into superb junior leaders. They appoint the best first-termers acting corporals as soon as vacancies occur, and they promote them as soon as minimum time in grade and service reequirements are me . Commanders look to emergent leaders from the COHORT packages to lead the fire teams, squads, and sections in the next incarnation of their units. Some commanders send every soldier for whom they can obtain a quota to Ranger, Jungle, Airborne, BNCOC, and specialist schools.

(2) Discussion: The first-term soldiers' dissatisfaction in the 7th ID(L) seems to stem more from expectations aroused by recruiters and from rumor than from experience. Many do not seem to be aware of the esteem in which their commanders hold them. Commanders vary in the energy with which they pursue career development opportunities for their first-term soldiers, and in their readiness to tell their men how good they are.

(3) Future Research:

(a) The number of first-term soldiers interviewed so far is too small to describe the origins of their discontents with confidence. They use the COHORT system as a scapegoat; it is essential to determine which of their complaints are produced by COHORT policies. The number of COHORT soldiers interviewed or observed will be expanded in 1986.

(b) The discrepancies between the soldiers' view of how they are treated and the commanders and NCOs' view of their value to the Army indicates that some commanders have not opened intra-company communications fully. The research team will use survey data to identify companies in which complaints are numerous and those in which soldiers are relatively contented, then use participant observers to assess the quality of communications in those units. When cause-and-effect relationships appear, they

will be the subjects of descriptive concept papers for
circulation and discussion at company level.

j. Issue: Factors Inhibiting the Success of COHORT Units.

(1) Observations: There are erratic but serious shortages of mission-essential equipment.

(a) Several company and battalion commanders reported shortages of common supply items such as rifle cleaning rods, cleaning rod tips, poncho liners, magazines for M-16 rifles, and 2-quart canteens. Shortages were not uniformly distributed; one company in a battalion could have a full or nearly full issue of an item and the other companies have none. The explanation often given to these commanders, that the item in question was "not in the supply system" or "unavailable Army-wide," was evidently not accurate. Officers added that the most serious effect of shortages of these common items was that it damaged the credibility of battalion and company commanders urging their troops to extreme efforts because of the urgency of the divisional mission. A company commander's statement to his men that they were to be ready for immediate commitment in combat on 1 October 1985 made little sense when the only rifle magazines in the company were a few scrounged by trading MRE rations to garrison units.

(b) All commanders reported non-availability of light infantry mission-specific equipment. Training in independent missions and night operations is degraded because squad radios are not available, and batteries for night vision devices are too expensive to be used for training. Commanders of mature COHORT units said that lack of light infantry mission-specific equipment complicates their efforts to conduct the advanced professional exercises essential to sustain the enthusiastic commitment throughout the COHORT life cycle.

(c) Brigade, battalion, and company commanders cited rigidity of COHORT personnel management policies as detrimental to the efficiency of their commands. Some voiced a need for provisions to transfer soldiers out of COHORT units in such exceptional situations as promotion into excess status or selection for OCS or the USMA Preparatory School. Others reported a need for small packets of soldiers to restore the rifle strength of units that started with understrength first-term COHORT packages and that lost additional personnel through injury, elimination proceedings, or promotion. Commanders reported that COHORT units can assimilate privates from OSUT more easily than experienced soldiers. The latter tend to disrupt the networks of vertical cohesion between cadre NCOs, emerging leaders from the COHORT, and the bulk of the COHORT soldiers.

(2) Discussion: The universality of these problems, and the Catch-22 situations in which they place commanders, identify them as issues overdue for action by the DA staff. They are extrinsic to the COHORT principle, but they compromise the successful implementation of that principle.

(3) <u>Future Research</u>: The research team will use data
analysis techniqes to identify relationships between shortages of
equipment or personnel on the one hand, and psychological
readiness on the other. Concurrently, the team will observe
commanders' efforts to work around the shortages. In its reports
the team will continue to identify extrinsic factors that affect
the successful implementation of the COHORT principle.

k. **Issue: Accouterments and Bonding.**

(1) <u>Observations</u>: Commanders at all levels value the use of accouterments and other symbolic items to enhance soldiers' identification with their units. The ways in which the items are expressed often depend upon the level of the organization and the willingness of leaders to tolerate variations within the bounds of uniformity of appearance and standards of behavior.

(a) In one brigade consisting of three battalions of the same regiment, the leaders (especially the officers) use regimental items of identification such as a distinctive authorized belt buckle to focus a sense of belonging and a history of continuity at the brigade level.

(b) Battalions encourage their members to purchase (at their own expense) distinctive tee-shirts, shorts, or jackets with the unit's crest and name. In several One-station Unit Training (OSUT) packages, the trainees themselves arranged for the design and ordering of the clothing before their arrival at Fort Ord. The officer-NCO cadre already at Fort Ord were later expected to conform to the troops' selection.

(c) One battalion commander researched the motto of his battalion's regiment. Finding the phrase to be both archaic and misleading to the modern soldier, he sought and received permission to redesignate his battalion motto using a word that he believed clearly embodies the "light fighter" ethos. This same word (synonymous with "assault" or "charge") is used by the battalion in rendering salutes.

(d) At levels below battalion, symbols often take the form of distinctive attitudes and public behavior rather than of items that are worn or appear in writing. One company commander and his first sergeant, for example, have focused on the importance of displaying "motivation" to distinguish their company from the others. As a result, the company has the reputation for being the noisiest and most enthusiastic during physical training. All officers and NCO's in the unit are expected to perform and teach this characteristic to soldiers: leaders who do not conform, regardless of other demonstrated traits of competence or acceptance by their troops, are pressured to change.

(e) Introducing uniqueness that may cause confusion in tactical situations is discouraged. Staff officers noted that commanders often prohibit platoon and squad leaders from employing platoon- or squad-specific ways of wearing the "cat eyes" on the back of helmets.

(f) Commanders at all levels, NCO's, and many of the first-term soldiers express a hope that the Division adopt

accouterment distinctive to "light fighters." They suggest a piece of cloth similar to the "Ranger" and "Special Forces" tabs or a beret. Almost all interviewees agree that this distinctive item should not be given automatically to all who are assigned to the Division, such as privates newly arrived from Basic Training; otherwise, the accouterment would have no more meaning than a medal awarded without the meritorious deeds. Suitable points in the train-up cycle are especially those involving the successful completion of an exercise such as Rites of Passage.

    (2) <u>Discussion</u>: The use of accouterments, symbolic items, and distinctive behavioral practices is common within the Army. They are effective in marshalling psychological identification with a group. Initial impressions are that the important elements in understanding the use of symbolic items and practices include: the timing of introduction; the organizational level of the unit involved; the meaning to soldiers according to rank; and the potential for conflict with requirements for uniformity and standardization.

    (3) <u>Future Research</u>: Research needs to be directed at different levels in the Division, and will focus on who initiates and is affected by the symbols, how the process occurs, and what impact these symbols have upon individual stress and group cohesion. While identifying additional items and practices, the research team will broaden the focus to include studying aspects of symbolism that allow a comparison of public and private behaviors and expressions. This further analysis will assist in understanding the contributions of symbolic items and practices in strengthening or weakening unit cohesion in combat and in other situations of severe stress.

1. Issue: Constraints to Familial Adaptation to Army Life in the 7th ID(L) COHORT Units.

(1) Observations: Spouses and family members express needs for prompt, accurate and usable information on the COHORT system, on Light Fighter initiatives, on the timing of scheduled exercises and field duty for 7th ID(L) units, and for updates on changes affecting soldier family life at Fort Ord. WRAIR reconnaissance interviews and observations at Fort Ord show that:

(a) Spouses of enlisted men know relatively little about the concepts underlying COHORT unit formation and Light Infantry objectives. However, wives and family members acquire individual and shared perceptions of the effects of these initiatives on their lives via accumulated daily experience and verbal exchanges over time, as well as through unit messages.

(b) Spouses express strong needs to know the timing and length of field exercises away from Fort Ord, and changes in Army policies or Light Infantry requirements.

(c) Enlisted men and their wives point out that advance communication from commanders to families helps control rumors and minimizes false or negative impressions of COHORT, Light Infantry, and Army life among family members.

(d) Newsletters by Family Support Groups and unit briefings to families are valued by many wives as sources of accurate information. However, commanders are reluctant to publicize dates of proposed field training far in advance, since these schedules may be revised by higher headquarters.

(2) Discussion: The essence of these findings is that smoothly organized communications from commanders to family members can alleviate the build-up of anxieties among spouses and reduce family member uncertainty about separation from the soldier in the field. Spouses and children find it easier to adjust to trying situations if they learn about events well in advance and can plan to make accommodations at home. Positive outcomes are reduction in feelings of stress and decreased resistance by spouses to heavy training demands on soldiers. Identification by family members with the goals and demands of the soldier's unit is enhanced by increased awareness of the nature of COHORT and knowledge of advance training plans for their soldier's Light Infantry unit, especially at the battalion and company levels. Their felt needs may, at times, conflict with the uncertainty factors faced by a commander in planning field exercises, and a commander's desire not to be placed in a position of having to 'change his mind' and appear indecisive.

(3) <u>Future Research</u>: Family/unit research will concentrate
on gaining in-depth understanding of the changing perceptions by
spouses and family members of 7th ID(L) unit activities as the
soldiers progress through training into readi ss status and as
units mature. Research inquiries will be aimed at: eliciting
formal and informal sources of information to families; assessing
the effectiveness and accuracy of each channel of communication;
observing two-way communication between family members and
miltary representatives of their sponsor's units. Research will
include assessment of the networks of interpersonal information-
sharing among unit spouses. The study will also assess the
circulation and impact of rumors and gossip about unit activities
and the Army that may mislead or upset family members
unnecessarily. Modes of effective rumor control by commanders
will be analysed. Detailed household and group participant-
observation will be performed to compare family behavior while
units are in garrison to behavior during field exercises and in
response to alerts and fly-aways. (See Soldier/Unit Issue i.,
above.)

231

m. Issue: Opportunities for Family Member Adjustment to 7th ID(L) and Fort Ord.

(1) Observations: Unit welcoming receptions and orientation of soldier families at Fort Ord by military units serve a cohesion-building purpose and help reduce familial stress. However, these COHORT unit activities are not well integrated with installation agency orientation assistance and housing referral functions.

(a) Interviews with spouses and soldiers suggest that unit-sponsored receptions for enlisted men's families upon their arrival at Fort Ord stimulate positive responses and improved capacity by family members to adapt to difficult living conditions.

(b) Interviews also indicate that absence of welcoming attention by unit leadership for new families makes some spouses feel isolated. This is associated with the emergence of negative attitudes toward life at Fort Ord and about COHORT Light Infantry among some spouses.

(c) Units actively seek to meet arriving family members at key locations, including, the Monterey airport, the Fort Ord Bus Depot, on-post guesthouses, infantry unit dining facilities and learning centers, unit day rooms, and barracks' courtyards. Sites used for large group receptions include, post theaters, clubs, picnic areas, recreational sites and Chapels. Unit-sponsored tours of installation facilities and adjacent civilian resources also emerged as ways of providing organized welcoming and familiarization.

(d) Family arrivals tend to coincide with first-term COHORT soldier arrivals. This facilitates group reception efforts by unit cadre. However, when individual families arrive at different points in time, spouses report that welcoming functions are often absent or disjointed. Officer and NCO cadres do not report as COHORT packages and their families arrive sporadically. Welcome efforts by partially formed units are problematic for newly arriving cadre households.

(2) Discussion: WRAIR surveys of spouses and married soldiers demonstrate statistically significant positive effects from personalized welcoming efforts by the military units. These efforts promote more successful short-term adjustment and better long-term adaptation by soldier households to the Army way of life. (See J. Martin, Chapter VI, this report.)

(a) At both CONUS and OCONUS sites, favorable first impressions and early acquaintance with other married couples in the unit have been shown to improve spousal and child adaptation during the course of the unit life-cycle. Unit group hospitality and initial assistance with 'settling-in' problems promote two-way interchange of information and improved spousal identification with the soldier's unit and with the Army installation. These positive mindsets tend to persist and help buffer stresses that emerge over time for family members and soldiers. Results are improved soldier-family morale, and better performance and retention rates. Cohesion within units is also enhanced by sincere demonstration of caring for family needs from the outset by commanders, senior NCOs, and their spouses.

(b) Conversely, surveys and interviews indicate an absence of welcoming attention has deleterious effects on family member stability and adaptability. Decreased self-esteem and negative attitudes toward unit and installation are linked to reduced household coping ability and increased family stress problems. These factors also adversely affect soldier morale, trainability and readiness to fight, and diminish vertical cohesion and retention rates.

(c) WRAIR interviews demonstrate psycho-social isolation, among some newly arrived spouses at Fort Ord. Spouses from all ranks who felt unwelcomed gave generally negative views of COHORT Light Infantry, Fort Ord and the Army. These mindsets may persist throughout the tour even as living conditions actually improve for affected individuals.

(d) Lack of attention to spousal and children's needs on arrival and no opportunities for get-togethers with other unit family members have negative effects. Isolated spouses are far less likely to bond together with other unit spouses. Their participation rates in unit-sponsored activities for families later on are low. Concomitantly, spousal and family member interest in fitting into the military community of the installation is diminished by newcomer feelings of discomfort vis-a-vis military units and shyness toward wives of other unit soldiers. Receptions and informal gatherings tend to break the ice and provide opportunities for developing awareness of mutual interests, and for creation of friendships among spouses and family members. Unit-planned social activities increase the bonding between families. These interactions improve vertical as well as horizontal cohesion among soldiers through their spouses. Welcoming gatherings provide opportunities for unit Family Support Groups to make announcements, obtain addresses of new families, and distribute telephone tree lists. These actions reinforce face-to-face familiarization among spouses and children across ranks within the unit, increasing ease of communication.

(3) Future Research: There are two major gaps in the
welcoming process which call for research effort, as follows:

(a) Units are hard-pressed to provide warm welcomes to
families that trickle in during the arrival period. Good results
are found with unit-sponsored group activities for multiple
arrivals early in the COHORT unit life cycle. Families coming in
at odd times appear to fall through the cracks of existing
reception efforts. Prompt reception methods that do not overtax
unit resources are needed. It appears that a key facility for
receiving newcomers is the installation guesthouse where families
stay for up to a month or more upon arrival at Fort Ord.
Research will focus on how the guesthouse can be used to create
initial good impressions among family members.

(b) Unit-to-family welcoming efforts need to achieve
improved coordination with installation agency-based orientation
and in-processing services. At times the formal in-processing
procedures and informal unit welcoming activities overlap but do
not connect; in other cases they conflict, and cause confusion
amongst new family members about household living conditions.
Research will focus on areas of coordination between military
unit and installation agency efforts, e.g., ACS orientation
procedures versus unit provision of information, or Housing
Office assistance vis-a-vis unit efforts to find apartments for
soldier families on the local economy. A concept paper on this
issue will be circulated for review by unit and installation
personnel.

n. Issue: Predictability of Soldier and Unit Work Hours.

(1) Observations: Predictability of soldier working hours in garrison helps maintain family morale and spousal support for heavy military demands on soldier time.

(a) Enlisted and officer wives express a need to be able to anticipate garrison work hours on a daily and weekly basis in order to plan family meals and other off-duty activities. Soldiers maintain that while details extraneous to 7th ID(L) training needs have been minimized, they experience the 'hurry up and wait'syndrome at the end of the duty day.

(b) Some spouses lack confidence in the predictability of garrison work schedules or in the reliability of scheduled duty hours.

(2) Discussion:

(a) Quality time for soldiers to spend with their family members is treated as a very scarce resource by spouses, especially due to the large portion of time spent by units in the field. The opportunity to utilize evenings and weekends, holidays and leave, and compensation and recovery time in a planned way is often more important to wives and children than their stated preference for shorter workdays by the soldier's unit.

(b) Although commanders are interested in shortening workdays, all too often intervening factors within the chain of command force elongation of the workday. Repetitive loss of anticipated off-duty time raises levels of uncertainty and distress unnecessarily, resulting in loss of trust in commanders and a decline in morale by soldiers and family members. These conditions contribute to destabilization of family interaction patterns at home and increase family stress.

(3) Future Research:

(a) Research on the issue of military unit predictability will focus on the distinction between quality time needed by soldiers with family members and the quantity of time required by 7th ID(L) units in training and garrison duty.

It is expected that married men, especially those in early stages of conjugal relationships, will experience the greatest spousal demands on their time. However, more seasoned cadre whose families have adapted to Army work schedules should exhibit effective ways to cope with Army time constraints. Comparisons will be made across the rank structure in this study. (See Soldier/Unit Issue c., above.)

(b) A second major issue for future research is the operational reality that could facilitate more regular and shorter work hours in garrison. Multiple requirements on unit commanders tend to delay departure from duty at the end of the day. Research will address how COHORT soldiers respond to the pressures of long duty hours. This is critical since early release from duty can become a reward for unit performance. However, equity in duty time across companies is also an issue; fairness norms are often set by the group process itself.

o.   Issue: The effect of TDY Separations on Family Stability.

(1)   Observations: Separations due to field exercises of 7th Light Infantry units affect family stability. Research team interviews at Fort Ord and Fort Hunter Liggett show that field duty time can impair family member relationships with soldiers and upset household functioning. Causes of separation stress are of three main types:

(a)   Too frequent separations have cumulative effects on family functioning.

(b)   Soldier absences during major family crises or critical life changes cause distress.

(c)   Long duration field stays disestablish the role played by a soldier in his household, causing re-entry problems, and may overwhelm spousal coping capacity.

(2)   Discussion: WRAIR survey data and interviews demonstrate the potential for adverse impacts due to military field time demands that absent the soldier from his nuclear family. Examples of this effect appeared during the training period for 7th ID(L) COHORT units, mainly among recently married enlisted soldiers with wives and very young children. In several cases wives were unable to handle household crises alone, or women in late stages of pregnancy were put at risk. A few were upset by incidents of telephone harrassment or 'peeping toms' during their husbands' field absences.

(a)   Immediate or extended family deaths or serious illnesses add stress to the situation for soldiers in the field. However, commanders have responded by quickly returning men with family emergencies to Fort Ord and providing passes to help alleviate these concerns. Battalion command policies on what constitutes a family emergency were found to vary considerably. COHORT soldiers' desire for equitable treatment of individuals tests the limits of each commander's policy on excusing a soldier from field exercises for family or personal problems.

(b)   When field time is recurrent and frequent, as required in the training cycle of the Light Infantry, evidence from previous WRAIR research suggests that cumulative disruptions of household life may seriously degrade marital bonds and parental-child rapport. Well-spaced periods of unit activity in garrison permit a recovery phase that is also beneficial to family functioning. Off-duty recovery time is also a way used by some commanders to help soldiers reintegrate into their family life.

(c)   Some commanders encourage education of all family members, as well as soldiers, on how to prepare for departure and for re-entry from the field.   Downtime and off-duty time permit recovery of family solidarity through shared activities.   Skill in use of downtime may be enhanced through unit-sponsored information and outreach education efforts directed at family members.

(3)   Future Research: Light Infantry commanders have various ways of handling separation and re-entry problems to buffer their soldiers and family members against disabling effects of stress.   The research team will monitor the impacts of these interventions through longitudinal survey measures of spousal attitudes as well as soldier perceptions.   A concept paper will describe unit innovations for overcoming TDY separation stress. The concept paper will be circulated among commanders, as well as married soldiers and their wives, to stimulate emergence of a broadened recognition of separation stress and tools to counteract it.

p. Issue: Family-to-unit Bonding and Family Support Groups.

(1) Observations: Unit-sponsored Family Support Groups (FSG) can strengthen "soldier will" by alleviating family distress. Participation in Family Support Group organizations is contingent on an atmosphere of openness that de-emphasizes hierarchical rank differences among spouses. Successful Family Support Group integration with military units requires persistent command backing at each organizational level.

(a) Interview data suggest that COHORT battalions and company units provide a favorable climate for the emergence of family support activities volunteered by unit spouses.

(b) Family-to-unit bonding and cohesion among spouses does not occur spontaneously within units. Planned activities, calculated to generate reciprocal sentiments, are essential to help family members identify with their sponsor's Family Support Group, and to help them understand its potential role in their lives.

(c) Wives of enlisted men express strong feelings about their status in FSG functions. They are wary of situations where wives of officers and NCOs "wear their husbands' rank." However, when wives of leaders do not participate, FSG activities languish. Two-thirds of married soldiers in COHORT units are junior NCOs. They also have the largest family size. Their family needs include increased social support. About a quarter of 7th LID families are those of first-term enlisted men. They also experience many problems which can be addressed with the help of a unit Family Support Group.

(d) Data from interviews shows that willingness to participate in a unit Family Support Group's activities depends on creation of a sense of mutual reciprocity and non-judgemental confidentiality about each family's personal problems.

(2) Discussion: Heavy users of FSG referral and direct assistance are not usually the same spouses who volunteer for group activities. The main receivers of support action are wives of junior NCO and enlisted men with children, who live off-post and have no local ties. The main contributors are usually wives seasoned to Army life, living on post. This asymmetric interactive situation creates strains within developing Family Support Groups. Those who are willing to contribute expect more mutuality of effort from recipients.

(a)   The Light Infantry COHORT unit is well-situated to undergird the development and maintenance of functional Family Support Groups through initial command sponsorship and personal support by commanders' wives at each level. Commanders' wives usually recognize the value of projecting an inviting and democratic atmosphere in the process of establishing and advancing FSG objectives. If perceived as "rank-free" in style, FSG groups receive more participation from enlisted spouses. Domination by a perceived "wives chain of command" works against this goal.

(b)   The unit size and composition best able to operate effectively as a group of spouses is the company. A COHORT company usually includes at least three dozen resident married soldiers at Fort Ord.   But, the tightest inter-family links usually emerge between spouses of soldiers in the same platoon of similar rank. Company-level FSG formation generates group cohesion across ranks as well as within ranks when organized with sensitivity to the feelings of enlisted men's wives.

(c)   Command emphasis from the division level (provided informally through leadership by the division commander's wife and battalion commanders' wives) provides a positive climate for the creation and stimulation of Family Support Groups at the battalion level and below. A battalion commander's commitment to the promotion of functional family support organization and coordination with his staff is critical to the growth and survival of this largely voluntary organization. The company commander and first sergeant and their wives are also crucial. But, if FSG support comes only at the company level, turnover in leadership, variations in levels of voluntary interest by members, or personality clashes may result in problems. Problem areas may be inactivity of company FSG memberships or conflict between FSG volunteers and the chain of command over the proper role of the FSG. Assertive FSG members may challenge commanders to negotiate policy changes. The operations of the FSG council - composed of company representatives at the battalion level - serves a stabilizing and focusing function to stimulate FSG consistency across companies and to channel the perceived concerns of spouses to the appropriate level of command.

(d)   The authorized purpose of the FSG is to assist family members with information and limited types of personal help, and to provide a support network for family members while units are away at field duty. However, some FSGs expand service activity beyond Army-authorized scopes of work and responsibilities. This may lead to improvements in family-unit cohesion in some cases. It may also contribute to conflict or confusion amongst members or sub-groups if FSG goals and mandates are not clearly communicated to unit and family members.

(e) It is not uncommon that many single soldiers living in the barracks benefit from various Family Support Group activities aimed at offering morale support to all unit soldiers. These include cakes and cookies at the barracks when soldiers come back from the field, and FSG and unit planned social 'gatherings. Single soldiers may be requested to provide labor and resources to assist with FSG functions at unit facilities, e.g., babysitting services, preparation of flyers and written announcements, and help with FSG dinners and party preparations.

(f) Monetary donations by single soldiers at FSG-sponsored unit events tend to become significant budgetary resources for the organization. Significant in-kind donations by married soldiers' wives take the form of baked goods and services such as sewing tags and patches on uniforms. These reciprocal exchanges build the basis for family-unit goodwill and social support if there is consistent command backing for the Family Support Group efforts.

(3) Future Research: A major goal of WRAIR future research will be to assess the linkages between "soldier will" (and unit preparedness for combat) and Family Support Group effectiveness in reducing the stress on family members and building group morale. Developments in new and mature FSG organizations at Fort Ord will be monitored to test the impact of these linkages. Concept papers on these subjects will be prepared and circulated to unit FSG members and the Study Advisory Group.

(a) The dynamics of FSG formation, and the functional requisites for maintenance of FSG usefulness across the life-cycle of COHORT units, will be major research areas and the subject of concept papers and reports. Key objectives for analysis will be to assess the relationships between family coping capacity and stress reduction through family-to-unit bonding. The linkage of these processes to command and community domains will be studied. (See Family/Unit/Community Issue q., below.)

(b) Data on NCO family members' links to FSG activities are as yet scanty. Future research will specifically address the stresses experienced by these types of families. Analysis will be performed in tandem with observation of the stress experienced by NCOs in garrison and in the field. (See Soldier/Unit Issue h., above.)

q. **Issue: The Family Support Group At the Interface Between Command and Family.**

(1) **Observations:** In the 7th ID(L), the family support group (FSG) is visibly promoted by top command as a vital bridge between Army families and the unit. In each unit, the FSG also may be required to link models of expectations and behavior rooted in divergent traditions.

(a) Commanders at most levels recognize that when a light fighter trains fifty percent of the time in the field and therefore away from his family, the family needs access to reliable sources of practical information, emotional support, and basic social services. The FSG, an organization that is created anew in each newly formed unit, is an officially endorsed auxiliary to the unit that is designed to provide, or to facilitate acquiring, the necessary information, support, or services. To accomplish these tasks, the FSG works in concert with the unit families, command, rear detachment command, and Fort Ord community services.

(b) Brigade and battalion commanders at Fort Ord praise the ability of FSG's, in general, to handle routine referrals for information and assistance. This frees up command to concentrate on mission-related planning or on personnel actions that require command decisions. In several battalions, the roles of the S1/Rear Detachment Commander and of the Chaplain have evolved into consultants to battalion FSG's, as anticipated in the Fort Ord FSG regulation.

(2) **Discussion:** In the past, a traditional military command structure typically ignored the importance of family relationships. In that environment, the two institutions of the Army and the family competed for the individual soldier's limited time, energy, and devotion. The FSG may be seen as one attempt to bridge these competing institutions. Supportive services, such as the Army Community Services and more recently the Family Support Group concept, were created to actively alleviate the stresses on families so that families can support the Army's basic readiness mission.

(a) Paradoxically, as FSG's demonstrate proficiency in handling family crises and in planning successful morale-enhancing activities, some commanders may begin to perceive the FSG as a threat to their authority. The sense of threat is heightened if the women express opinions about matters that involve traditional command perogatives, such as requesting written command policies on predictable and equitable work schedules or desiring to negotiate acceptable reasons for excusing soldiers from garrison or field duty to attend to family needs.

(b) On the other hand, the commander and senior NCO at the company or battalion level who do not feel threatened by the activities of their FSG can draw upon support of unit wives as morale boosters for all the soldiers. The short-term effect is that the unit leaders can develop a group of advisers and extra hands to tackle salient unit-family issues; the long-term effect for the Army is a demonstrated higher retention rate among their troops.

(3) <u>Future Research</u>: The research team will continue to follow the development of several family support group efforts at the battalion and company levels. In addition, the team will observe the FSG program as an example of a high-priority command-endorsed community service project designed to support and complement the Light Fighter thrust in the units.

r. Issue: Fort Ord Community and Command Social Context.

(1) Observations: National and regional media frequently broadcast news coverage on the living conditions of soldiers and their families at Fort Ord. This magnifies public interest in their situation and contributes to a "spotlight effect", amplifying Department of the Army concern about the appropriate development of the Light Infantry divisions and of COHORT.

(2) Discussion:

(a) 7th Light Infantry commanders view their units as prototypes for the Army of the future. They attempt to achieve training perfection and to project a sharp professional public image. These efforts at 'overachievement' or 'eliteness' may become powerful stressors on enlisted soldiers and their family members. In turn, family members may develop distorted perceptions of the deficits in their quality of life and degree of household distress in this pressure-cooker atmosphere.

(b) The spotlight also falls on installation agencies at Fort Ord which manage the infrastructure and provide benefits to soldier families. These include the housing office, the engineers, the shopping facilities, the health-care system and the social and welfare services. Conflicts between installation and division or incongruities between fast-developing combat units and more stable installation agencies may be highlighted by the glare of publicity.

(3) Future Research: WRAIR plans to study the human responses to this spotlight effect at Fort Ord as part of its analysis of soldier and unit performance. The issue of family resilience in coping with the special conditions of life at Fort Ord in the COHORT Light Infantry will be examined as part of the social context, a major element in our study. Data analysis will combine community relations and group symbolic expressions, studied by interview and observation, with survey results on individual attitudes and perceptions among soldiers and their spouses. (See D. Marlowe, Chapter IV, this report.)

4. Study Projections

   a. During the reconnaissance phase of the evaluation of the Light Infantry Division, the research team developed a list of topics that appeared suitable for development as "concept papers," defined here as essays or information papers written around specific themes that revea something new about the Army, or she' new light on a traditional idea. These topics appear below :n two categories--soldier/unit themes and family/unit/community themes--with topics in order of research priority.

   b. Soldier/Unit Themes:

Unit welcome to soldiers

Accouterments and unit symbols

NCO problems in COHORT units

Soldier recovery periods, downtime, and burnout

Command integrity

Junior enlisted soldier career information and options

Unit life-cycles

Group misconduct in COHORT units

Role relations and teaching-learning rapport among
   NCO's and officers; training new lieutenants

Predictability in COHORT units and optimizing duty time

Impression management: looking good vs. being good

COHORT units and the "spotlight effect" on soldiers

   c. Family/Unit/Community Themes

Unit information transmission to families

Unit welcome to family members

Quality family time

Health, social services, and benefits available:
   integration with unit to meet family needs

Activist vs. passive agency and unit approaches to
   familial problems of soldiers

c. Family/Unit/Community Themes (cont.)

Spouse employment and volunteer work among COHORT unit spouses

Daily life activities of COHORT soldier family members, family stress, and coping skills

Functioning and innovation in family support groups

Housing dilemmas on- and off-post for COHORT families

COHORT units and the "spotlight effect" on families